Resumo

LIMONGI, Fernando  e  FIGUEIREDO, Argelina. The budget process and legislative behavior: individual amendments, support for the executive, and government programs.Traduzido porSandra Gomes. Dados [online]. 2006, vol.2Selected edition, pp. 0-0. ISSN 0011-5258.

The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.

Palavras-chave : budget; Executive Branch; Legislative behavior; budget amendments.

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