Mariza Peirano

Universidade de Brasília – Brasil

Translated by Mariza Peirano
Translated from Horizontes Antropológicos, Porto Alegre, v.15, n.32, p. 53-80, July/Dec. 2009.

ABSTRACT

Keywords: Eliot Spitzer, ethnography, ID theft, United States.

RESUMO

No mundo moderno, documentos são objetos indispensáveis, sem os quais não conseguimos demonstrar que somos quem dizemos que somos. Precisamos de provas materiais que atestem a veracidade da nossa autoidentificação. Este artigo relata a experiência de pesquisa sobre documentos de identidade nos Estados Unidos, por meio de dois eventos em que Eliot Spitzer, governador do estado de Nova Iorque de janeiro de 2007 a março de 2008, foi figura central, e nos quais os documentos foram um subtexto importante. Uma comparação com o caso brasileiro está presente ao longo do artigo, que termina examinando o fenômeno conhecido como ID theft.

Palavras-chave: Eliot Spitzer, Estados Unidos, etnografia, ID theft.

As we all know, fieldwork does not begin in a chosen place or at a particular moment; it takes place within us, when we mobilize a specific sensibility ― that "jeweler's eye", as Fischer (2009) would term it. A daily event becomes a native expression, revealing that ethnography is not defined according to the means of communication, but rather by the purpose to which the observation is submitted.

²

When I thought I could leave for the United States at the end of 2007, I received an email from the officer of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Columbia University, to which I would be affiliated for the following six months, in which she apologized for asking me for another document to complete all the necessary paperwork. She explained to me that Columbia had separated ("un-attached" was her term) all personal information from the respective social security numbers,. So,  as a way of "matching" a person to his/her documents, the International Office then required a copy of my passport with the application. This new regulation had just come out to her.

This was truly the beginning of my fieldwork about documents and processes of identification in the US. Sufficiently familiarized with the country's immigration bureaucracy after many years of to-ing and fro-ing, this simple email revealed new, relevant dimensions I was not aware of ― I was dealing with an "ethnographic fact" even before arriving in the "field". After all, identification procedures change, they are dynamic, despite the invariable and immutable character with which we tend to view them. This was a singular change since a passport is far more complex in semiotic terms than a social security card. A passport includes name, photo, number, filiation, birth date, signature, issue date in the country of origin, and the American visa. On the contrary, the social security number, although part of a national database, is simply a card with a name and a number (similar to the Brazilian CPF).

My interest in processes of identification began in the 1980s, in the context of a research on the impact of the governmental "program of debureaucratization" of the time in small towns (Peirano 1986). A second phase expanded it to the universe of official papers in Brazil, in which I tried to unravel the semantics of ID documents and the role of redundancy in these objects (Peirano 2006). This was when I realized that some aspects of the American case were in sharp contrast to those in Brazil.³

In the absence of a national ID card in the US, the driver's license fully takes on this role ― but this is a state-issued ID and not compulsory, although one can apply for a non-driver's license.⁴ As in Brazil, the birth certificate serves as the origin of all other papers, among which is the social security number. But this number, contrary to our CPF, which we make public all the time, must be kept secret, given the danger of fraud and "ID theft" (more on this below). Compared to Brazilians, Americans are born, live and die with few documents.⁵ After the World Trade Center terrorist attack, new legislation established that, by 2013, a sort of national ID known as the Real ID will be mandatory for several activities, such as boarding a plane, entering federal buildings, crossing particular borders. But this legislation faces great reaction from the states that should implement them, and from the population who retort to it in the name of civil rights and liberties. So, while in Brazil, we complain of the excesses of bureaucracy and of the oppression of IDs´ redundancy, in the US, the configuration of existing documents indicates the opposite pole. And if the social security number is the main identification of a person, kept in secret and protected from foreign eyes, this is the context in which the values of the "modern fact", with its emphasis on numbers as neutral and apolitical, have caught on in exemplary terms.⁶

Latour (2007: 204-13) indicates that IDs are kinds of plug-ins. Using computer terminology and analogy, IDs are like software that allow us to see an image, listen to music, watch a DVD. They make visible what was just virtual and help eliminate the local/global dichotomy. They could be called subjectifiers, personnalizers, or  individualisers, but he prefers the more neutral term of plug-ins.⁷ My general orientation follows a somewhat different path: it is because I believe that form and content are inseparable, there is no impartial, neutral or meaningless technology; they always belong to cosmologies.⁸ This is the challenge of this essay, and, with this objective in mind, I examine two events in which Eliot Spitzer, the governor of the state of New York during the period January 2007 to March 2008, was a central figure. Considered one of the most brilliant politicians of his generation, in two crucial moments his career was shattered by events that had their subtext in identification processes. First, however, I will make a brief digression to say something about the place of ethnography in contemporary anthropological research.  

Ethnography today

Nowadays, ethnography has been receiving renewed interest in a context in which anthropology has apparently lost its appeal. In the centers of intellectual production, ethnography preempts the idea of an anthropology lately denounced by "incorrect" power relations between researchers and natives, which were the hallmark of its beginnings. In the former research sites too, ethnography is also now adopted while anthropology remains impure, thus eliminating the moral weight due to having had their population scrutinized by western ethnologists. But, more often than not, it is its methodological aspects that are considered proper, correct and untainted regarding the anthropological past and, so, it is exported to other areas of investigation, such as sociology, history, human geography, philosophy.⁹

A sui generis phenomenon occurs ― at the same time that the "Traditional Model of Ethnography" is under attack in the emblematic figure of Malinowski, it is his own invention, fieldwork and/or ethnography, that are now being established as the great legacy of anthropology. But emphasis on the method ― be it in its critique or renewed version ― leaves aside precisely the great lesson Malinowski left us, i.e., that it is not possible to separate the ethnographic perspective from its implicit theoretical dimension. Malinowski was adamant in searching for the Trobriand theories of magic, language, myths etc., which would eventually be translated into a native cosmology populated by common men, witches, chiefs, canoes, bracelets, rocks, magic spells, all of them moving on the sea, flying in the air and anchoring on earth. Ethnographic description with theoretical ambitions contrasted with sociological analysis, which Malinowski considered subsidiary, because, for him, sociology ― as "the view from outside" ― dismissed the search for the "native's point of view," which was the hallmark of anthropology.¹⁰

The first Spitzer's controversy: IDs for immigrants

Due to the daily reading of The New York Times via Internet, when, on March 2008,  Eliot Spitzer shocked New Yorkers with his sudden resignation as governor of the state, his name and a bit of his career were not totally strange to me: in late 2007, the young, brilliant, faultless Democrat governor of the state issued an executive order directing state offices to allow illegal immigrants to be issued driver's licenses, effective as of December 2007. Applicants for driver's licenses would not be required to prove legal immigration status and would be allowed to present a foreign passport as identification. Proof of residence would also be required. The door was opened to make illegal immigrants, legal. Without a national ID card, the driver's license is in fact its substitute.

Spitzer's executive order stressed other aspects. In a state with more than 500,000 foreigners, Spitzer said that the new policy would help all New Yorkers by improving traffic safety ― unlicensed drivers are nearly five times as likely to be in fatal car crashes compared to licensed drivers. At the same time, by allowing an immigrant a driver's license, this would bring him or her out of the shadows,  indirectly helping the country's security. Proof of residence would prevent a flood of requests from outside the state, and the use of high technology to compare photos would make it impossible for a driver to have more than one license.

The proposal was unusual. After  9/11, many states oriented themselves in the opposite direction, increasing the requirements to hamper illegal immigrants applying for a driver's license, which, as we remember, made it possible for terrorists to embark on the planes. But Spitzer argued that the Department of Motor Vehicles was not an immigration and naturalization service. He also reminded that the social security card and the birth certificate ― the IDs generally required to create others ― do not include a photo and, for this reason, easily become objects of fraud. Giving a false social security number is one of the easiest ways for an illegal immigrant to get a job.¹¹

Immediate reactions

Reactions were immediate, despite the fact that the public was used to Spitzer's proposals.¹² Jubilant immigrants from community organizations waved banners and shouted their approval as soon as Spitzer delivered the news, but other organizations such as the 9/11 Families for a Secure America considered it insane and threatened to make the governor responsible in the event of a new terrorist attack. During the seven weeks after the governor had issued the bill on September 21, 2007, the proposal was judged, debated, discussed, and finally removed on November 13.

During those weeks, the Catholic conference of the state of New York, which represents the state's Catholic bishops on matters of public policy, released a statement supporting Spitzer's plan to allow illegal immigrants to obtain New York driver's licenses. Spitzer also had a good number of unions and other organizations lining up behind him. Some days later, some terrorism and security experts also voiced their support, saying it would help bring a hidden population into the open and ultimately make the system more secure, not to mention getting more drivers on the roads licensed and insured.¹³ Meanwhile, opponents decried Spitzer's move as a "passport to terror" since the technology to compare faces could not be relied on for verifying people's true identity. Republican officials threatened to boycott the bill, while Republican legislators threatened to block the policy, saying the governor did not have the statutory authority to act on his own. Spitzer called the reactions hysterical: "We are not talking about letting more people into this country; we are talking about being practical about those who are already here".¹⁴

Senator Hillary Clinton, at the time the candidate with more chance to become the Democrat nominee for the presidential election, on being asked about what she thought of Spitzer's policy to allow illegal immigrants to get driver's licenses, was at a loss as to how to reply. She said the policy "makes a lot of sense", but did not quite say she approved Spitzer's plan, acknowledging that sometimes a state must do what the federal government fails to do. The situation got no better in terms of a host of pros and cons: approved by the instances of security and counter-terrorism ― which always prefer identification over anonymity, criticized by Republicans and then Democrats alike, threatened by the officers of the administration who said they would not implement it, by the end of October the bill was considered the single most unpopular decision since Spitzer took office: in October 23, eight Democrat state senators voted against it,  in a vote result that was 39 to 19 against the motion.¹⁵

Spitzer did not give up. To save the central idea, he changed the proposal twice. First, he accepted that the license for illegal immigrants would have a different appearance from the others, and would be restricted to the purpose of driving vehicles, i.e., not valid for federal purposes. Besides, the cost would be less than for the standard one.¹⁶ The usual driver's license, in turn, would be upgraded in anticipation of the Real ID legislation.¹⁷

But the new proposal continued to displease Democrats and Republicans, as well as lawyers representing immigrants. For the latter, the new license would stigmatize those who carry it and could potentially make the police suspicious. Meanwhile, the Real ID federal identification system had faced intense opposition from civil libertarians, immigration advocates and many lawmakers. The basic concerns focused on privacy protection and the costs to states of implementing it.¹⁸ A third attempt consisted of an alternative kind of license, restricted to New Yorkers and which would allow residents to cross the border to Canada. In this version of the plan, licenses for foreigners would have the visa expiration date stamped on them. But, in this case, the lawyers said, illegal immigrants would be unlikely to apply for licenses, defeating Spitzer's original purpose.

The following two weeks were crucial for the destiny of the proposal. Republicans criticized the arrogance of the governor's insistence on giving driver's licenses to illegal aliens, thus entwining the driver's license issue with the debate over immigration.¹⁹ For their turn, Democrats questioned if Spitzer's proposal had not given the Bush administration a political victory by supporting the Real ID proposal. The plan was crushed when those who had initially supported it felt betrayed by the inclusion of expiry dates for foreigners' visas.²⁰

A national controversy

Initially a question of impact on the residents of New York, by the beginning of November, the proposal had become a national issue, especially due to the spread of the antagonical positions of known radio and cable TV commentators, including those who considered themselves politically independent.²¹ When the discussion reached the debate for the presidential succession, Democrat congressmen tried to convince Spitzer to shelve the idea; at the same time, a top aide to the secretary of Homeland Security showed concern that the Spitzer plan would undermine the federal initiative to roll out a new, highly secure, nationally recognized license. The plan was upsetting everybody and became hugely unpopular. A rising national star just a year before, Spitzer had become isolated within his own party.²² On November 13, a poll showed that 70% of the New York residents were opposed to the plan, and, on this same day, Spitzer announced that he was dropping it. But he was still showing his reluctance: "You have perhaps seen me struggle with it because I thought we had a principled decision, and it's not necessarily easy to back away from trying to move a debate forward."²³

Who is Eliot Spitzer?

At this point, a twofold clarification is necessary: first, why the driver's license was such an issue at the end of 2007; and second, who is Eliot Spitzer.

In the modern world, IDs are indispensable items, without which we cannot prove that we are who we say we are. We need material substantiation that attests to the authenticity of our self-identification because we cannot, by ourselves, prove it. Our word is not enough.²⁴ The American driver's license acquires its importance in this context. Among the documents available in the US ― and in the absence of a national ID card ( to some extent represented by the Real ID project, cf. footnote 17) ― the driver's license is the document that most approximates to the ideal redundancy of an ID card. This redundancy should include the three different kinds of signs defined by Charles Peirce as the icon, the index and the symbol.²⁵ The idea that an ID refers to a single person means that the process of matching the person and the document must  be carried out with a maximum guarantee of success. For this reason, redundancy is essential. This explains why, we now realize, Columbia International Office detached ("un-attached") the personal information from the social security number, and, in its place, required the passport, a "more redundant" ID (as redundant as the driver's license, for instance).²⁶

This is the context in which we can understand Spitzer's role in the driver's license controversy. A rising star in the national political scene, he was considered by many as potentially the first Jewish president of the US, his victory as a governor of New York having been obtained by the largest margin of any other candidate to the state, 69% of the votes. Born in 1959, son of a real state tycoon, he attended Princeton University for his undergraduate studies and Harvard to study Law. As a state Attorney General before the election, Spitzer prosecuted cases relating to corporate white collar crime, securities fraud, Internet fraud and environmental protection. He pursued cases against companies involved in computer chip price fixing, predatory lending practices by mortgage lenders, and became known as the "sheriff of Wall Street" for revealing business conflicts involving stock analysts at Merrill Lynch. In 2004, he oversaw a task force to arrest 18 people involved in a prostitution ring on Staten Island, and, in 2005, filed a civil complaint against the chief executive of the AIG for violations of insurance and securities laws. When he was elected the 58^th governor of New York, he promised to "change the ethics of Albany", and pledged reforms "substantial in size and historic in scope".²⁹

Considered arrogant by many, when criticized by Michael Bloomberg, the mayor of New York, on the issue of the immigrants' driver's licenses, he was emphatic in saying that the mayor was "factually wrong, legally wrong, morally wrong, and ethically wrong". When he finally announced that he had dropped his bid to offer licenses more widely, even then he said his was a good idea.³⁰

This good idea was hindered, first by the antagonism between the federal regulation and the state legislation in the American system, in this particular case reinforced by the bi-partidarism between the Bush administration federal law on the Real ID and the Democrat idea that national IDs penalized the poor and the elderly.³¹ Second, it made clear how identification has two paradoxically complementary aspects: on the one hand, they allow their holders several privileges in relation to those who are undocumented; on the other, they submit the holders to constant external control, taking from them several private rights.³² Spitzer emphasized the first aspect: by granting illegal immigrants driver's licenses he was in fact allowing them to hold some sort of legal status, and in this sense he felt factually, legally, morally and ethically correct: by putting their picture in a legal card, he was giving immigrants a "face". On the other hand, the Federal Department of Homeland Security, initially also approved the proposal exactly because it increased its control over the population: for government identification is always better than anonymity. These two sides of identification papers were constantly present in the weeks during which the debate took place, represented by opposed political parties and debated, first, within the context of the large problem of immigration, and second, within the cultural values of freedom and individual rights. But there is another paradox related to identification, and it refers to its dynamic aspect: we tend to consider that documents are papers frozen in time, but actually they are constantly changing both individually ― for instance, in the process of inclusion of new data by means of new technologies, as everywhere the new passports confirm ― and in the historical configuration of the available sorts of documentation in a particular country, including their hierarchy ― for instance, the social security number is substituted by the passport as a requirement for foreigners to become affiliated to Columbia University, the driver's license gives way to the Real ID in official terms.

Spitzer's true error: the photo in the media

The second episode, with a tragic Shakespearean aspect (as often mentioned), occurred in the afternoon of March 10, 2008, when, in a "breaking news" edition, The New York Times announced that governor Eliot Spitzer was linked to a high-priced prostitution ring, a piece of news that spread rapidly throughout the city.³³

The revelation shocked New Yorkers who considered it more than unforgivable ― it was incomprehensible. If Eliot Spitzer had been caught on a federal wiretap arranging to meet with a high-priced prostitute at a Washington hotel, nobody could be trusted. Eliot Spitzer was the example of a public figure among politicians. For the next two days, headlines of printed and electronic news centered on this unique scandal, which could eventually even affect the presidential dispute then in course. Open television had constant updates and cable television saw the number of viewers increasing, Wall Street was said to be celebrating (as an attorney, Spitzer had denounced speculators), there was discussion about if it was a private or a public matter, if the payments involved campaign funds, whether Spitzer would resign or be impeached ― everybody wanted to know why this young, serious, ambitious politician, with an exemplary marriage and family, had committed such a mistake.³⁴ On March 12, after two long days in which the news was focused on the affair, Eliot Spitzer announced his resignation with his wife at his side saying: "I cannot allow my private failings to disrupt the people's work. Over the course of my public life, I have insisted ― I believe correctly ― that people take responsibility for their conduct. I can and will ask no less of myself. For this reason, I am resigning from the office of governor." New Yorkers remained stunned for several weeks, with the help of the media, which discussed not only the case but also topics like lying in politics, the "fashion" of public apologies, infidelity in marriage and so on. ³⁵

The revelation that Spitzer was linked to a prostitution ring began in a routine examination of suspicious financial transactions reported to the Internal Revenue Service by banks, which found several unusual movements of cash involving the governor of New York. Because the focus of the investigation involved a high-ranking government official, prosecutors were required to seek the approval of the United States Attorney General to proceed. That was when the investigators learned that the money was not related to political corruption, which was a possibility that the IRS considered, but was being used to pay for prostitution, manipulated in a way so as to conceal Spitzer's connection. Spitzer was Client 9, recognized as the governor by a young woman who had worked previously as a prostitute for the Emperor's Club. A judge approved wiretaps on the cell phone of some of those suspected of involvement in the escort service. Though this was hardly a criminal case, this possibility could not be ruled out given the fact that he could be charged with human trafficking (from New York to Washington) with the purpose of prostitution, an argument used by Spitzer himself when he prosecuted illicit rings.³6 In 2007, the governor had signed one of the most rigorous and comprehensive laws against sexual trafficking. Now the human rights groups that had applauded him before began to accuse him of becoming one of those his own law was destined to punish.³⁷

Client 9 had spent thousands of dollars in uncommon transactions, generally in cash or as deposits in a shell company, indicating the aim of hiding the source, the destination and the purpose of the money. Instead of his own name, Spitzer used a  friend's, George Fox ― who, later on, was surprised to find out the governor had used it. In the files of the Mayflower Hotel, on the night that incriminated him when he was already a suspect and being monitored, Spitzer gave his true address, in New York's Fifth Avenue. But, during the months of transactions with the Emperor's Club, he had never revealed his identity.³⁸ The payment of almost 5,000 dollars for the February date was made to the girl in cash. Avoiding being recognized was a clear concern in his behavior during the contacts with the Club.

Identification and recognition are not the same.³⁹ We all need identification to prove who we are ― papers, documents, IDs, some legal material sign that points to us. But Spitzer needs no identification, he is recognized because his is a familiar face in the crowd. The usual photo that we have in our IDs, in wallets and pockets, in his case was as if magically dislocated, ending up in the media, in the newspapers and television. His image has a place in the public domain. He is thus recognized as the governor of New York by some of the girls from the Emperor's Club,⁴⁰ though it is not his involvement with prostitutes and their recognition of whom he actually is that make it a public scandal. For that to take place, recognition had to be translated into identification. His name, address, bank account, all had to be checked to prove who he really is. From then on, had been identified as Eliot Spitzer, then it was a case of inquiring whether his was a case of political corruption or criminal indictment for transporting a woman across states for the purpose of prostitution.

In terms of the American rules of identification, of all the elements (name, signature, photo), here again the photo seems to have been the key and marked one ― in the two episodes involving Spitzer, the first focused on the driver's license (with a photo), which he had proposed and had been rejected both by the political instances and by the residents of New York; the second episode developed around the absence of the photo, by which he believed he would escape identification. Even if Spitzer may have emotionally (even though not intellectually) felt that he was "above the law," in semiotic terms his real mistake was to believe that, outside the context of legal principles, i.e., without a document that proved who he was, the process of identification would not operate.⁴¹  He gives a friend's name, pays in cash, albeit offers his own address, and is is given a number (Client 9), instead of a name, by the prostitution ring. Curiously, in the first episode, Spitzer reveals himself as an innovator trying to legitimize those who live, with or without legal papers, in the US; in the second episode, he clings to common sense values about the de facto correlation between the documents and the person, as if what exists in the world is only what is registered on paper. In this context, Eliot Spitzer becomes the good example of the contemporary ambiguity towards an ID, including its dynamic and historical aspects.

⁴²

Six months after his resignation, an article in NYT described the new daily life of the former governor, as someone trying to rehabilitate his image. The newspaper reminded the readers of the "breathtaking quick exodus from office" saying how, one day he was a national figure some had seen destined for the White House; the next he was a target of ridicule. He now dedicated himself to work at his father's real estate firm, to jogging in Central Park , buying his own cup of coffee after dropping his daughters at the school bus stop.⁴³ The article mentions how the glare of the cameras outside his apartment had been replaced with moments of recognition in the Upper East Side neighborhood, where some people now ask for his autograph or offer him supportive words or smiles, and cabdrivers take pictures of him on their cell phones. He still does not need a "photo ID" to tell who he is.  

ID theft

The absence of a federal photo ID may be one important source for the expansion of a phenomenon known as ID theft.⁴⁴ Since the formal identity is basically predicated

Identity theft occurs when someone uses someone else's personal identifying information, like name, social security number, credit card number, without the victim's permission, to commit fraud or other crimes.⁴⁷ The Federal Trade Commission estimates that as many as 9 million people have their identities "stolen" each year in the US. With some of the victims' information, "identity thieves" may rent a house, obtain a credit card, obtain telephone lines, open bank accounts or take a loan in the victim's name, obtain government benefits, medical services, give the victim's personal information to police during an arrest, clone an ATM card.

⁴⁸

Among the possible crimes listed by the Federal Trade Commission, one has grave consequences, when the thief obtains a driver's license or any other official ID, uses the name of the victim and replaces the photograph. This "doubles" the person, which makes ID theft one of the most feared cases of fraud. Some consumers victimized by identity theft may lose job opportunities, or be denied loans for education, housing or cars because of negative information on their credit reports. In large cities, Americans in general zealously guard their social security numbers, birth certificates and driver's licenses, and are even obsessed with the destination of their domestic garbage, the Internet, the change of billing addresses ― all possible routes for ID theft. Many people thus contract private firms that offer protection. For the approximate price of 100 dollars a year, they keep alerts in the companies that control the credit history of consumers.⁴⁹

A contrast may help clarify ID theft: while in Brazil the cards are the doubles of people, which may be confirmed by looking at bakery cash desks and betting shops, which post missing ID cards on the glass, as if claiming their true owners, in the US this ordinary scene is unimaginable ― the documents are not people's doubles; the fact is that, in the US, there would be multiple cloning of the victim.⁵⁰

⁵¹

Once in a while, the NYT publishes some accounts about the anguish of those who become victims of ID theft. I'll provide two examples. The first was written by a psychiatrist and tells the story of a homeless man she meets in a shelter clinic, who describes the worry that is causing him insomnia. It all started when he pulled a muscle in his shoulder and went to a hospital emergency room. As usual, first a nurse came, and, after taking his vital signs, wrote them down on a chart with his name on it. When the doctor came, she mentioned the overdose detected on his last visit. The patient denied it; he had never had been in that hospital before; he does not "do"drugs. He is corrected by her because his chart says he had been transported in a stupor from a shelter across town. In the entry in his chart were his name, birth date and an accurate social security number. The doctor read them out loud to him. All were right, he admitted, but he had not been in that hospital before. Since he had actually been in that shelter, maybe someone had copied his information, though not stolen his wallet.

The doctor refuses to show him his medical information and the chart because she is in the surreal position of being asked to share privileged information about one patient with another patient who might or might not have been the same person. The homeless man is finally discharged without seeing the chart. When later on he asks for help to fight his insomnia, he gets the prescription but, before leaving, reflects on the nature of things: "Before my shoulder started hurting, life was easier." And he adds: "There was only one of me then." The account was written by the psychiatrist who saw him for his sleeping problem (Ely 2008).

⁵²

This feature of ID theft ― that the problem is not the forging of documents, but the duplication of the person, in the old Martin Guèrre style ― reappears in the second short story, described by the victim herself, Laura Dave. Finding herself in California for a friend's wedding, she calls her bank in New York to be sure that she can clear an important check. At this moment, the bank associate tells her that it would be impossible because her account is almost $10,000 overdrawn. She adds that the bank had received a call from her saying she was in Mexico, and asks: "Who are you?" She is a victim of ID theft.

Innocently, she thinks that some calls will solve the problem, but hears from a police officer: "Get ready, kid. Once someone gets a hold of your identity, you have to fight the good fight to get it back. This is just the beginning". From then on, she starts living in a situation in which she has to prove, by phone, to skeptical strangers at the other end of credit hot lines that she is who she says she is. In one of these epic calls, she discovers that the new Laura had not only emptied her bank account, but opened at least seven new credit card accounts in her name.

In a roadside coffee shop, upon hanging up her cell phone, a woman at a nearby table gives her a kind smile, and, having overheard her conversation, says that her sister-in-law had also gotten her identity stolen.""And it all turned out alright?", she asks. "Not really. It was a nightmare that went on for years". It is then that Laura gets back into her car and, on her way to Los Angeles, decides to go to Big Sur, where she remembers how happy she was there as a child on a trip with her father. She is also reminded of Henry Miller, who loved Big Sur and made it his home, who said: "Until we lose ourselves, there is no hope of finding ourselves." She is somehow peaceful at last. But before this happens, she imagines the other Laura walking around in Mexico, spending her money and even speaking to officials at her bank, all in an apparently convincing performance, and she, the real Laura, unable to tell a convincing story about who she is. Maybe the other is not a better candidate to be her...? (Dave 2008).

In the last week of the six months that I spent in the US, three people I know received letters related to a threat of ID theft to which they could be subjected due to loss of sensitive data: two letters were from a large bank and the third, from an important university. The bank had lost one of several boxes of data back-up tapes that were being transported to an off-site storage facility, containing name, postal address, social security number and share ownership information about the clients; the university had one archival database file containing the housing information of approximately 5,000 current and former undergraduate students, with names and social security numbers, found on a Google-hosted website ― which was immediately removed as soon as the fact was discovered. The letters notifying the bank clients and the university student offered them a free two-year subscription to a credit monitoring service that would notify them if certain suspicious activities could indicate identity theft.  

I close this essay noting that comparison, whether explicit or implicit, has been present throughout. The previous investigation into the Brazilian case made the US case, as often happens, not be the "model" to be emulated everywhere. On the contrary, the contrast exposed the vulnerability of its identification processes. The comparative aspects also revealed that to call IDs plug-ins, as does Latour, is quite   illuminating as long as we link them to cosmologies. They are these special amulets, wished-for items by some, restrictive and undesirable objects for others, our "doubles" of which we cannot lose sight. They have meaning, value, and life. The reaction to all types of centralized database is a feature of American cosmology, and it has consequences that not only affect American citizens, but, within today's financial context, for example, reach the rest of the world. I remember an offer that I received for a credit card from a large American bank. To apply for it I was expected to fill a simple detachable form and return it by mail with the following information: social security number, birth date, home phone and mother's maiden name. My name and address, the bank probably got from some other database. There was no requirement for a "photo ID".

References cited

CAPLAN, JANE. 2001. "This or that particular person": Protocols of identification in nineteenth-century Europe. In J. Caplan and J. Torpey (eds.) Documenting Individual Identity. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 49-66.

CHATTERJEE, PARTHA. 2002. A Princely Impostor? The strange and universal history of the Kumar of Bhawal. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

DAMATTA, ROBERTO. 2002. A mão visível do Estado. Notas sobre o significado cultural dos documentos na sociedade brasileira. Anuário Antropológico/99: 37-64.

DANIEL, ERNESTINE VALENTINE. 1996. Charred Lullabies. Chapters in an anthropography of violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

DAVE, LAURA. 2008. G.P.S. for my lost identity. The New York Times. January 20.

DAVIS, NATALIE ZEMON. 1983. The Return of Martin Guerre. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

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Received 02/26/2009
Approved 03/25/2009