<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0102-6909</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. bras. ciênc. soc.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0102-6909</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais - ANPOCS]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0102-69092010000100004</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The armed forces in Brazilian's constitutions: as forças armadas nas constituições nacionais]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[Autonomia na lei: i'armée dans les constitutions nationales]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="fr"><![CDATA[Autonomie dans la loi]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Mathias]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Suzeley]]></given-names>
</name>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Guzzi]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Andre]]></given-names>
</name>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="A">
<institution><![CDATA[,  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2010</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2010</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>5</volume>
<numero>se</numero>
<fpage>0</fpage>
<lpage>0</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0102-69092010000100004&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0102-69092010000100004&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0102-69092010000100004&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[This article discusses the differences between the function, the mission and the role of the Armed Forces across the different Brazilian Constitutions: from the "Imperial Constitution" of 1824 to the so-called "Citizen Constitution" of 1988. The hypothesis presented here is that military autonomy has been maintained by law, which makes it difficult to promote the military subordination necessary to consolidate Brazil's democratic regime.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[O objetivo do presente trabalho é analisar as diferenças entre função, missão e papel das Forças Armadas nas Cartas Constitucionais brasileiras, de 1824 a 1988. A hipótese discutida é que a disjunção consagrada constitucionalmente entre Lei e Ordem consolida uma limitação à democracia ao autorizar intervenções das Forças Armadas para além da Lei. Argumentamos que a autonomia militar, garantida pelas Cartas, dificulta sobremaneira a subordinação militar em relação ao poder civil, necessária à consolidação do regime democrático.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="fr"><p><![CDATA[L'objectif de ce travail est d'analyser les différences entre la fonction, la mission et le rôle de l'Armée dans les constitutions brésiliennes, de 1824 à 1988. L'hypothèse en discussion est que la disjonction consacrée constitutionnellement entre la Loi et l'Ordre consolide une limitation à la démocratie en autorisant des interventions dans l'Armée qui vont au-delà de la Loi. Nous défendons que l'autonomie militaire, garantie par les constitutions, rend très difficile la subordination militaire par rapport au pouvoir civil, car cette subordination est nécessaire à la consolidation du régime démocratique.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Brazil]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legislation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Armed Forces]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Constitution]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Autonomy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Democracy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Legislação]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Forças Armadas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Constituição]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Autonomia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Democracia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[Législation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[Armée]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[Constitution]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[Autonomie]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[Démocratie]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><body><![CDATA[  <font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="4"><b>The Armed Forces in   Brazilian's Constitutions<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><b><sup>1</sup></b></a></b></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>Autonomia na lei: as   for&ccedil;as armadas nas constitui&ccedil;&otilde;es nacionais</b></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>Autonomie dans   la loi: l'arm&eacute;e dans les constitutions nationales</b></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><b>Suzeley Mathias; Andre Guzzi</b></p>     <p>Translated by Andr&eacute; Cavaller Guzzi    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br>   Translation from <a href="http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-69092010000200003&lng=pt&nrm=iso" target="_blank"><b>Rev.     bras. Ci. Soc.,</b>&nbsp;vol.25&nbsp;no.73,&nbsp;S&atilde;o Paulo,&nbsp;June&nbsp;2010</a>.</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p> <hr size="1" noshade>     <p><b>ABSTRACT</b></p>     <p>This article discusses the differences between the   function, the mission and the role of the Armed Forces across the different   Brazilian Constitutions: from the "Imperial Constitution" of 1824 to the   so-called "Citizen Constitution" of 1988. The hypothesis presented here is that   military autonomy has been maintained by law, which makes it difficult to   promote the military subordination necessary to consolidate Brazil's democratic   regime.</p>     <p><b>Keywords: </b>Brazil, Legislation, Armed Forces, Constitution, Autonomy,   Democracy.</p> <hr size="1" noshade>      <p><b>RESUMO</b></p>     <p>O objetivo do presente trabalho &eacute; analisar as diferen&ccedil;as   entre fun&ccedil;&atilde;o, miss&atilde;o e papel das For&ccedil;as Armadas nas Cartas Constitucionais   brasileiras, de 1824 a 1988. A hip&oacute;tese discutida &eacute; que a disjun&ccedil;&atilde;o consagrada   constitucionalmente entre Lei e Ordem consolida uma limita&ccedil;&atilde;o &agrave; democracia ao   autorizar interven&ccedil;&otilde;es das For&ccedil;as Armadas para al&eacute;m da Lei. Argumentamos que a   autonomia militar, garantida pelas Cartas, dificulta sobremaneira a   subordina&ccedil;&atilde;o militar em rela&ccedil;&atilde;o ao poder civil, necess&aacute;ria &agrave; consolida&ccedil;&atilde;o do   regime democr&aacute;tico.</p>     <p><b>Palavras-chave:</b> Legisla&ccedil;&atilde;o; For&ccedil;as Armadas;   Constitui&ccedil;&atilde;o; Autonomia; Democracia.</p> <hr size="1" noshade>      <p><b>RESUM&Eacute;</b></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>L'objectif de ce travail est d'analyser les diff&eacute;rences   entre la fonction, la mission et le r&ocirc;le de l'Arm&eacute;e dans les constitutions   br&eacute;siliennes, de 1824 &agrave; 1988. L'hypoth&egrave;se en discussion est que la disjonction   consacr&eacute;e constitutionnellement entre la Loi et l'Ordre consolide une   limitation &agrave; la d&eacute;mocratie en autorisant des interventions dans l'Arm&eacute;e qui vont   au-del&agrave; de la Loi. Nous d&eacute;fendons que l'autonomie militaire, garantie par les   constitutions, rend tr&egrave;s difficile la subordination militaire par rapport au   pouvoir civil, car cette subordination est n&eacute;cessaire &agrave; la consolidation du   r&eacute;gime d&eacute;mocratique. </p>     <p><b>Mots-cl&eacute;s:</b> L&eacute;gislation; Arm&eacute;e; Constitution; Autonomie; D&eacute;mocratie.</p> <hr size="1" noshade>      <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>Introduction</b></font></p>     <p>The participation   of the Armed Forces in the Brazilian political process is a phenomenon that was   born along with the country. Even before independence from Portugal, military   leaders had significant participation and influence in Brazilian politics.   According to Oliveiros Ferreira (2000, p. 48-9), on June, 5<sup>th</sup>, 1821,   when the Emperor D. Pedro confronted the troop commander, Jorge de Avilez, <i>law</i> was opposed to <i>arms,</i> and <i>arms </i>determined the future of <i>law. </i> Civil   authority ceded to the military forces when the former, influenced by the   latter, forced Conde de Arcos to resign and named Judge &Aacute;lvares Diniz,   suggested by a commander, to replace him. This is one of many episodes of the   Brazilian history that illustrates the influence of the military forces in   politics and their interest in articulating what they understood as moral and   legitimate within the legal system of a certain time.</p>     <p>Along with the   discussion between the legal power of the state, embodied in Don Pedro I, and   the power of the Armed Forces, represented by the military that apparently   aimed at changing the government and imposing its own political alternative, there   is the construction of a personality trait, a tradition of the Brazilian Armed   Forces that greatly differs from its counterparts, from the oldest Armed Forces   to the ones that are formed in similar historic and regional conditions. In   other words: while in other places, the law is suspended or overreached by   military influences in politics, in Brazil military intervention is followed by   its institutionalization by legal means, creating a framework in which the   Armed Forces are specific means, the organized force of the state. However, if   there is an attentive look to this situation and, specially, if it is compared   to the Armed Forces of Brazil's neighbors, it is possible to see that by   legalizing its intervention in politics, the Brazilian Armed Forces are overreaching   the fine line between forces and law. Our hypothesis, therefore, is that the   Brazilian Armed Forces construct themselves as forces autonomous from the state,   rather than as the state's means of legitimate force, widening their autonomy   vis-&agrave;-vis the authority of the state and introducing their own vision about   themselves in the Constitutions. </p>     <p>To readers who   are not familiar with the Brazilian history, it may seem that we are confusing   the establishment of legal force - the state's mechanism to maintain order -   and the constitution of military autonomy, as military intervention in   politics, which is common throughout the Latin American history, has never been   made according to legal order, but against it. In some specific situations, the   Armed Forces agreed to share power with other national elites; however, this   attitude was never legally regulated or determined in the national   Constitutions.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup>2</sup></a>    In Brazil, as opposed to the other countries in Latin America, the Armed Forces   acts under the shadow of the Law.  One example of this is that soon after March   31st, 1964, the Armed Forces did not enforce the suspension of the 1946   Constitution. Instead, they published Institutional Acts and, through them, the   Armed Forces made the Senate elect Marshall Castelo Branco as the President of   the Republic.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup>3</sup></a></p>     <p>Using these   Constitutional Charters as sources for analysis - throughout 180 years of   history, Brazil has had eight Constitutions - this paper shows that there is a   parallel between the construction and evolution of the Brazilian state and the   autonomy of the military. Even today, the military is not completely   subordinated to the civilian government, and it mitigates the consolidation of   democracy in the country (O'Donnell, 1999). In the same way that democracy is a   political regime that is constructed by actors through a non-linear process,   the evolution of the Brazilian Constitutions does not follow a universal   process. Rather, their evolution is a social construction that represents the   ever-changing relations between different actors and reflects the search for   both the military's and the nation's identities (Coelho, 1976).</p>     <p>In more specific   terms, the Constitution reflects a social reality and is the product of the   hegemonic strengths of a society. Therefore, the legal system of a state is   never neutral, as it reflects the ideological patterns of the hegemonic   strengths of a society during the moment at which the system is being defined.   The definition of the military functions in each Constitution is a political   definition because politics are the basis of the law, while the law builds the   state.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>As a body of   principles that organizes a state, a Constitutional Charter can be understood   in different ways. Firstly, a Constitution can be understood as the creation of   an apparatus that legitimizes the organization of the state, as can be   exemplified with the Constitution of 1824. Secondly, a Constitution can   represent the aims of a society, portraying its main ideals, as it can be   observed with the Constitution of 1934 (Ferreira, 1986). Thirdly, a   Constitution can illustrate at the same time the existent organization of a   state and the aims that the society intends to achieve. A possible example of   this Constitution is the Constitution of 1988 - also called "Citizen   Constitution" - as its main idea is to achieve changes within the established   organization, but it also denounces the inequalities and injustices of Brazil.   Although the elaboration process of the Constitution is the same for the three   mentioned kinds of Constitution, the results are different, oscillating between   a conservative and a changing aspect.</p>     <p>The paper is   divided into three parts. The first part is an analysis of Articles related to   the Armed Forces in the different Brazilian Constitutions, from the   Constitution of 1824 to the constitution of 1967. Both the formal aspects (<i>how</i> the Constitutions were written) and the substantive aspects (<i>what</i> was   written) will be taken into consideration in this part. The second part is an   analysis of the current Constitution of 1988, in which legislators created a   new governmental structure in order to mediate the relations between civil   society and the Armed Forces. Finally, the third part is an analysis of the   current character of the legal military aspect.</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>1. The Armed Forces   in Constitutions before 1988</b></font></p>     <p><i>The Constitution of 1824</i></p>     <p>The first   Brazilian constitution, <i>Political Constitution of the Brazilian Empire</i>,   promulgated in 1824, was composed by a set of 179 articles divided into eight   titles. Even though the terminology "Armed Forces" was not common at that period,   Article 102 of the Constitution mentions the state's inherent exercise of   coercive power. The same article also attributed the following to the Executive   branch: to name the commanders of the Army and Navy Forces, to force them to   resign whenever they consider it necessary and to declare war and make peace.   Articles 145 to 150 of the Constitution describe the organization of the Army   and Navy Forces and determine that all citizens are obliged to defend the   independence and the integrity of the Empire while the Executive branch has the   sole responsibility to decide whether or not to use its Forces. Therefore, it   was established that the Military Forces were essentially obedient, as they   could not even gather together without authorization from a legitimate   authority, which, in this case, was the Executive branch (Article   147).             </p>     <p>In 1824, there   was not a distinction between internal and external enemy and the Brazilian   citizens were responsible for the internal and external defense of the Empire.   However, at that time, as the Empire had a very large territory without   well-defined borders and its emancipation from the Portuguese Monarchy was not   consensual (it is important to remember that there were many revolutions   against its emancipation, especially in the North and South of the Empire), the   use of the Forces meant the protection of the newly created country.</p>     <p>Regarding the   exercise of authority, and preceding the articles related to the organizations   of the branches of power (Executive, Legislative, Judiciary and Moderating) and   the Military Force, Article 98 determined that the Moderating Branch   (Portuguese: Poder Moderador) was the central pillar of the political   organization and was delegated exclusively to the Emperor, whose person,   according to Article 99, was sacred and, therefore, was not subject to any   responsibility.</p>     <p>In this sense,   two aspects should be highlighted as they reflect the role of the Military   Forces during the Empire: First, Article 98 was the cause of many discussions   and debates in the Parliament of the Empire. Second, there is no mention of the   Military Forces, and as they are subordinated by the Executive branch, the use   of force is the responsibility of the Ministers, who are responsible for the <i>exercise     of the Executive branch</i>. Therefore, the Military Forces, as they were   completely subordinated by the Executive branch of the Empire, did not have any   legal possibility to participate in the politics of the Empire, and, as we will   show in this paper, this is a particularity of this Constitution, as all other   Brazilian Constitutions allowed such participation.</p>     <p>In conclusion, at   that time there was no "Military Power". Actually, the Military Force consisted   of an intermittent set of men who were "essentially obedient" to the Executive   branch. Regarding the Emperor, he was not responsible for the military forces,   but he could recruit the Military Forces through its Ministers, who were   responsible for the exercise of the Executive branch.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><i>The Constitution of 1891</i></p>     <p>The Brazilian constitution   of 1891, promulgated three years after the Proclamation of the Republic, in   1889, was very different from the previous Constitution as far as the Armed   Forces were concerned. Regarding the mention of the military in the   Constitution, the Military Forces are mentioned only at the end of the   Constitution of 1824; in 1891 this content is mentioned from the introductory   articles on. Article 14 (Title I) mentioned that:</p> </font>     <blockquote>       <p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">"The Army and the Navy are     national and permanent institutions and their aims are to defend the country     internationally and to maintain the laws internally. The Armed Forces are     essentially obedient, within the limits of the Law, to their hierarchic     superiors and support the constitutional institutions".</font></p> </blockquote> <font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">     <p>Other points   related to the formal aspects of the Constitution are that the noun "armed   forces" is used, unlike in the Constitution of 1824. However, "armed forces" is   not capitalized and the concept and definition of armed forces are mentioned   before the explanation of the organization of the state, as if the importance   of defining the role of the military forces precedes the conceptualization of   the state, which the military forces are part of.</p>     <p>In order to   understand the difference between the two Constitutions, it is important to   first see how the Republic of Brazil was constructed: the ideal of the nation   was built under <i>manu militare</i>. In other words, the Proclamation of the   Republic was a consequence of a military coup d'etat. The civilians,   nevertheless, had a great responsibility for the construction of society; as   they could not or did not realize which Forces were willing to cede, they let a   small group -- the same one that supported Benjamin Constant, who had   Republican views -- assume command of the military and, consequently, the   government. Echoing the possibility of the dissolution of the Empire, with the   consequent division of the territory, the military corporation consolidated   around a republican ideal.</p>     <p>Due to the   advantages provided by the circumstances, a small group conquered the Military,   and then made the military a "new partisan corporation" led by its own   political party. This is the best explanation to understand the permanent   character attributed to the armed forces in the Constitution of 1891. Making   the Armed Forces a permanent institution permitted the corporation to quickly   become autonomous in regards to civil power and to equalize armed forces with   the state in terms of power.</p>     <p>The only   institution that is also characterized as permanent is the State itself, in which   the Armed Forces and the civil bureaucracy are, or should be, instruments to   guarantee and legitimize its power. In other words, political regimes and   governments can change, as well as the structure of the State, but the State   will permanently continue to hold political power. To rephrase Max Weber, the   State is the only entity that, within limits of its territory, has a monopoly   over legitimate violence.</p>     <p>Another   contribution provided by the constituent to military autonomy was to designate   the Armed Forces a national entity which could conflict with the federal   government, as the Armed Forces represented the unitary and unifying aspect of   the country. With national and permanent characteristics, the Armed Forces   became a mediating power among regional groups that wished to represent the   nation; but, due to their origins in remote regions of the Brazilian territory,   they only represented local and temporary interests of a small and regional   area of the nation and therefore were relatively disadvantaged when compared to   the national influence of the Armed Forces.</p>     <p>It is also   important to mention a paradox found in the established function of the Armed   Forces in 1891: the Armed Forces would be responsible for both enforcing and   complying with the law that limited their power. According to Article 14,   mentioned above, the Armed Forces had to enforce the laws related to the   institution and, at the same time, obey their superiors in the government as   outlined "within the limits of the law".</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>Unlike the   Constitution of 1824, the Constitution of 1891 did not provide a clear   explanation regarding military obedience and could not answer the following   questions: Which superiors were the Armed Forces supposed to obey when there   was no consensus among their superiors? Would they obey the immediate superior   or would they obey the highest superior in the hierarchy? If the immediate   superior is coup-minded whereas the highest superior is a legalist, how will   they be able to resolve the equation between obedience, legality and hierarchy?</p>     <p>Another   inaccurate aspect of the Constitution of 1891 regarding the Armed Forces was   the "enforcement of the law within the Brazilian territory", which was a   responsibility of the Armed Forces. In an exceptional situation, who would   define the "enforcement of the law"? Brazilian historiography frequently   describes the election system of the First Republic as quite fraudulent.   Therefore, how would the enforcement of the law be defined in this situation?   What would the role of the Armed Forces be in this case?</p>     <p>The Constitution   of 1891 did not act only in favor of the autonomy of the Armed Forces. As a   result of the diffidence of civilians towards the military, the Constitution   was silent regarding the organization of regional military services, and it did   not dissolve the National Guard (Guarda Nacional), which was not demobilized   until the 1920s. Despite some weaknesses, the existence of the regional   military services and the National Guard favored a federal offsetting, as they   served as a counterbalance to the power exercised by the Armed Forces. One   clear example was the Sao Paulo Public Force (For&ccedil;a P&uacute;blica de Sao Paulo) that   was trained by a French mission right after World War I; while the National   Armed Forces promoted a similar initiative of contracting a foreign mission for   the first time only ten years later.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup>4</sup></a></p>     <p>According to Carl   Schmitt, sovereignty belongs to the one who makes decisions during states of   exception. Based on this idea, it is important to point out which internal   actor made decisions in situations of legal uncertainty throughout the First   Republic in Brazil. Due to the organization of the elites, it is possible to   affirm that this power was far from the military's scope; however, the military   was gradually constructing the foundations to make decisions in periods of   exceptionality.</p>     <p>While the   Constitution of 1891 presented great changes related to the military   bureaucracy, the next Constitution, of 1934, brought more substantive changes   related to the search for autonomy. The main aspects of the Constitution of   1934 were the introduction of the concept of "national security", the creation   of the Military Justice and the increase in military function through the   division of law and order.</p>     <p><i>The Constitution of 1934</i></p>     <p>The main   particularity of the Constitution of 1934 was its very short duration, as it   lasted only one year. From 1935 to 1937, the Constitution was replaced by the   "National Security" Law, and in 1937 a new Constitution was enforced (Pandolfi,   1989).</p>     <p>The Constitution   of 1934 was a direct consequence of the Revolution of 1932 and gave legality to   the Revolution of 1930. According to its Preamble, this Constitution reflected   the desire to construct a democratic and inclusive political regime. The   inclusive character of this Constitution expanded the military functions.</p>     <p>The sector of   the Constitution of 1934 titled "On National Security" scrutinized military   functions and created the High Council of National Security (Conselho Superior   de Seguran&ccedil;a Nacional) - Article 159 - which would be responsible for all   issues related to national security. However, there is no explanation regarding   what national security is (Decreto nº 7, de 03/08/1934).</p>     <p>Article 162   determines the military functions: "The Armed Forces are national permanent   institutions and essentially obedient to its hierarchic superiors. Their main   goal is to defend the national territory and to protect the constitutional   power, law and order." The definition of the Armed Forces is a mere repetition   of the previous Constitution. However, while the functions of the Armed Forces   are expanded, they are characterized by ambiguity. In addition to the lack of   an explanation regarding national security, law and order are considered   distinct and independent from each other, and order reaches beyond the law that   constitutes the State.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>In this sense,   if order can be beyond what is established through law, how could order be   defined? Who could define order, its limits and its breadth? According to the   Constitution of 1934, it is the Armed Forces' responsibility to maintain the   domestic order. Therefore, what are the main functions of this institution: to   do what is stated in the Constitution or to defend what they understand as   order? As the Armed Forces are essentially obedient, who would define what   order is?  In this case, would it be the self-perception of high-ranking   officials, such as commanders and admirals, which determines when order has   been broken and what should be done to stabilize and normalize the situation?</p>     <p>When opposing   law and order, at the same time that it gave responsibility for guaranteeing   internal order in the country to the military, the constitution allowed the   Armed Forces, in order to maintain order and the fulfillment of its   constitutional functions, to ignore the law and impose its own order. For this   reason, in order to participate in political issues, the Armed Forces just   needed to respect the Constitution and try to establish order. This fact gave   legitimacy to the Armed Forces' actions.</p>     <p>The Constitution   of 1934 also created the "military judiciary," whose aim was to judge military   and civilians in special circumstances. According to Article 84 "the military   will have special jurisdiction in case of military offenses. This tribunal   could be extended to civilians in case of crimes against external security or   against military institutions."<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup>5</sup></a> It is important to mention that the creation of the military judiciary   represented an advance in trials of crimes related to military aspects, and   also meant a way to embrace and take care of all issues related to security,   including public security. Finally, the Constitution of 1934 extended the right   to vote to all literate citizens over 18 years old, including "sergeants of the   Army and of the Navy, auxiliary forces of the Army, students of military   academies and subordinate officers" (Article 108). As a result of this, both   low-ranking officers and sergeants established partisan groups, making the   Armed Forces a partisan institution.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup>6</sup></a></p>     <p>Therefore, in   comparing the Constitution of 1934 to the speeches of the military commanders, it   appears that the Constitution gave the Armed Forces the ability to become a   political party, as this institution had a project for the nation, which   included the industrial and technological modernization of the country.   However, as the Constitution lasted a very short period of time, it was not   possible, at least during this period of history, to actually change the role   of the Armed Forces into a political party.</p>     <p><i>The Constitution of 1937</i></p>     <p>Before analyzing   the Constitution of 1937, it is necessary to clarify the difference between the   role, the function and the mission of the Armed Forces. As defined by   sociology, a role is a social attribution. Using the analogy of a theatre,   roles are the scripts that each specific actor must represent in a play. In the   particular case of the Armed Forces, the role of the military is determined by   society, regardless of the norms and values held by the military.</p>     <p>Also as defined   by sociology, a function is an internal attribute of a specific actor within an   organism or structure. In other words, a function is a legally prescribed order   for a determined social status (Merton, 1992; 1979). In this case, the function   of the Armed Force is to be an instrument of the State when it affirms that   action is necessary.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup>7</sup></a></p>     <p>The term   mission, different from role and function, does not have its roots in   sociology. A mission is the incumbency or task attributed to a specific actor   who must execute it when it is required. For instance, commanders may give   soldiers the mission to vaccinate the population in order to protect them   against an epidemic of disease. Even though this mission is unrelated to the   main function of the Armed Forces (the soldiers are not trained to work as   paramedics), this same mission can be seen as an accomplishment of the role of   the Armed Forces in a specific situation, for example, during a peace keeping   operation.</p>     <p>As far as the   Constitution of 1937 is concerned, the first important characteristic of this   document is, according to Alfonso Arinos de Frank Melo (1985), its "imperfect   character". This means that it was created without the intention of putting it   into practice; in other words, the main intention of this document was to   legalize Getulio Vargas' dictatorship, leaving the central government free to   do whatever it believed necessary in order to ‘develop' Brazil. It is important   to remember that the Armed Forces supported Vargas' dictatorship.</p>     <p>In order to   establish the dictatorship, the Constitution of 1937 empowered the Executive   branch of the central government, concentrating all authority of the government   on the president of the Republic.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>In regards to   the Armed Forces, Article 161 explained that they "are a permanent national   institution, organized under a hierarchical discipline and under the full   obedience to the President of the Republic."<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup>8</sup></a> When establishing that the Armed Forces were under the control of the President   of the Republic, there was a retrocession in the movement of military autonomy,   as, according to the Constitution of 1937, this institution became the armed   branch of the government, just as it was during the Empire.</p>     <p>The conversion   of the Armed Forces to professionalization is mentioned in the Article 166,   according to which the Defense of the State is exclusively subordinated by the   President of the Republic, as he was responsible for determining when the   internal order is in danger, decreeing a state of emergency or war, and using   the Armed Forces, internally or externally, in order to reestablish order. The   importance of the process of subordination to the Presidency arose with much   more vigor when it was realized that Congress was no longer able to contradict   a president's decision or order (Article 167).</p>     <p>As an echo of   the revolutions of 1935 and in order to limit the interference of the military   in national politics and to bar the presence of ideological movements in the   barracks, the Constitution forbade actively-employed members of the military to   vote or to be eligible to be voted for (Article 117 b). However, the military's   interest in participating in the political decisions of the country led to the modification   of this article in 1945, so that "actively-employed members of the military, <i>except     for the commanders</i>, cannot vote" (Constitutional Law nº 9, of 02/28/1945,   emphasis added). In this sense, the civil power yields to the military's   autonomy in a juridical way.</p>     <p>In sum, as the   Constitution of 1937 legalized a dictatorship that had a strong military basis,   it hindered the prerogatives of the Armed Forces legalized in the Constitutions   of 1934 and of 1891, making it similar to the Constitution of the Empire   (1824). In other words, through the Constitution of 1937, the Armed Forces were   made subordinate to the Executive branch of the central government with subtle   changes; the 1937 constituent contributed to the professionalization of the   Armed Forces, as this institution was organized as a bureaucracy, which was   neither autonomous nor fragmented, and did not support the creation of partisan   factions within the corporation.</p>     <p>The   concentration of power in the dictator's hands did not eliminate the   contradictions that characterized the end of the 1930s, which engendered, in   the international arena, the greatest worldwide conflict, World War II. The   Brazilian government, trying to take advantage of the conjuncture of the   beginning of the 1940s, characterized by intense insecurity, adopted an   ambiguous position in regards to WWII: sometimes leaning towards the Axis and   sometimes leaning towards the Allies. In 1944 Getulio Vargas, finally convinced   that the support of the Allies -- especially to the United States -- would be   more beneficial to Brazil, organized the Brazilian Expeditionary Forces (FEB,   in Portuguese) to fight in Italy against the Axis.</p>     <p>Vargas' decision   to support the Allies completely changed the outcome of its dictatorial regime,   as well as the interests of the Armed Forces. After the experience of the FEB   in Italy and their closer relationship with the United States, the Armed Forces   were interested in developing the political ideas of modern capitalism within   the institution. For this reason, the Armed Forces actively participated in the   movement that required the end of "the New State" (Estado Novo), as its system   was incompatible with the new capitalist tendencies of the Western world.</p>     <p>Having in mind   this new conjuncture, the New State came to an end and, in 1946, one year after   the end of Getulio Vargas' mandate, the fourth constitution of the Republic of   Brazil was promulgated.</p>     <p><i>The Constitution of 1946</i></p>     <p>The Constitution   of 1946 is seen as the most democratic constitution of Brazil, with the   exception of the Constitution of 1988. With regards to the military sector,   though, it follows in the footsteps of the 1934 Charter, guaranteeing more   autonomy to the Armed Forces. Therefore, this Constitution states that:</p> </font>     <blockquote>       ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">Article 176 -     The Armed Forces, constituted essentially by the Army, the Navy and the Air     Force, are permanent national institutions, are organized with a basis on     discipline and hierarchy, under the supreme authority of the President of the     Republic and within the limits of the Law.</font></p> </blockquote> <font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">     <p>This Charter is   the first one to present a division between the Army, the Navy and the Air   Forces, while all of the previous Constitutions mentioned the "Armed Forces" in   a general sense, distinguishing only between "land" and "sea". It also   institutionalized the creation of the Air Forces, accepting the division   adopted by the United States of America, one of the few countries to adopt this   ternary division.</p>     <p>Military   aviation was created in Brazil in 1920, as part of the Army. After a short   period of time, "Navy aviation" was organized and remained in existence until   1941. In this year, perhaps as a way to demonstrate its good will to the North   Americans, President Getulio Vargas created the Air Force Ministry, which   started to focus on the responsibility for the Armed Forces after the   extinction of the Army and the Navy aviation divisions.</p>     <p>The post-1946   legal reality did not alter the military Ministry structure, accepting the one   that was inherited from the dictatorial regime. Therefore, the existence of a   new Force, if tending to raise internal tensions against the military   environment, supplied more relative power to the regime in the interior of the   State, because of the increase in numbers for the Armed Forces in   decision-making organisms.</p>     <p>Article 176   reflects the Forces' organizational intentions by informing, in an improvement   of the text from 1937, that they are "organized with a basis on discipline and   hierarchy". However, they did not remove the influence of politics from the   military sector because, as opposed to the 1937 Constitution, they limit   obedience to the Law, so they were organized "under the supreme authority of   the President of the Republic and within the limits of Law" which, at that   time, served more to weaken civil power from the government.</p>     <p>With regards to   other aspects, the new reality keeps the same previous pattern, conserving the   National Security Council - which gains specificity with the replacement of the   "special organs" (as they were in 1934 and 1937) by the "armed forces special   organs" (Article 179) - the military compulsory service (Article 181) and the   Military Justice (Articles 106-08). In the way that it was organized, even if   it intended to rely upon the professional Armed Forces, the Law actually   contributed to an increase in armed interventions in politics, which culminated   in the Military Revolution of March 31<sup>st</sup>, 1964.</p>     <p><i>The Constitution of 1967</i></p>     <p>Members of the military took power in 1964. In order to avoid opposition   in the Congress, the military used Institutional Acts to amend the   Constitution. Three years later, in 1967, the military created a new   constitution to aggregate all the Institutional Acts.</p>     <p>The Constitution of 1967, regarding the organization of the Armed   Forces, presents few changes compared to the previous Constitutions. Article 92   of the Constitution of 1967 defined the Armed Forces:</p> </font>     <blockquote>       ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">The Armed Forces, constituted by the     Navy of War, the Army and the Military Air Forces, are national, permanent and     regular institutions. They are organized through hierarchy and discipline and     they are under the authority of the President of the Republic and within the     limits of the Law.</font></p>       <p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">§1º - the Armed Forces have to   defend the Country and to guarantee the Power, the Law and the order.</font></p> </blockquote> <font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">     <p>There are two new aspects of the Constitution's composition: Firstly,   the Armed Forces have a <i>regular</i> character, which makes them different   from any possible military organized groups which are not under the government   command, such as the paramilitary groups. The highest precision that was   intended to provide to the identity of the Armed Forces can be seen when the   adjectives "of war" and "military" are used to define, respectively, the Navy   and the Air Forces. Secondly, in this constitution the expression "constituted power" substitutes the expression "constitutional power".</p>     <p>Although the first change might be considered more significant,  as it   better describes the military profession, it is the second change that   illustrates how the members of the military  understood their  responsibility,   as they needed to zeal for the established power, regardless whether the power   was legal (as regulated by the Constitution) or not.</p>     <p>This Constitution, on the other hand, continues separating the ideas of   law and order, repeating, once again, the same problem that happened in the   previous Constitutions. As, at this moment, there was a military government,   the internal problems of the military corporation, which were previously   disregarded, echoed in a very strongly way. In addition to this, the   corporation had a hierarchical organization based on the discipline of their   members; therefore, the internal disparities could not be presented very   clearly. However, due to functions that could not be incorporated into the   regularization (as the ones related to parallel activities of the responsible   for the internal security, especially related to the SNI), the organization of   the political regime after the coup of 1964 had quotidian implications in the   barracks. Because of this, Institutional Act nº 17 (also called AI 17), of   10/14/1969 was created. According to AI-17, the President of the Republic could   temporarily remove "the members of the military who had tried or would   potentially try to act against the cohesion of the Armed Forces" (1st Article).   This removal could become definitive depending on the decision of the High   Military Command (3rd Article).</p>     <p>Despite the mentioned changes, the biggest innovation in the   Constitution of 1967 is not in the treatment of the Armed Forces, but in the   way that the precept of national security is incorporated into the   Constitution, transforming it into the motto of the collective existence of   Brazil.  In this sense, all of the citizens (even adolescents and native   inhabitants) were responsible for national security (Article 89), even though   they did not participate in the formulation of the national security, which was   an exclusive function of the National Security Council.</p>     <p>The Constitution of 1967 expanded the responsibilities of the President   of the Republic, incorporating legislative precepts, and expanded the functions   of the Armed Forces. The Constitutional Amendment nº 1, of October 17<sup>th</sup>,   1969 - considered by many as a new Constitution due to the great quantity of   registered changes - distinguished the Armed Forces from the other governmental   institutions even more, giving the Armed Forces a fundamental political role.   The conceptualization of the Armed Forces is the same in the Constitution of   1967 and in the Amendment of 1969, as is evident when we compare Article 90 of   the Amendment to the Article 92 of the Constitution of 1967. However, as the   Amendment gives the Armed Forces more functions, it is also evident that there   is an increase of actions for the Armed Forces, in accordance to the law.</p>     <p>The Amendment of 1969 also brings some changes to the National Security   Council, as it has the "highest level of the direct advisory councils to the   President of the Republic". The functions of this Council are regulated by the   National Security Doctrine, as, according to Article 89 of the Amendment of   1969, this Council has to "establish the permanent national objectives and the   basis of the national politics". This extract repeats <i>ipsis literis</i> the   manuals published by the Army War College (Escola Superior de Guerra, ESG).</p>     <p>According to the Manual of the national War College, published in 1975,   the permanent national objectives can be analyzed through the expression "Security   and Development", in which "security" represents the maintenance of   the traditional values of the nation (p.35), while "development"   represents the necessity to modernize and renew those values, generating   "improvement and progress of the nation" (p. 36).</p>     <p>The Constitution of 1967 was modified through Amendment n. 1 of 1969,   which was formulated when there was a Military <i>Junta</i> (derived from a Spanish word which can be translated as   "conference" or "board") under the command of Alm. Augusto Rademaker (Navy), Brig. M&aacute;rcio Melo   (Air Forces) and Gen. Aur&eacute;lio Lyra Tavares (Army).</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>According to the Amendment of 1969, the motto "Security and   Development" became a legal act. In this sense, Article 8 of the constitution   of 1946, which explained the function of the country as to "organize the Armed   Forces, the security of the borders and the external defense" was substituted,   in the Constitution of 1967, by "organize the Armed Forces, and plan and   guarantee national security". In 1969, it was substituted by: "plan and promote   national development and security." Therefore, the Amendment:</p> </font>     <blockquote>       <p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">[...] emphasizes the preoccupation     with the defense of the state [...] and turned the principle of national     security a fundamental norm of the current constitutional system.  It was a     kind of principle of necessity, superimposing the efficacy of almost all of the     constitutional norms. In addition to this, the concept of "national security",     through which the constitution created many restrictive dispositions, […] was     not defined in the text of the Constitution" (Velasco e Cruz &amp; Martins,     1984: 38).</font></p> </blockquote> <font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">     <p>The Amendment enforces the importance of security to national   development. In other words, both the Constitution of 1967 and the Amendment of   1969 highlight the importance of the National Security Doctrine as a basis to   the development of the country. In this sense, they transform the state and the   society into military institutions and they transform the Armed Forces into the   protectors of the nation that is, in accordance with the institution,   threatened as its citizens could not know how to defend the Nation against external and internal threats </p>     <p>The Constitution of 1967, amended, shredded and condemned, determined   the outcomes of Brazil for 21 years. This Constitution was substituted by the   "Citizen Constitution" of October 5<sup>th</sup>, 1988, which was born,   according to Faoro, "not as a rupture of the constituent power, in order to   legitimate its content. It is the legitimacy in decomposition, intensified by   the inefficiency, which arouses the constituent power of the persons" (1985:   55).</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>2. The Armed Forces   into Constitution of 1988</b></font></p>     <p>The process that   resulted in the current Constitution shows that a substantive review of the   role and the mission of the Armed Forces could not be expected. The way this   Constitution was prepared, precisely the one that (re)established democracy in   the country after a long period in which legitimacy was based on bayonets,   wasn't even independent: instead of a Constitutional Convention, Brazil formed   a Constituent Congress, and, worse, it reflected an electoral process in which   many citizens weren't even aware of the fact that they were electing those who   would represent them at the opening of a new legal order in the country.</p>     <p>As the 1988   Constitution is a result of a "transition through transaction", as   Share and Mainwaring (1986) determined, the Armed Forces and its roles were   practically the same as defined in the Constitution of 1967. Thus, it can be   read in Article 142: "The Armed Forces, constituted by the Navy, Army and   Air Forces, are permanent and ordinary national institutions, organized by   hierarchy and discipline, under the President's supreme authority".   However, it is written in a new way, even if ambiguous, which starts to   constitute these Forces' roles. In the same Article, it is asserted that the   Armed Forces "aim for the country's defense, the guarantee of   constitutional power and, by initiative of either one of these elements, law   and order", determining that a supplementary law would rule this function.   This law was released only in 1991, three years after the promulgation of the   Constitution.</p>     <p>In a nutshell,   both the definition and the roles assigned to the Armed Forces represented a compromise   among the different authors, especially constituents and the members of the   military. According to the settlement, the members of the military continued as   guardians of national values while the civilians could continue with their   democratic project.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>Immediately,   there are two problems with this compromise. Regarding the first problem,   succumbing their permanent character to the militaries - a quality that not   even the Sovereign State has-<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup>9</sup></a> those responsible for the Law forgot a golden rule, recently   recalled by the former Spanish defense minister Narc&iacute;s Serra:</p> </font>     <blockquote>       <p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">[...] The militaries who believe they     are creating permanent values are a real threat to the democracy, since the     distance between permanent and superior values is no longer than a step, and     the militaries who believe having them consider themselves guarantors of these     values, making them substantial to the nation. (2008: 77).</font></p> </blockquote> <font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">     <p>Our constitution   framers were beyond what Serra states, because they didn't make the Armed   Forces representatives of permanent values, but made them part of these values,   or, more accurately, one value. Therefore, they are above their own nationality.</p>     <p>Concerning the   second issue, which reinforces the first one, the problem is to institute the   national character as an attribute of the same Armed Forces, that is, as the   only professional institution to which all nation representation is assigned,   which no other organization can demand. When defining them as "national   and permanent", they legally made the Armed Forces an entity superior to   the legitimate people's representatives regarding democracy and perhaps superior   to the people themselves.</p>     <p>Therefore, based   only on the Armed Forces definition, its independence is legally guaranteed.   Notwithstanding the constitution framers went beyond this: when defining their   roles, they kept the military responsibility over law and order, and, trying to   subordinate such prerogative to the civil government, created an ambiguous   situation that, it is not wrong to say, is only similar to the notorious AI-5,<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup>10</sup></a> which was exactly the instrument of military government that   founded the open dictatorship.</p>     <p>Another topic to   be highlighted in Article 142 is the focus on removing the possibility of the   Forces to act in defense of the "constituted powers", replaced by the   "defense of constitutional powers", adding "by initiative"   of the same powers, subordinating military action to civilian authority.   However, hierarchy among authorities is not defined by opening the possibility   of, at least, three problems, all of them leading to questions without   satisfactory answers.</p>     <p>The first problem   concerns the internal nature of the Forces, because it is about the disruption   of the hierarchy principle. Notice that the way of exercising power in Brazil,   along with the concentration of authority in the Executive branch, is not far   from generating a conflict among the branches. If, hypothetically, military   intervention against the Executive branch is demanded by either Legislative or   Judicial initiative, and given the fact that the President is the Forces   commander-in-chief, it can be said that they are in a "legal"   situation of insubordination!</p>     <p>The second   problem, or a consequence of the first one, could happen when there is no   agreement among the branches regarding an Armed Forces action. In that case, to   which branch should they report? To the first one who reacts? Depending on the   branch they report to, there will be a problem, but when they choose, the main   consequence will be presented: its autonomy to decide what is its mission,   which is far from any subordination in democracy.</p>     <p>The third problem   concerns which level of authority would reserve the right to decide about the   application of military force. Could one of the governors or trial court judges   summon the Armed Forces, or is such decision up to the national power? It   didn't take long to define this difficult situation. A little more than a month   after the Constitution took effect, at the end of 1988, the Army was called by   a local judge to control a strike organized by at the steelworks in Volta   Redonda (RJ), which resulted in the death of three workers. Since then, the   Forces themselves started to resist more to participate in actions to control law   and order.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>These problems   were solved only on July 30th 1991, by Supplementary Law n. 69, which ruled the   application of the Armed Forces under the President's authority.</p> </font>     <blockquote>       <p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">Article 8 - The application of the Armed Forces in the     country's defense, of constitutional powers, of law and order, is the     President's responsibility, which will determine him to the respective Military     Ministers.</font></p>       <p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">§ 1 - The decision of the application of the Armed     Forces  is the President's responsibility, by his own initiative or as a     request from any of the constitutional powers, through the Supreme Federal     Court President or the Federal Senate President or the Chamber of Deputies     President, to the extent of their respective areas.</font></p>       <p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">§ 2º - The Armed Forces operation will take place     according to the President's guidelines, after they are out of all the     instruments destined to the preservation of public order and patrimony and     people's safety listed in the Article 144 of the Federal Constitution.</font></p> </blockquote> <font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">     <p>With this law,   the legislature solved the subordination issue, but did not affect either the   autonomy or the concentration of power in the Executive, jeopardizing   democracy, since the Supplementary Law does not mention anything about the   necessity of establishing the State of Defense (Article 136) or the State of Siege   (Articles 137-139). This fact moved away participation of the Congress on the   application of military forces according to the circumstances, which would be common in any democracy.</p>     <p>With respect to   Military Service and to Military Justice, the Constitution of 1988 repeated the   previous Constitutions, when the enforcement of the first (Article 143) and the   ambiguity of the second was kept, which just states that the trial of military   crimes corresponds to that court's responsibility (Article 124), failing to   state whether civilians could be subject to it.</p>     <p>As previously   mentioned, the Constitution of 1988 sought to eliminate any term contained in   its former system. That is why the expression "national security" that   remained in the 1967 Constitution is not mentioned, being substituted either by   "state security" or "national defense". The National   Security Council is substituted by the National Defense Council (Article 91),   being careful enough to make it a consultancy organ. However, when not creating   the ministry of Defense, maintaining three military ministries, besides the   Armed Forces General Staff and "Casa Militar" (a ministry worked to link   political parties and Republic President), the number of men in military   uniforms remained untouched, proving once more the compromise of the Brazilian   transition.</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>3. Permanent   autonomy</b></font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>As recently   (re)built democracies show, pushing the military force , whose main role is    national territory defense, away from the activities related to public security   is an important condition for military subordination to the civil leadership   and, therefore, to the generation of a democratic system. On the other hand,   the Brazilian government, perhaps because of its incapacity to ensure its   citizens' security, have been using the Armed Forces to solve matters of public   security, having created a brigade for mission training in order to "ensure   law and order" (GLO).</p>     <p>After the shock   caused by the Army operation in Volta Redonda (1988), which limited the use of   military to keep the public order, the global meeting organized in 1992, in Rio   de Janeiro, was the most important event in which a security plan covered by   the three Forces was used. According to the UN evaluation:</p>     <p>The Conference in Rio was the first global reunion after the end of   the Cold War, and there were questions of whether new politics could be   manipulated around a common global future. It was also the biggest and the most   attended conference worldwide promoted by the UN up to that time, having 178   states represented in the negotiations and 118 heads of state attending   "C&uacute;pula da Terra" (<a href="http://www.universia.com.br/materia.jsp?id=4054" target="_blank">http://www.universia.com.br/materia.jsp?id=4054</a>).</p>     <p>The Armed Forces   application in this case, even not being the most correct one, could be   understood as a relevant operation, as if they were "out of all   instruments destined to the preservation of public order", since Brazil   does not hold a national police that could operate in such an important situation as the ECO-92.</p>     <p>Because of the   Rio-92 Operation's success, the use of the Armed Forces in matters of public   security started being accepted by the population as part of their natural   mission, especially the Army's, known for being present in such situations.   Thus, mistrustfulness that could remain with the population around the   bureaucratic-authoritative system was overcome. This is one of the explanations   for the growing demand of the Armed Forces in maintaining public order.</p>     <p>Parallel to the   growth of GLO operations, the government sought the regulation of the   application of the Forces, as well as deepened military preparation. The first   action taken was the publication, in 1996, of a document about national   defense. In this document, in the guidelines to be used, there is no mention of   subsidiary activities, even though it states that it is part of the armed   forces' responsibility to contribute to national development. This way, it is   entitled to what should be taken as national defense.</p>     <p>Fulfilling his   campaign promise, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso created the Ministry of   Defense on July 1999,<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup>11</sup></a> at the same time that he sanctioned Supplementary Law 97 that would   substitute Supplementary Law 69, with changes related to the new ministry. To   the 1999 law, it was added in 2004, through Supplementary Law 117, more   accurate definitions to the understanding of military missions in public order,   such as the one which refers to when it should be determined that the Armed   Forces must interfere.</p> </font>     <blockquote>       <p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">Article 15, § 3 states: "It is considered to be     out of the instruments related in  Article 144 of Federal Constitution when     [...] they are formally acknowledged by their respective Chief of Federal or     State Executive Branch as unavailable, non-existent or insufficient to the     regular performance of its constitutional mission."</font></p> </blockquote> <font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">     <p>Even with all   the legal regulation for its application and maintenance of law and order,   important military sectors continued resisting police tasks, understanding that   the training is not specific and that operations like the one demanded by   public security threaten the military ethos. Even so, they continued being   widely applied in GLO operations, as in the following examples: the Rio   Operation, carried out in Rio de Janeiro at the end of 1994, whose goal was to   stop drug traffic; in 1995, the Armed Forces were called to contain the oil   tanker staff strike, which happened again in 2001 in the police officers'   strike. In the same year, in perhaps the most prosaic example, a mobilization   of 250 Army soldiers took place at President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's farm, which   was threatened by the Landless Workers' Movement (Movimento dos Sem Terra -   MST).<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup>12</sup></a></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>The consequence   of all of these examples was the vulgarization of the use of forces in the   country's defense, highlighting the government's inability to comprehend the   inadequacy of the forces applied, with non-important and momentary results to   public security, when it was not clearly illegal, standing the Armed Forces'   lack of preparation in dealing with police tasks. More important, if, in all of   the examples provided the result was not greater tragedies, the most recent   operation clearly shows not only the lack of preparation, but also the   intensity in which the Army has incorporated police practice, the same that   justified the GLO operations. </p>     <p>As Martins Filho   summarizes (2008), in Luis In&aacute;cio Lula da Silva's government "there was   not the use of the Armed Forces in order to control social movements not even   once in five years. Now, he ended up ordering the Army [...] that a very risky   mission was carried out for political/electoral reasons [...]", creating an   indelible stain in the Armed Forces reputation. This happened when this   government requested a military grouping action in Morro da Previd&ecirc;ncia, a slum   (favela) in Rio de Janeiro taken by drug dealers,<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup>13</sup></a> which resulted in the death of three minors who didn't have any   criminal records, all of them assigned to the group formed by 11 militaries   taking over in Provid&ecirc;ncia on June 14, 2008.</p>     <p>On the other   hand, and despite the Armed Forces legislation and even after their mission was   formalized through a legal ruling and the creation of parameters for the   Defense, they kept asking for definitions and charging politicians for what   they call incapacity of defining what they want from the Armed Forces. Thus,   after two documents to the national defense politics, it remains the historical   lack of definition relative to the priorities, and in which scale they should   be handled by the military forces, which is acknowledged by the civil   leadership:</p>     <p>Civil Power,   which succeeded the military dictatorship, identified, as an ideal, the Defense   topics with political repression. For that reason, the topic was vulgarized in   the Constituent Assembly (1987-1988). Emerging leaderships didn't want to touch   anything that could link them to the previous system</p> </font>     <blockquote>       <p><font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">[...] as a necessary consequence, the Defense topics     were out of the national agenda. Executive and Legislative started considering     them an exclusive military agenda [...] in the academic area, a similar process     was developed [...] in other countries, such topics are the subject of deep     intellectual interest. There is plentiful work when it comes to studies in the     civil institutions area. The interchange between civilians and militaries     provides the State better conditions to decide, and better control for the     society [...] (Jobin, 2008).</font></p> </blockquote> <font size="2" face="Verdana, Geneva, sans-serif">     <p>It is important to highlight that during the process of the   constituent assembly and the complementary legislation, as well as the creation   of the Defense Law, the military presence and orientation was a reality that   many analysts called the "powerful military lobby" (Oliveira, 1994) or to   mention the military authorship in the documents of defense and in the budgets   for the area (Mathias, 2005). It allowed the Armed Forces to preserve an   autonomy from the civil power. This autonomy is not only portrayed in the   Article 142 of the 1988 Constitution, but also in the discourse of the   parlamentarians who claim that it is a duty of the Armed Forces to decide how   to use the budget, the legal mantainance of the division of civil and military   education<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup>14</sup></a>, the lack   of a judicial court to judge military personnal envolved with GLO operations   (Operations to Guarantee Law and Order)<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup>15</sup></a>, etc.</p>     <p>However,   highlighting the political society's lack of knowledge relatively to the   military world, as well as society's lack of participation in the process of   the Constitution creation, and having as background the type of transition from   bureaucratic-authoritative government to civil, the Basic Law hardly presented   advances regarding the definitions of military roles, which were reflected in    continued military autonomy and Armed Forces participation, even meaning   institutionally less, in positions that required decisions from the democratic government (Mathias, 2004).</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>Final Words</b></font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>The military   resistance to enforcing public security and its difficulty in convincing the   government of its lack of usefulness for such activity may indicate that   military subordination is part of today's reality. However, the way the   transition from the bureaucratic-authoritative systems was held must be   considered. This transition allowed the Armed Forces themselves, as previously   mentioned, to demand that the Constitution assured them the responsibility for   the guarantee of Law and Order, which permitted them to reach all of their   goals when the distension was initiated to keep for themselves the prerogatives   to actively participate in the government without being confounded with    political power.</p>     <p>Nevertheless,   something went wrong, that is, the costs to keep themselves in the government   were much higher than initially expected. However, many military personnel   defend the idea that the maintenance of Law and Order represent a way of   keeping the Forces close to the citizens and guarantee continued investment,   resulting in the improvement of the Forces. Thus, using a purely logical reasoning,   the Armed Forces would benefit if they operated as sponsors of internal   security.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup>16</sup></a></p>     <p>In 2008, the   Citizen's Constitution celebrated its twentieth anniversary, being the eighth   constitution in over 180 years of independent history. It carries more details   than the others - it is represented by 250 Articles that have been through 60   amendments (Villa, 2008) - but perhaps for this same reason it is not so   functional and it is often disrespected. This does not mean that its role is   not being fulfilled; on the contrary, it has promoted the consolidation of   institutions, a condition that is vital to the development of a democratic   system.</p>     <p>However, as   discussed in this article, the Brazilian Constitutions gradually legalized   military autonomy, and at the same time civilians grew distant from subjects   related to defense and military organization. A good example was and still is   the way academics who insist on working on these topics diminish the   significance of the work performed by the military institution.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><sup>17</sup></a></p>     <p>On the other   hand, it would be naive to assume a constitutional reality can convert such a   long process as the construction of military autonomy. It is also certain that   a Constitution does not avoid military interventions or <i>coups</i>. However, law   enforcement is a necessary condition to consolidate democracy. At least as a   suggestion, the law points out values that should permeate the society it   regulates. If the law represents the permanence of military autonomy, how can   the consolidation of democracy be achieved?</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>Bibliography</b></font></p>     <p>Coelho,   E. C. (1976). <i>Em busca de identidade: </i>o   Ex&eacute;rcito e a pol&iacute;tica na sociedade brasileira. R.J., Forense Universit&aacute;ria.</p>     <p>Faoro,   R. (1985). <i>Assembl&eacute;ia Constituinte: </i>a legitimidade recuperada.   S.P., Brasiliense, 3ª Ed.</p>     <p>Ferreira,   O. S. (2000). <i>Vida e morte do partido fardado. </i>S.P., Ed. SENAC.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>______. (1986). <i>Uma Constitui&ccedil;&atilde;o para a   mudan&ccedil;a. </i>S.P., Duas Cidades Ed.</p>     <p>Forjas,   M.C.S. (1977). <i>Tenentismo e Pol&iacute;tica. </i>R.J., Paz e Terra.</p>     <p>Franco,   A.A.M. (1985). <i>Brasil, sociedade democr&aacute;tica. </i>R.J., Jos&eacute; Olympio ed.</p>     <p>Gaspari, E. (2002). <i>A ditadura   envergonhada. </i>S.P., Cia das Letras ed.</p>     <p>Jobin, N. (2008) A defesa na agenda   nacional. O plano estrat&eacute;gico de defesa. <i>Interesse Nacional</i>, Bras&iacute;lia,   junho.</p>     <p>Martins Filho, J. R. (2008). Entrevista   concedida a M&ocirc;nica Manir. <i>O Estado de S. Paulo</i>, 22/06/2008, caderno   Ali&aacute;s.</p>     <!-- ref --><p>Mathias, S.K. (1995). <i>Distens&atilde;o no   Brasil: </i>o projeto militar. Campinas, Papirus.    </p>     <p>______.   (2003). <i>A militariza&ccedil;&atilde;o da burocracia. </i>A participa&ccedil;&atilde;o militar na   administra&ccedil;&atilde;o federal das Comunica&ccedil;&otilde;es e da Educa&ccedil;&atilde;o, 1963-1990. S.P., Ed.   UNESP/FAPESP.</p>     <p>Merton, R. K.   (1992) <i>Teoria y estructura sociales. </i>Cid. M&eacute;xico, Fondo de Cultura   Econ&ocirc;mica.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>______.   (1979) <i>A ambival&ecirc;ncia sociol&oacute;gica, </i>R.J., Zahar ed.</p>     <p>O'Donnell, G. (1999) "Teoria   democr&aacute;tica e pol&iacute;tica comparada",<i> Dados</i>, v. 42, n. 4, pp. 655-690.</p>     <p>Pandolfi, D. <i>et. al.</i>(1989).<i> O   Golpe Silencioso</i>: As Origens do Estado Corporativo. R.J., Rio Fundo.</p>     <p>Rouqui&eacute;, Alain (coord.). <i>Os partidos   militares no Brasil. </i>S.P., ed. Record, s/d.</p>     <p>Share, D. &amp; Mainwaring, S. Transi&ccedil;&atilde;o   pela transa&ccedil;&atilde;o: democratiza&ccedil;&atilde;o no Brasil e na Espanha. <i>Dados</i> (29): 2. R.J., IUPERJ.</p>     <p>Serra, Narc&iacute;s   (2008). <i>La transici&oacute;n militar. </i>Reflexiones em torno a la reforma   democr&aacute;tica de las fuerzas armadas. Barcelona, Ed. Debate (Random House   Mondadori).</p>     <p>SOARES,   S. A. (2006). Controles e autonomias: as For&ccedil;as Armadas e sistema pol&iacute;tico   brasileiro (1974-1999). S.P., Editora da UNESP.</p>     <p>Velasco e Cruz, Sebasti&atilde;o C. e Martins, Carlos E. (1984). De Castelo a   Figueiredo: uma incurs&atilde;o na pr&eacute;-hist&oacute;ria da ‘abertura'. In Almeida, Maria Herm&iacute;nia T. e Sorj, Bernardo (orgs.) <i>Sociedade e     Pol&iacute;tica no Brasil p&oacute;s-64.</i> S.P., Brasiliense, 2ª. Ed.</p>     <p>Villa, Marco Antonio. "Cornuc&oacute;pia   Constituinte". In <i>O Estado de S. Paulo</i>, 29/08/2008, p. J-5.</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">1</a> A   primary version of this paper was published in 1991 in a no-longer-existent   Brazilian journal called <i>Pol&iacute;tica e Estrat&eacute;gia</i> (Politics and Strategy).    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">2</a> Here are some examples of these relation between Armed Forces and national   elites: "Pacto del Punto Fijo", power division agreed between political parties   "Democratic Action" and "Independent Electoral Organization Committee" in   Venezuela from  1958 until 1988; and the "Frente Liberal" in Colombia from 1958   until 1974. In both cases, there was a distribution of power among the involved   parties, leaving defense and security matters as subject to the Armed Forces   scope. In neither case, however, were these agreements formalized.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">3</a> In order to mention some examples of the last cycle of military coups in South   America, in Argentina (1966 and 1973), in Uruguay (1973), and in Chile (1973),   one of their initial measures was to suspend the Constitution. For a more   detiled explanation of these measures, see O'Donnell, Guillermo (1990). An&aacute;lise   do Autoritarismo Burocr&aacute;tico. Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">4</a> At the first decade of the Republic (especially in   1906, 1908 and 1910), some officers were sent to Germany in order to study the   German military system and, afterwards, to implement some aspects of elements   of the system and modernize the Brazilian Armed Forces. When they returned to   Brazil, they funded a journal called "National Defense" (A Defesa Nacional) to   present what they had learned in Germany. However, the "Turkish Youth", as   these officers were called, could not implement the necessary changes for the   professionalization of the Armed Forces. The disparities between the Turkish   Youth and other officers who did not have the same experience were one of the   main reasons that led to the "lieutenantism" conflicts that happened from 1922   to 1924.  Cf. Forjas,   M.C.S. <i>Tenentismo e Pol&iacute;tica. </i>R.J.: Paz e Terra, 1977.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">5</a> Article 77 of the Constitution of 1891determined that   the military would have a special forum in order to judge military crimes.   However, this forum was never created. The Constitution of 1934, on the other   hand, in addition to creating the military judiciary, it also established a   labor and an electoral judiciaries.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">6</a> We use the same definition of military political   party as Alain Rouqui&eacute;, for whom "[...] the military parties could be real   parties funded by officers in order to play a role in the civil society or they   could be the cristalization of tendencies that struggle for power in the   military institution scope and in military political structures Rouqui&eacute;, A. "Os   processos pol&iacute;ticos nos partidos militares do Brasil". <i>In </i>Rouqui&eacute;, A. (coord.) <i>Os partidos   militares no Brasil. </i>S.P.: ed. Record, s/d., p. 13.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">7</a> As  Merton's theory asserts, instead of using the   terms "role" and "function", it is possible to use the terms:  "latent   function" (which are not necessary and, sometimes, they are considered   undesirable by the agent)  and "manifest function" (consequence of an action or   behavior expected by the agent). However, we use the terms role, function and   mission to better demonstrate the differences between role - meaning what the   officers do not expect to do, but  the society expects them to do -;  function   - meaning what the officers expect to do as part of their profession -; and   mission - meaning what the government imposes upon the officers. The basis for   this classification is:  Merton,   R. K. <i>Teoria y estructura sociales. </i>Cid. M&eacute;xico, Fondo de Cultura Econ&ocirc;mica,   1992. More specifically, there is ambivalence in the social role, as a specific   social position can represent more than one role, depending on the relation   between position and norm. Merton,   R. K. <i>A ambival&ecirc;ncia sociol&oacute;gica, </i>R.J. Zahar ed., 1979, pp. 19 ss.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">8</a> It is interesting to observe that the way of writing   the word "president" changed from the previous constitutions, in which this   word was not capitalized, to the Constitution of 1937, in which this word was   always capitalized.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">9</a> We owe this observation to Oliveiros S. Ferreira.    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br>   <a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">10</a> On December 13th 1968, under General Costa e Silva's   government,  Institutional Act n. 5 was edited, which, according to  then   vice-president Pedro Aleixo, founded the open dictatorship in Brazil, since it   gave every judge the prerogative of arresting people, without evidence and   basic individual guarantees, which was abolished by such Act.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">11</a> This is not the place to develop an analysis related to   the generation of the Ministry of Defense, but it is important to register this   generation was possible by the intervention of an organ over the three military   ministries, keeping the Forces Commanders the same former prerogatives. A   detailed essay about it is Fucille, Luis   A. (2006). Democracia e quest&atilde;o militar: a cria&ccedil;&atilde;o do Minist&eacute;rio da Defesa no   Brasil. Doctoral Dissertation in Social Sciences under Eli&eacute;zer   Rizzo de Oliveira's orientation. Campinas, IFCH-UNICAMP, <i>digit.</i>    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">12</a> Justice sentenced the president to pay back all the   expenses with the militaries to the public treasury. <i>O Estado de S. Paulo</i>,   12/07/2001. Weeks before, there was a similar threat regarding the property of   Ambassador Flecha de Lima, but in that case, the Armed Forces were not   summoned.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">13</a> As acknowledged by authorities, the Army was   positioned in Provid&ecirc;ncia in December/2007, when the security of the project   entitled "Cimento Social" was assigned to them, sponsored by the   Ministry of Cities [Minist&eacute;rio das Cidades], that promoted a deal with the   Ministry of Defense, mediated by senator Marcelo Crivela, local politician. It   is known that the different slums in this city are controlled by groups of drug   dealers. In Provid&ecirc;ncia, it is said the place is under Comando Vermelho's   protection, while its neighbor Morro da Mineira would be under control of the   group "Amigo dos Amigos", known as the former's rival. According to   formal complaints, on 14/06/2008, 11 militaries were in Provid&ecirc;ncia to handle   security under a lieutenant's command, who would have arrested three young kids   and took them to the Army command, that would have released them after a   discomposure. Not satisfied with the result, the lieutenant requested that the   three of them were taken to Morro da Mineira, after having negotiated that with   the criminal group. The result was their torture and death, all minors and   without criminal records. See details in <i>Folha de S. Paulo</i>, June 17 and   30, 2008.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">14</a> According to Law of Diretrizes and Bases   of the National Education: Art. 83. The military education is regulamented in   specific law,  em lei espec&iacute;fica, according to the fixed norms by education   systems. Brazil: MEC (Ministry of Education) - Law 9394/98.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">15</a> Although, as indicated, the GLO operations have been regulamented, a reform in   the Military Justice or in the legislation of the Military Process has not been   done so far. In the same way, the use of the Armed Forces in GLO operations   continues to be based on  alliances among the administrative bodies envolved,   without a clear autohority that can be responsible for the use of force.    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">16</a> This is the opinion, for instance, of some generals, as the ones from   Guararapes, that gather militaries for a long time and defend the ideas of not   only keeping but also increasing the political participation of their peers:   Cf. <a href="http://www.fortalweb.com.br/grupoguararapes/" target="_blank">http://www.fortalweb.com.br/grupoguararapes/</a>    <br>   <a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">17</a> It   is true that in the last few years this position, at least concerning the   government, has been different, with several initiative projects destined to   studies in the defense area and armed forces. Nevertheless, it is common the   academic society still considers such studies as non-scientific or tendentious.   It can be affirmed, therefore, the statement pronounced by Jos&eacute; Genu&iacute;no, old PT   partisan and politician, prevails: worrying about the Armed Forces and its   duties is a topic that "does not result in vote in democracy and it   results in jail in dictatorship".</p> </font>      ]]></body><back>
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