<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-5258</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Dados ]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Dados]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-5258</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) - Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-52582006000200002</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The budget process and legislative behavior: individual amendments, support for the executive, and government programs]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="fr"><![CDATA[Mécanismes budgétaires et comportement législatif: amendements individuels, appui au pouvoir exécutif et programmes de gouvernement]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[Processo orçamentário e comportamento legislativo: emendas individuais, apoio ao executivo e programas de governo]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Limongi]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Fernando]]></given-names>
</name>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Figueiredo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Argelina]]></given-names>
</name>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gomes]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Sandra]]></given-names>
</name>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="A">
<institution><![CDATA[,  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2006</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2006</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>2</volume>
<numero>se</numero>
<fpage>0</fpage>
<lpage>0</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-52582006000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-52582006000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-52582006000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="fr"><p><![CDATA[Dans cet article, on s'oppose à la thèse selon laquelle les amendements individuels sont fondamentaux pour un système d'échanges d'appui au gouvernement de la part de parlementaires aspirant à des politiques distributives comme l'une des formes de garantir leur réélection. À partir de l'analyse des ressources qui ont été attribuées par la voie d'amendements parlementaires, de leur distribution dans les différents programmes gouvernementaux et du vote nominal à la Chambre des Députés entre 1996 et 2001, on montre ici que les amendements individuels ne sont pas privilégiés par le pouvoir législatif lors du vote du budget, ni par le pouvoir exécutif lors de son exécution; il n'y a pas de différences entre un programme dicté par l'exécutif et le programme des législateurs; l'affiliation aux partis peut expliquer non seulement les votes à la Chambre mais aussi l'exécution des amendements individuels, ce qui en fait une variable-clé pour expliquer la relation Exécutif-Législatif.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[budget]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Executive Branch]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legislative behavior]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[budget amendments]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[budget]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[pouvoir exécutif]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[comportement législatif]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[amendements budgétaires]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><body><![CDATA[ <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="4"><b><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""></a>The    budget process and legislative behavior: individual amendments, support for    the executive, and government programs<a href="#_ftn1" title="">*</a></b></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>M&eacute;canismes    budg&eacute;taires et comportement l&eacute;gislatif: amendements individuels,    appui au pouvoir ex&eacute;cutif et programmes de gouvernement</b></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>Processo or&ccedil;ament&aacute;rio    e comportamento legislativo: emendas individuais, apoio ao executivo e programas    de governo</b></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>Fernando Limongi;    Argelina Figueiredo</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Translated by Sandra    Gomes    <br>   Translation from <a href="http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582005000400002&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=pt" target="_blank"><b>Dados    - Revista de Ciências Sociais</b>, v.48, n.4, p.737-776, Oct./Dec. 2005</a></font><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">.</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p> <Hr size="1" noshade>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>ABSTRACT</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The article challenges    the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging    favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive    policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated    through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government    programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from    1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized    either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its    implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the    Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both    House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus    an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><strong>Key words:    </strong>budget; Executive Branch; Legislative behavior; budget amendments.    </font></p> <hr size="1" noshade>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>R&Eacute;SUM&Eacute;</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Dans cet article,    on s'oppose &agrave; la th&egrave;se selon laquelle les amendements individuels    sont fondamentaux pour un syst&egrave;me d'&eacute;changes d'appui au gouvernement    de la part de parlementaires aspirant &agrave; des politiques distributives    comme l'une des formes de garantir leur r&eacute;&eacute;lection. &Agrave; partir    de l'analyse des ressources qui ont &eacute;t&eacute; attribu&eacute;es par    la voie d'amendements parlementaires, de leur distribution dans les diff&eacute;rents    programmes gouvernementaux et du vote nominal &agrave; la Chambre des D&eacute;put&eacute;s    entre 1996 et 2001, on montre ici que les amendements individuels ne sont pas    privil&eacute;gi&eacute;s par le pouvoir l&eacute;gislatif lors du vote du budget,    ni par le pouvoir ex&eacute;cutif lors de son ex&eacute;cution; il n'y a pas    de diff&eacute;rences entre un programme dict&eacute; par l'ex&eacute;cutif    et le programme des l&eacute;gislateurs; l'affiliation aux partis peut expliquer    non seulement les votes &agrave; la Chambre mais aussi l'ex&eacute;cution des    amendements individuels, ce qui en fait une variable-cl&eacute; pour expliquer    la relation Ex&eacute;cutif-L&eacute;gislatif.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>Keywords :</b>    budget; pouvoir ex&eacute;cutif; comportement l&eacute;gislatif; amendements    budg&eacute;taires.</font></p> <hr size="1" noshade>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>INTRODUCTION</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Analyses of Executive-Legislative    relations in Brazil assume the right of Congress to amend the budget as a central    point. In these analyses, the participation of Congress in the budgetary process    is reduced to the individual right to propose amendments to the budget. It is    not difficult to understand why this part of the budget process attracts so    much attention: individual amendments provide the elements that support the    current interpretation about the <i>modus operandi</i> of the Brazilian political    system. It provides, above all, the necessary evidence to argue that this system    revolves around individualistic politicians, who are only interested in clientelistic    and pork barrel distribution of public resources. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Individual amendments    are supposed to be the central part of a complex system of political exchanges    that can guarantee, in Congress, the support the government needs and, in the    electoral arena, the resources that representatives seek to deliver to their    constituencies. As the Executive has the final word regarding the authorization    of spending, individual amendments are seen as a "political currency" available    to politicians. The Executive could obtain support for his desired set of policies    by providing resources for pork barrel policies that representatives want to    deliver to their constituency. Therefore, this system would seal agreements    among the electorate, legislators and the Executive. In this sense, analyzing    individual amendments has been seen as the "lost link" that would join the electoral    and legislative arenas in a single analytical body. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Concerning the    electoral arena, the argument is based on the assumption that the basic need    of any politician is to find the necessary means to guarantee their reelection.    In order to do so, according to the current <i>analysis textbook</i>, there    is a strategy that can guarantee the highest political return for politicians,    i.e., to provide tangible benefits to clearly defined constituencies. Voters,    in acknowledgement to or, more precisely, as a way of paying back for the provided    services, would retribute with their votes. In other words, individual amendments    to the budget would be part of an electoral strategy identified by the specialized    literature as "the personal vote" (Cain, Ferejohn e Fiorina, 1987). The Brazilian    "electoral connection" – to use another fashionable term – would be, therefore,    dependent on the implementation of these amendaments<a name="b1"></a><a href="#1"><sup>1</sup></a>    . In fact, references to current concepts in North-American literature are not    even necessary here. The caricatural portrayal of politicians is not different    in the case of Brazil: they are individualistic and solely interested in getting    votes and, in doing so, they would sacrifice public welfare. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Regarding the legislative    arena, the argument follows similar patterns. It relies on the usual consequences    attributed to presidentialism, i.e., a lack of mechanisms that could guarantee    Presidents the political support needed to their legislative agenda. The Executive    needs the votes of legislators but it does not have the means to gather them.    Prime-ministers, on the contrary, could guarantee support by threatening to    dissolve Parliament or to anticipate elections, putting at risk the tenure of    legislators. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">However - so the    argument goes - as in Brazil the President controls budget execution, i.e. the    budget approved by Congress is not mandatory, the Executive is able to exchange    the resources that representatives want to deliver to their constituencies with    votes to approve the government agenda. Authorizing the execution of budget    resources, therefore, would be the way the Executive gathers support from Representatives.    </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> It is quite frequent    to hear in the Press and within the academic community, that there is a trade-off    between the authorization to execute amendments and support to the Executive    in roll-call votes. On the 27<sup>th</sup> of November 2003, when this article    started to be written, the headlines of the newspaper <i>O Estado de São Paulo</i>    concerning the approval, by the Senate, of a tax reform bill sent by the government    informed that Senators would receive a compensation for approving what the government    wanted by agreeing to authorize the spending of public resources demanded by    legislators' electoral clienteles. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Academic views    are no different. For Santos et alii (1997):</font></p>     <blockquote>        <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">"In the budget      game &#91;...&#93; is possible to identify two distinct logics: the Executive's,      acting to approve bills of the government agenda and, in the contemporary      context of economic stabilization, to cut expenses; and the Legislature's,      which is primarily interested in maximizing the electoral gains of its members      and, only secondarily, acting to approve bills that, representing general      public welfare, do not bring immediate individual gains. &#91;…&#93;. &#91;During      the phase of consideration of the Executive bill by Congress&#93; the logic      of the Legislature's game is predominant, forcing the Executive to negotiate      with the Budget Committee the bills it wants to see approved.    ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<br>     </font><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">However,      during the budget implementation stage, the Executive overturns this advantage.      &#91;…&#93; although deciding at the last moment of the process on this distributive      conflict, the Executive is still not absolute sovereign as it is forced to      negotiate vetoes, cuts, supplemental appropriations in exchange to parliamentary      support to the policies that are priority to the governmental agenda." (idem:      118-119).</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">According to Pereira    and Mueller (2002), the execution of individual amendments is "one of the most    important mechanisms that the Executive has at its disposal to negotiate its    preferences with the coalition in Congress". The control of the budget process    by the Executive gives "a low-cost and extremely useful political means to be    exchanged by political support from the government coalition in Congress" (idem:267).    For these authors:</font></p>     <blockquote>        <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">"The evidences      presented &#91;…&#93; show that the President rewards representatives who      vote systematically to approve the bills government is interested in, authorizing      the execution of their individual amendments, and, at the same time, punishes      the ones that did not vote for these bills by simply not executing the amendments      proposed by them" (idem:274).</font></p> </blockquote>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In this article,    we try to explore these arguments by looking not only at the empirical aspects    involved but also at their theoretical assumptions. First, it is important to    say that, independent of the point of view used to analyze these aspects, individual    amendments are far from being the most important way that Congress participates    in the budgetary process. Besides individual amendments, there are two other    types of amendments: collective – that are signed by State or Regional caucuses    or by Committees – and institutional – that are signed by the rapporteurs of    the budgetary annual bill, either the general or partial rapporteurs. From the    Congress point of view, individual amendments are not a priority.  Congress    allocates much more resources through the collective and the rapporteurs' amendments.    Since the definition of the amount of resources allocated by each type of amendments    is an internal decision of Congress, such evidence is enough to question the    view that the budgetary process is oriented exclusively to respond to individual    interests of representatives. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Nonetheless, given    the central role normally attributed to the liberation of resources to individual    amendments within Executive-Legislative relations, we look into the assumption    that votes are exchanged by the execution of amendments and we show that it    is not possible to establish this claimed causal relationship. In order to do    so, we examine the approval and the execution rates of individual amendments    for the 1996-2001 period<a name="b2"></a><a href="#2"><sup>2</sup></a>. What    we find is that amendments can be executed without the expected voting behavior,    and also votes are casted in support of the government without the expected    matching part – i.e., authorization for spending. Given the high rates of turnover    in the Brazilian Congress, there are cases in which to exchange votes for the    execution of amendments is not even possible. There are countless cases of representatives    voting according to the interests of the Executive but did not participate in    the budgetary process, and there are others who participated in the budget consideration    process, had their amendments executed but did not hold a tenure in Congress    anymore. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">We also discuss    the behavioral assumptions involved in the "political exchange" argument. The    argument that amendments are "a political currency" assumes that legislators    have a common interest, i.e., to promote distributive policies. These policies    are supposed to be the most appropriate way to raise the chances of representatives    being reelected. Implicitly, individual amendments are seen as an opposite tool    to the interests of the Executive as it is assumed that, if the Executive could    allocate resources freely, it would not sponsor the policies proposed by legislators.    According to this argument, when the President authorizes the outlay of resources    allocated by individual amendments, he is forced to do it against his own priorities.    Concerning the allocation of public resources, the Executive-Legislative relation    could be characterized as a zero-sum game.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">We argue that this    view completely ignores party membership, which divides representatives in two    fields: the ones supporting government and the opposition. From a political    point of view, this division is previous and more profound than the participation    in the budgetary process via individual amendments. Concerning specifically    the budgetary process, such relation is based on the centralization of budget    consideration. There is a delegation of power from backbenchers to party leaders    represented, in this case, by the general rapporteur and his direct collaborators    (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2002; 2003).</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">We show that there    is no significant differences regarding the allocation of public resources by    the two branches of government. Their priorities are not radically different.    To put it differently, there is no conflict of agendas. When resources allocated    by legislators are authorized to be executed, the Executive does not waver to    political pressures and abdicates to implement its own agenda. The allocation    of resources by legislators is rather complementary, not oppositional to the    Executive and the reason for this is the control the Executive has over the    budget process, which is much larger than normally assumed. The Executive is    able to channel the demands of representatives and to accommodate them within    its government program. Indeed, this explains why the Executive executes amendments    proposed either by opposition or allied legislators who do not vote according    to the interests of the government. </font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>BUDGET EXECUTION    AND SUPPORT TO THE EXECUTIVE</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The individual    amendment is only one of the ways representatives can change the budget proposal    sent by the Executive. Internal resolutions of the National Congress regulate    the participation of legislators during the budget consideration process – i.e.,    internal resolutions of the Budget Committee – CMO, in Portuguese<a name="b3"></a><a href="#3"><sup>3</sup></a>    – which also foresees the presentation of collective and rapporteurs' amendments.    </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The relative participation    of individual amendments in the total amount of resources allocated by the Legislature    is quite small. In the analyzed period, the participation of individual amendments    in all approved amendments made by Congress was only 17.4%. Put it conversely    in order to emphasize this point: 82.6% of all resources allocated by Congress    to public investments in the federal budget came from collective or institutional    actors (rapporteurs). This is a decision made by Congress itself. Of all resources    allocated in the budget, Congress opts to reserve the vast majority of them    to collective forms of amendments. It is not easy to adapt such a fact to the    usual emphasis on "personal vote" and the individualistic behavior of Brazilian    politicians. If individual amendments are so crucial to reelection proposes,    why to allocate the "lion's share" to other kinds of amendments?</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">It is also worth    noting that when the Executive is authorizing the execution of the budget, the    individual amendments of legislators are not a priority either. Individual amendments    have the lowest execution rates: the overall average for the period is 59.6%    in contrast with 78% of execution for Committees amendments, 62.2% for State    caucuses amendments and 65.4% for the general budget rapporteur. If legislators    had the bargaining power normally attributed to them, we would expect higher    levels of concessions in comparison to what they actually get. Moreover, if    individual amendments are so decisive for their political careers, why do they    not rebel against the low rates of execution? Or, put it in a different way,    if the government had the alleged difficulty in gathering support to his own    agenda, we could expect the focus to be on individual amendments made by legislators.    </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In sum, whether    we look into the allocations made by Congress or to the Executive's decision    to execute the resources allocated by the Legislature, we cannot find support    to the assumption that individual amendments are central in this process. In    both parts of this process, collective amendments and the ones presented by    rapporteurs are the priority. However, in spite of the fact that these figures    are public and known, the public opinion, the Press and political scientists    still believe that individual amendments are the central axis structuring the    budget process. These interpretations are based on false theoretical conceptions    and assumptions about the logic behind the Brazilian political system and we    return to this point further on. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Given the importance    normally attributed to individual amendments, in this paper we will not analyze    the remaining types of amendments and will concentrate on the first one. Our    objective is to show that even if they are analyzed alone – i.e., when the rest    of the budgetary process is ignored – the execution of individual amendments    does not support the argument that they are used as a "political currency" in    order to obtain parliamentary support. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Since 1995, when    an internal resolution of the Two-Houses Budget Committee (CMO) was approved    – every year Congress defines ceilings to individual amendments, limiting the    maximum number of amendments and the maximum amount of resources each legislator    can appropriate. Therefore, in this respect, there is no differentiation among    legislators. Throughout the whole period, a maximum of 20 amendments per representative    per year was the rule. Regarding the amount of resource available in the appropriation    bill, the ceiling has varied during the period. From 1996 to 1999, the ceiling    was established at R$ 1,5 million, raising to R$ 2 million in 2000. In the 2001    budget, this amount was again reviewed, changing to R$ 2.5 million<a name="b4"></a><a href="#4"><sup>4</sup></a>.    This means that, from the point of view of individuals, each legislator has    the same capacity to influence the final allocation of resources in the appropriation    bill. Party affiliation, the number of mandates, the position within the hierarchy    in Congress, region or State origins, connections with the Executive, in sum,    none of the legislators' characteristics affects their capacity to allocate    resources. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">As resources are    distributed in such a uniform way, there is no point in investigating which    group of legislators, whichever they might belong to, wins or looses with the    allocations made. The adopted rules that distribute resources equally neutralize    the influence that any other factor could have had to distinguish representatives    politically. Therefore, it makes no sense to talk about political exchanges    in order to get amendments approved. There is no support or interests to be    exchanged. Each of them has their quota secured beforehand and they are not    dependent on the votes of other legislators to get their interests secured.    Universalism is the adopted rule, which is granted in the Preliminary Report    written by the general rapporteur.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The adoption of    this rule affects the relationship among legislators and between them and the    rapporteurs. They are all treated as equal, a fact that neutralizes or, at least,    diminishes the degree of conflict that the access to scarce resources might    provoke. As far as it is known, before the adoption of this rule, the division    of resources among legislators was quite unequal, favoring subgroups of legislators    that had special access to the positions of power within the budgetary process.    In the previous scheme, the group connected to legislators controlling the production    of budget reports was in an advantageous position, giving rise to a huge scheme    of corruption which was revealed to the public in 1992 and investigated by Congress    in 1993.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The current uniform    division of resources among legislators should be seen, thus, as part of a rationalization    of legislative participation in the budgetary process, a rationalization that    awarded an institutional role to rapporteurs as they became more subject to    party leaders control and guarantees, therefore, the prevalence of the interests    of the majoritarian coalition supporting the Executive. By guaranteeing a uniform    distribution of resources to all representatives, the general rapporteurs of    the budget can act more freely as they do not need to arbitrate internal disputes    for resources. In this sense, this principle reduces the costs of approving    the proposal of the rapporteur. </font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Congressional internal    conflict is transferred to another stage of the budgetary process: the execution    or the authorization to spend budget items. During consideration of the budget    proposal, the distribution of resources is uniform but, during execution, the    logic is different. That is, the Executive, who has a wide degree of freedom    to execute the budget, as it is not mandatory, especially concerning resources    of the investment area, discriminate – or can discriminate – representatives.    For this reason, outlays do not necessarily have to match the distribution of    resources approved by legislators.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">There is a deep    contrast concerning the participation of representatives in the authorization    and execution stages. <a href="#tab1">Table 1</a> shows that individual execution    rates of legislators' amendments vary significantly<a name="b5"></a><a href="#5"><sup>5</sup></a>.    For example, for the 1996 approved budget, among the 444 legislators that allocated    resources for investment with individual amendments, 20.3% of them had an execution    rate lower than 10%. In this same year, but on the other extreme of the distribution,    only eight representatives (1.8% of the legislators that approved some amendment)    had the full amount of their amendments executed by the Executive. It is noticeable,    therefore, that execution, in opposition to authorization, differentiates legislators.</font></p>     <p><a name="tab1"></a></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><img src="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02tab01.gif"></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The final participation    of legislators concerning the allocation of resources is quite heterogeneous,    and this heterogeneity is the result of decisions made by the Executive to defer    spending (to impound) or to authorize the execution of allocated resources.    Given that the Executive has a high degree of freedom to choose which parts    of the budget will be implemented, we should ask what are the criteria used    by this branch to guide his decisions<a name="b6"></a><a href="#6"><sup>6</sup></a>.    It is worth noting that annual execution rates varied throughout the period.    The year that presented the lowest execution rates was 1996, when less than    40% of all approved individual amendments were executed, and over 50% of legislators    had less than 40% of their amounts executed. 1998 was another poor year for    representatives while 2001 was the most successful one. As we have argued elsewhere,    we believe this variation does not depend on the pressure exercised by Congress.    The overall rate is due to macroeconomic policies pursued by the government<a name="b7"></a><a href="#7"><sup>7</sup></a>.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">If execution rates    are organized by groups of parties, as in <a href="#tab2">Table 2</a> below,    we have a better idea about the criteria used by the Executive to guide his    decisions. Legislators belonging to center or right-wing parties that supported    the governement<a name="b8"></a><a href="#8"><sup>8</sup></a> are the ones who    benefited most, while left-wing members – or opposition in the analyzed period    – suffer the greatest losses. An obvious conclusion seems to emerge: the execution    of individual amendments is dictated by partisanship criteria.</font></p>     <p><a name="tab2"></a></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p align="center"><img src="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02tab02.gif"></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The support to    the Executive agenda in roll-call votes follows the same pattern. Members of    parties who belong to the government coalition support the government. The opposition    does not. A roll-call is considered part of the Executive agenda if voting refers    to a constitutional amendment and, at the same time, the government position    – against or in favor – is made public. It is a stricter criterion than normally    used and it allows a more accurate test of the hypothesis being explored here.    As the approval of amendments to the Constitution demands a qualified majority,    the vote of each legislator is more important to the Executive than in an ordinary,    simple majority roll-call. If a legislator, for whatever reason, did not vote,    his/her vote was classified as undisciplined if the Executive called for a 'yea'    vote<a name="b9"></a><a href="#9"><sup>9</sup></a>. Only those legislators voting    in 10 or more roll-calls within a year were included in the analysis. The number    of roll-calls considered varied per year. In order to maintain the consistency    in the analysis, the sample includes only legislators that presented amendments    to the budget and that did not switch to parties from opposition to allied or    vice-versa.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a href="#tab3">Table    3</a> shows clearly that voting in accordance to the government agenda is related    to party affiliation. The average support rate of a government coalition party    member is around 75% with some variation among parties<a name="b10"></a><a href="#10"><sup>10</sup></a>.    Legislators who are members of PFL and PSDB tended to vote more united and consistently    in comparison to legislators belonging to PPB and PMDB. In the latter two parties,    in some issues or areas, there were few legislators whose voting behavior resembles    opposition parties, which explains the fall in the average rates. </font></p>     <p><a name="tab3"></a></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><img src="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02tab03.gif"></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">There is an obvious    correlation between the execution of individual amendments and the behavior    in roll-call votes. The execution of the resources allocated by individual amendments    in the approved budget favors precisely the members of parties who vote in support    of the legislative agenda of the Executive. There is, thus, strong evidence    of a relationship between them. The thesis that asserts the execution of individual    amendments is used as a "political currency" suggests that this relationship    is the result of individual negotiations and that the President rewards or punishes    legislators according to their voting behavior – whether in favor or against    the government (Pereira and Mueller, 2002:274). If this is the case, we should    conclude that the partisan correlation is spurious. Party affiliation, therefore,    would not influence behavior on the floor or the execution of amendments. Legislators    would be individually rewarded or punished by the Executive. What would count    on this matter is their behavior on the floor, independent of the party they    belong to. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">It is no novelty    to point out that a correlation, showed either by regression analysis or comparison    of means, is not enough to demonstrate the existence of a causal association    between two variables. The problem is to specify whether there is a relationship    between the behavior on the floor and the execution of amendments that are independent    of party affiliation. If we find low execution rates and low government support    only among the representatives that belong to opposition parties and high rates    of execution and higher support to the government only among the members of    the government coalition parties, it will be difficult to distinguish between    the explanations based on individual relationships and the ones based on party    membership. Individual negotiations or negotiations centralized around party    leaders would produce similar results. The point is, therefore, how to separate    these two explanations. Given the correlation of both variables to party membership,    it matters to distinguish what can be credited to the party and to individual    negotiations.  If we find cases of left-wing legislators with high execution    rates and high rates of favorable votes to the Executive, and/or members of    the coalition parties who vote against the government and present low execution    rates, we would have strong evidences that negotiations are individual. Cases    like this would suggest the existence of an individual bargain in spite of party    affiliation. </font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Concerning the    first possibility, as <a href="#gra1">Graph 1</a> shows, there are no cases    of opposition members voting systematically with the government. The variation    of execution rates, though, is much higher than support to the government. Among    these representatives, the norm is low scores in both variables. Having said    that, we can still notice a few cases of medium to high rates of amendments    execution but without the expected correspondence on roll-call votes – in fact,    there are cases of legislators who gave no support at all to the government    and had their amendments fully executed. We can conclude, then, that the authorization    for spending, at least among left-wing party members, is not positively associated    with voting with the government. Amendments are executed without votes being    given to the Executive. For this subgroup of representatives, the variables    present a reasonable degree of independence. However, what we can definitely    say about the analyzed period is that left-wing members did not vote with the    government.</font></p>     <p><a name="gra1"></a></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><img src="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02gra01.gif"></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">When we turn to    the case of members of the government coalition, as it can be seen in <a href="#gra2">Graph    2</a>, we find more cases that could fit the argument of "political currency    for pork", as there are a considerable number of cases of low support to the    government and low execution rates. Nonetheless, there is a similar number of    cases with high execution rates but low government support – i.e., they are    Representatives who voted systematically against the government and still had    their amendments executed. The accumulation of cases of high support to the    government and low execution rates is of greater concern. In other words, there    are legislators who vote with the government although they do not receive, in    retribution, the execution of their amendments. As these cases are not the exception,    one can conclude that the disseminated assumption in the national political    chronicle of a strategy of 'political currency for pork' is not the standard    Executive-Legislative relation.</font></p>     <p><a name="gra2"></a></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><img src="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02gra02.gif"></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a href="#gra2">Graph    2</a> shows that the distribution of cases is quite disperse. There is a concentration    of cases on the right superior quadrant of the Graph. But it is clear that the    distribution of support to the Executive is more homogenous and more concentrated    in high values than the execution rates. Once again, we have indications that    the behavior of both variables follows different paths. Party membership is    a better predictor of voting behavior than the rates of execution of individual    amendments. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">We tested the hypothesis    that the partisan logic would determine both the behavior on the floor and the    rates of execution for amendments. This hypothesis can be demonstrated by comparing    results in three different models of logistic regression (<a href="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02box01.gif">Box    1</a>). The first model used only one explanatory variable, a dummy variable    identifying whether a representative belongs or not to the government coalition.    The second model uses the rates of execution as the independent variable. The    third one combines the two previous models, i.e., the rate of support to the    Executive is explained by party membership and rates of amendments execution.    </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In the three models,    the coefficients present the expected signals and are statistically significant,    a result probably already anticipated by the ones familiarized with this type    of analysis considering the evidences presented before and the number of cases    included in the analysis. What we want to compare, though, is the explanatory    capacity of each model to account for voting behavior on the floor. Therefore,    this comparison takes as a baseline all the votes with the government, which    represents 60.3% (40.459/67.055) of all votes given in the roll-calls included    in the analysis. Thus, it is not even necessary any statistical model to arrive    at a rate of correct prediction: if one simply "guesses" that all representatives    will vote with the government, the rate of correct prediction will be 60.3%    of the cases.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The first model,    which uses one variable identifying whether the legislator is a member of the    government coalition, predicts 75.36% of the votes correctly. The second model,    whose independent variable is the rate of execution of individual amendments,    predicts 67.86% of the votes correctly. The explanatory power of the rate of    execution of amendments is smaller than the previously one and, even worse,    it cannot improve the model results when added to the first estimation. The    difference between the first and the third model is null<a name="b11"></a><a href="#11"><sup>11</sup></a>.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">These results suggest    that party membership explains both the voting behavior on the floor and the    execution of amendments. This conclusion is reinforced when we look at the cases    of representatives who voted, although they had no amendments to be executed    and also the ones that had amendments executed without voting. In both cases,    party membership can be used as an explanatory variable. In other words, there    is a group of legislators whose behavior cannot be explained by the "political    currency for pork" thesis. The budget is amended and approved in one year but    executed throughout the following year. Because of the changes in the composition    of the Lower House, the set of representatives that have their amendments approved    are not necessarily the same ones that will be holding office when amendments    are executed. As a result, there are legislators who amend the budget bill and    do not hold any office (hence, cannot vote) in the year of execution and there    are representatives who vote but did not participate in the consideration process    of the budget and, thus, have no amendments to be executed. This last group    should be a problem for the Executive. If the liberation of resources for individual    amendments is the means by which the Executive can gather favorable votes to    his agenda, how can support be obtained? In these cases, the Executive would    not have the usual tool available to obtain support.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In post-electoral    years, as it is the case of 1999 in our database, the difference between Congress    composition at the time of approving the budget and executing amendments reaches    the extreme as the rates of turnover are relatively high. From the point of    view of the Executive, this should be an extremely difficult year in the legislative    arena<a name="b12"></a><a href="#12"><sup>12</sup></a>.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In this sense,    comparing the behavior of these two groups of legislators on the floor – the    ones with amendments to be executed and the ones with no amendments included    in the budget– should reveal interesting differences. However, as <a href="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02tab04.gif">Table    4</a> shows, the behavior of these two groups is not radically different. It    is worth noting that the number of representatives who did not participate in    the budget consideration process is quite large<a name="b13"></a><a href="#13"><sup>13</sup></a>.    </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">This is especially    the case of 1999, when a new elected Congress sworn in. In that year, 154 out    of 370 members of the government coalition did not have the opportunity to present    amendments to the budget<a name="b14"></a><a href="#14"><sup>14</sup></a>. Nevertheless,    these representatives voted accordingly to their party membership. Legislators    members of the government coalition followed the vote orientation announced    by the leader of the government on the floor, independently of having or not    amendments to be executed. How could the Executive have obtained these votes    in these cases? If the government is always depending on the liberation of resources    to govern, it would have been impossible to govern in 1999. The conclusion one    reaches is straightforward: voting behavior on the floor is determined by party    membership.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The opposite situation    should also be considered, i.e., the cases of representatives who had amendments    approved in the budget but were not members of Congress anymore at the time    of execution. If the Executive cannot count on these votes anymore, one should    expect the Executive not to execute these amendments. <a href="#tab5">Table    5</a> compares these two groups of representatives and shows that the rates    of amendment execution among legislators that hold office are higher in comparison    to non-reelected legislators. However, such a difference is far from being radical.    It calls the attention, above all, that amendments of representatives who did    not cast a single vote in the entire period are, in fact, executed. Important    to our argument here is that the rates of amendments execution among the members    of the government coalition holding or not office are quite similar. Once again    we conclude that party membership is crucial to understand Executive-Legislative    relations.</font></p>     <p><a name="tab5"></a></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><img src="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02tab05.gif"></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The execution of    amendments without the expected voting behavior or voting for the Executive    without amendments being executed do not fit the 'political currency for pork'    thesis. In these cases, by definition, the postulated 'exchanges' cannot take    place. Party membership explains both cases. Support to the Executive occurs    according to party lines even if amendments are not presented. Levels of individual    amendments execution also follow the government/opposition divide irrespective    of the possibility of the actual voting take place. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The notion that    there is something to be traded –votes by budgetary resources - assumes that    representatives and the Executive have independent, moreover, conflicting agendas.    The representatives' agenda would be expressed by individual amendments and    it is seen as a direct function of their electoral strategies. The outlay would    only take place when representatives exert pressure on the Executive who ends    up deviating resources from his own agenda to obtain the votes he needs to in    order to get his agenda approved. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Each branch allocation    pattern would follow the 'electoral connection' requirements, i.e., by the specific    links they have with their electoral basis. This argument treats legislators    as if they had homogenous interests – that is to say, as if all of them wanted    to pursue the same type of policies. The Executive, in turn, would be the only    political actor to bear in mind the general interests of the public. Each representative    would only see their own electorate, their constituency. All of them would,    in order to benefit their constituencies, use the same sort of policies, "delivering"    to them tangible benefits. Individual amendments would be the means by which    this electoral strategy becomes viable. In this sense, the execution of legislators'    amendments is seen as a concession made by the Executive, who would respond    to the particularistic interests of representatives in exchange to obtain, on    the floor, and as compensation, the votes necessary to approve the government    agenda. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">However, why should    we assume that the Executive and the Legislature are doomed to be in dispute?    The fact that political parties play a role in this relation or, put it in a    different way, there is a coalition of parties that support and another who    opposes the government leads one to realize that legislators do not have homogenous    interests, either concerning the policies they prefer or concerning the success    of the government. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Before we start    a more in-depth discussion about this point and its implications to understand    the role played by individual amendments, it is important to summarize the main    conclusions we have reached thus far. The connection between the analyzed variables    – execution of amendments and support to the Executive in the legislative arena    – is far from being direct. It is clear that one variable does not explain the    other. Both are dictated by a common cause: the party position in relation to    the government, although party membership does not perfectly predict the support    to the Executive. Party membership profile works better to explain the behavior    in roll-call votes than the rates of amendment execution, the reason being that    the Executive does not execute individual amendments as compensation to the    behavior of representatives. By the same token, it is not true that legislators    only support the government if their amendments are executed. </font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>BUDGET EXECUTION    AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES</b></font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">When political    scientists say that budget resources are allocated as a way of maximizing electoral    returns for representatives, they bear in mind a specific model of electoral    strategies pursued by politicians. In this kind of argument, politicians would    only be interested in their offices or mandates. In other words, politicians    are office-seeking and not policy-seeking, to use consolidated expressions in    the area. It follows from this reasoning that policies pursued by legislators    will be the ones that can maximize this end.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">North-American    literature calls this strategy the "personal vote". Politicians, by pursuing    this strategy, would prefer to create personal and individual connections with    their electorate, links that would be possible by providing public policies    that distribute tangible goods to specific groups. Thus, it follows from this    assumption that reelection-seekers legislators will use their amendment prerogative    in a uniform way. All of them would use amendments in the way the political    science "textbook" tell us they would, i.e., to promote distributive policies    in order to get, in exchange, crucial votes for their reelection.  </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">If all of them    adopted the same strategy, we would have to conclude that legislators cannot    be distinguished based on their party membership. Shared interests, including    distributive policies, would unite them against the interests of the Executive.    The latter, given its electoral connection to a national electorate and the    need to control macroeconomic effects of public spending, would be forced to    take into consideration the general interests of the public. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Therefore, according    to this argument, the execution of individual amendments would not contribute    to the implementation of government programs. Any amount of individual amendment    executed implies a reduction in the outlays the Executive would have preferred.    By executing these amendments, the Executive would transfer the resources, originally    allocated according to his priorities, to respond to the interests, necessarily    local and partial, of representatives. Even risking being repetitive, we want    to emphasize this point: the Executive would only execute amendments if he was    forced to do it, that is, as a mean of gaining the necessary votes to approve    his legislative agenda. Executive and Legislative would have mutually excluding    priorities. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">This thesis also    assumes that the Executive has two separate agendas, a legislative and a budgetary    one, and that these two are independent enough from each other to allow the    support given to one of them to be compensated by the losses incurred in the    other one. If you buy support in the legislative arena, you will sacrifice the    budgetary agenda. The legislative agenda is seen as belonging to the spheres    of policy choice while the decisions concerning the budget are seen as utility    transfers without any connection between the two. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In order to make    this argument valid, one would have to assume that either the two agendas, legislative    and budgetary, are independent – i.e., decisions made regarding to one of them    would not affect decisions on the other – or the actors could not see the inter-relations    between the two types of agendas. It is difficult to believe in any of these    two alternatives. How could be possible for representatives not to know that    the legislative agenda of the Executive that they are approving – for example,    the Law on Fiscal Responsibility – has consequences over the available budgetary    resources? Or how can one assume that the Executive would authorize spending    for small particularistic projects without noticing that the sum of all these    tiny resources will generate deficit and, as a result, undermine its policy    agenda? To assume that the Executive and the Legislature see the budgetary agenda    as independent from the legislative agenda is to suppose that one or the other    – or both – behave irrationally.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">There are no trade-offs    between an agenda dictated by representatives and another one dictated by the    Executive. There are no exchanges because there are not two agendas. If there    were two agendas, they would have to be the government and the opposition ones.    But, in fact, from the point of view of individual amendments, there is only    one agenda to be considered: the governmental one.  Individual amendments are    a small part inside this agenda but, and this is what it matters for this article,    they are still part of the government agenda. By allowing the execution of some    individual amendments, the Executive is still implementing its own agenda, which    part of the legislators are politically associated with, including, obviously,    the electoral arena. This is the next point to be discussed.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The right to present    amendments is the opportunity legislators have to participate in the process    of allocating resources within the budget bill, expressing their priorities    concerning public policies. However, although they can count on a fixed and    granted amount of appropriations, legislators cannot express their priorities    with no restrictions at all. The structure of the budget process defines which    programs or activities can be object of amendments. It is not possible to allocate    resources to new programs or activities that were not presented in the original    bill sent by the government. Moreover, if a legislator has the intention of    seeing their amendment executed, they should take into account the priorities    of the government and legislators are able to know what the priorities are.    It is enough to look at the previous year rates of execution or the budget bill    sent by the government to guess the Executive priorities. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Besides all the    constitutional restrictions that protect the Bill sent by the Executive, it    is also important to consider the way Congress organizes its own participation    in the budget process. As we have already discussed in other articles (Figueiredo    e Limongi, 2002; 2003), the decisions that, in reality, affect – or can affect    – the essence of the budget are made by the general and the partial rapporteurs.    That is to say that the consideration of a budgetary bill in Congress is highly    centralized and follows party lines. Regarding specifically individual amendments    – the decentralized part of the process – the amount of appropriations to be    divided is proposed by the general rapporteur in the preliminary report. As    these appropriations are defined normally by linear cuts in the original Bill    sent by the Executive, the distribution of individual amendments by categories    of spending (or any other unit that the budget may be structured) is defined    at this point<a name="b15"></a><a href="#15"><sup>15</sup></a>. Legislators    have restricted options on how to allocate resources that are granted to them.     </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Consequently, there    is no significant difference among political parties when we look at individual    amendments by the Ministries/agencies responsible for the actual execution of    the amendments or by government programs. <a href="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02tab06.gif">Table    6</a> presents the distribution of amendments by different spending units (normally,    a Ministry/Cabinet). The first four columns show the percentage of the total    for each group of parties (government coalition, small-right-wing and left-wing)    allocated to that unit. They show, thus, the priority that each political group    has given to one of these units. When we compare the entries in each one of    the political groups, it is clear that there is a convergence among legislators.    The priorities assigned by left-wing parties do not differ from the ones assigned    by government coalition members. </font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The last four columns    of <a href="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02tab06.gif">Table 6</a> show the average    execution rates of individual amendments for each unit analyzed. Clearly, the    government favors legislators who are members of its coalition in all units    of spending. In some units, this discrimination is smaller than in others. This    is specially the case of spending in the Ministry of Health (the National Fund    for Health and the National Health Foundation), which average rates of amendment    execution are more balanced. It is worth noting that these units of spending    concentrate around 20% of all resources allocated by individual amendments.    On the other hand, the case of the Ministry of Planning, which 37.6% of the    total amount of individual amendments is allocated to, shows marked differences    concerning the rates of execution. In this Ministry, representatives who are    members of the government coalition parties have 72.1% of their amendments executed    in contrast with 38.7% for the opposition. Having said that, it is important    to note that even for members of the coalition, execution rates varies with    the specific category. The execution rate for an oppositionist at the Ministry    of Planning, Budget and Management is higher than the one obtained by members    of the coalition in the Ministry of Education. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Similar findings    are seen when data is organized by government programs. The differences among    the groups of parties are smaller than the convergence among them. Once again,    within all programs it is noticeable that execution rates are higher for legislators    belonging to parties that support the government. However, the rates of execution    do depend also on the program overall execution rate.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">This data show    that there is no clear divergence of agendas among legislators when they are    grouped according to their position to the government. This reveals the capacity    of the Executive and the budget rapporteurs to direct individual amendments    to specific slots. The degree of freedom that representatives have is small.    The opposition cannot use the budget process as a way to implement its agenda.    </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The data reinforces    the conclusion reached before: execution of individual amendments is ruled by    political criteria. Amendments proposed by members of the government coalition    parties are more likely to be executed than the ones presented by the remaining    legislators. Yet, part of the amendments proposed by members of the opposition    is also executed and part of the amendments presented by representatives who    voted with the government is not executed. Moreover, there is a significant    variation in the rates of execution depending on the Ministries/agencies and    programs. To a large extent, this variation is the result of linear cuts made    by impoundment decrees. These cuts – issued by the Executive – follow the priorities    of public policies defined by this Branch of government.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a href="/img/revistas/s_dados/v2nse/a02tab07.gif">Table    7</a></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">It may be true    that parliamentary support to the Executive is crucial to the execution of amendments    but not as the result of a political exchange for every single bill being voted    on. The prospects for representatives getting their amendments executed depend    on the political party they belong to. The same is true for voting behavior:    party membership is a better predictor of the individual support to the Executive.    In sum, individual bargaining does not define the pattern of public spending    but party bargaining does.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>CONCLUSIONS</b></font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Individual amendments    are not the priority of the Legislature. Internal resolutions of Congress guarantee    that the vast majority of resources are channeled to collective and institutional    amendments. Individual amendments represent a small portion of legislative intervention    in the final allocation of resources (slightly above 15% of total amendments).    And this happens without any intervention from the Executive. That is to say,    as this is an internal decision of Congress, one has to be skeptical of the    fact that the budget process is oriented simply to respond to local or particularistic    interests of representatives' clienteles.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Despite all this,    given the central role normally attributed to the authorization of spending    in the explanation of Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil, we examined    in detail the hypothesis that execution of individual amendments are a 'political    currency' used by the Executive to obtain votes on the floor. We concluded that    is impossible to confirm the claimed causal relation. The authorization to execute    individual amendments cannot explain the behavior of legislators in roll-call    votes. Regression analyses show that party membership is a better predictor    of voting than execution amendment rates. Careful observation of the data show    a great number of members of the opposition that get their amendments executed    without the expected retribution on the floor. On the other hand, there are    members of the government coalition parties who behave "adequately" on the floor    and do not see their amendments executed. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">A more straightforward    way to test the existence of a trade-off between the execution of resources    and parliamentary support could be done by considering together both turnover    rates in Congress and the budgetary cycles. Amendments approved at year t may    or may not be executed only in year t+1. Hence, there are Congress members who    are present at time t but are not in time t+1. If amendments were "a political    currency" used to get support spending on pork, these amendments should not    have been executed. We have shown that this is not the case. The amendments    execution rates of members who were not present at time t+1, even considering    members of the opposition, are not zero. There are also cases of representatives    who swore in at time t+1 and did not present any amendments at time t. Hence,    the Executive would not be able to buy the support of these "new" members as    a "political currency". The Executive would simply not have a "political exchange    tool" at its disposal in order to persuade these legislators to vote in support    to the government agenda. As we show, these "new members" behave like the sophomores:    they vote according to party lines. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The fundamental    flaw of the "political currency" theses is due to its assumption, namely, that    representatives have a common interest in promoting distributive policies that    could grant (or would have the same positive effect to) their chances of reelection.    By extension, the interests of representatives are seen as in frontal antagonism    with the interests of the Executive as if there were two independent agendas.    As regard to the policies they prefer, the two branches are supposed to be playing    a zero-sum game. Therefore, when the Executive authorizes the execution of resources    allocated by individual amendments, the President would do it at the expense    of his own priorities. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">These arguments    miss a basic point: the structure of the conflict in the Brazilian political    system is not between the two branches of government but rather is based on    political party cleavages. Representatives are divided in two major groups:    the ones supporting the Executive and the opposition. This distinction implies    that the majority supporting the government approves the centralization of the    budget process in Congress. There is a delegation of power from representatives    to the general budget rapporteur and his direct collaborators. This delegation    explains the reduced role individual amendments play in the budgetary process    and the importance of macroeconomic variables for the rapporteurs' decisions.    Above all, the budget aims to guarantee the success of governmental policies,    especially the economic ones. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Regarding the priorities    of both branches, captured by the allocation of budgetary resources, the differences    are quite small. There are no conflictive agendas. More specifically, when the    Executive authorizes the execution of resources allocated by legislators, it    is not giving in to demands that harm the execution of its agenda. The allocation    of resources made by representatives is complementary, not contrary to the Executive's.    The latter is able to channel the demands of legislators and to accommodate    them within the programs that represent the government priorities. When the    Executive authorizes the execution of amendments proposed by members of the    opposition and/or the government coalition members who have not voted with the    government on the floor, it is simply because the Executive is executing its    own agenda. The control of the budget process by the Executive is so extensive    that not even opposition representatives have the ability to propose amendments    that could form an alternative agenda to the one presented by the government.    </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The right to present    individual amendments to the budget bill is an opportunity for representatives    to express their priorities in terms of public policies. Although they can count    on a guaranteed fixed amount of appropriations to allocate, representatives    cannot, however, express their priorities without restrictions. What is given    to them, basically, is the opportunity to complement an agenda that is defined    by the government.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>NOTES</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="1"></a><a href="#b1">1.</a>    These visions of the Brazilian system can be found, in different versions, in    Ames (1995a; 1995b; 2001); Bezerra (1999); Pereira (2000a; 2000b); Pereira e    Rennó (2001); Pereira e Mueller (2003). The consequences of this type of connection    to the economy are discussed by Franco (1995) and Serra (1994).</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="2"></a><a href="#b2">2.</a>    The database used here covers the period after the reformulation of the budgetary    process by the approval of Congress Resolution number 2/1995, a direct result    of the installation of an Investigation Committee formed as a response to a    corruption scheme that became public in 1992, involving members of the Budget    Committee, which ended up with many representatives losing their election mandates.     In reality, the participation of Congress in the 1994 and 1995 budgets was    quite limited. There is data available for the years before the hyper-inflation-control    Real Plan (1994) but it is virtually impossible to estimate rates of execution    as it would be necessary to correct the data according to inflation based on    the exact month of execution. The 2002 data were not available at the time this    article was being written. Therefore, the period covered here correspond to    the availability of data in order to test the hypothesis presented in the article.    Information on the organization of the database and the construction of variables    is presented at the Appendix. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="3"></a><a href="#b3">3.</a>    The official title of this Committee is "Comissão Mista de Planos, Orçamento    e Fiscalização – CMPOF" or Two-Houses Committee of Planning, Budgeting and Overseeing.    However, normally an abbreviated form of this title is used  "Comissão Mista    de Orçamento – CMO" or Joint Budget Committee. We adopt this last abbreviation    – CMO – throughout this article. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="4"></a><a href="#b4">4.</a>    The values used in this article were all corrected by inflation to values of    2001. Thus, the ceiling changed every year. It is important to notice that the    consistency tests that we developed to control the data made some of the amendments    that were registered as being approved to be excluded from our analysis. For    this reason, some legislators appear in our database with amounts of values    below the ceiling. Note also that some legislators did not exert the right of    presenting individual amendments. An additional source of differences in the    distribution of resources to each legislator is due to the decision of organizing    data only for appropriations allocated to the investment area. Please, refer    to the Appendix for detailed information about the adopted procedures. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="5"></a><a href="#b5">5.</a>    It is important to say that for all analyzed years, the number of legislators    that had their amendments approved was smaller than the total of members (513).    Besides legislators that did not present amendments, there are cases which all    members of a specific State preferred to transfer their individual resources    to State caucuses amendments. Maybe it is not too much to say that these two    types of behavior should not be observed if all legislators behaved in an individualistic    and distributive manner as normally attributed to them.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="6"></a><a href="#b6">6.</a>    It is important not to exaggerate this point of reasoning. The Executive's freedom    is not complete. The decrees of impoundment define cuts on budget units according    to the variations of revenues. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="7"></a><a href="#b7">7.</a>    See Figueiredo e Limongi (2002; 2003).</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="8"></a><a href="#b8">8.</a>    It is worth mentioning that small right-wing parties do not appear to receive    different treatment in comparison to larger ones that are members of the coalition    supporting the government. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="9"></a><a href="#b9">9.</a>    Unanimous roll-calls were excluded. Unanimous are all roll-calls that did not    present conflict among party leaders announced positions and which the minority    had less than 10% of total votes.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="10"></a><a href="#b10">10.</a>    These findings differ from previous analysis (for example, Figueiredo and Limongi,    2000) as the criteria to consider a roll-call differ in two respects: analyses    are restricted to constitutional amendments and the absenteeism is classified    as indiscipline. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="11"></a><a href="#b11">11.</a>    The same tests can be done to sub-samples based on different criteria – for    example, the degree of voting conflict – without changing the results. In all    models tested, the rate of execution of amendments does not improve the model    based solely on party affiliation. Better results are obtained if absentees    are not treated as non disciplined and excluded from the analysis as we usually    do. The results of all models are far from being adequate. This problem is related    to the structure of the data. The independent variables attach to each legislator    do not vary throughout a specific year. Therefore, as the majority of members    of the government coalition did vote with the government in the vast majority    of the cases, the model predicts that every member of the coalition will vote    with the government all time. </font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="12"></a><a href="#b12">12.</a>    Following the same line of reasoning, 1995 should also have been an extremely    difficult year for the Executive.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="13"></a><a href="#b13">13.</a>    The criteria to include these legislators in the analysis are the same ones    adopted in the previous analysis. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="14"></a><a href="#b14">14.</a>    Although the rates of reelection cannot be inferred from these figures, since    they are also affected by leaves of absence and retirement, it is worth noting    that these numbers should not be observed if rates of reelection were higher.    And low reelection rates should not occur were the electoral strategies of legislators    successful. The adaptation of the North-American model to the Brazilian reality    misses this basic point. The classical books of Mayhew (1974) and Fiorina (1989)    are all based on the observation that the reelection rates in the post-war United    States are very high.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a name="15"></a><a href="#b15">15.</a>    Individual amendments are also funded using the resources originally allocated    to cover extraordinary outlays (Reserva de Contigência) and by reestimating    revenues. </font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Codevasf – Companhia    de Desenvolvimento dos Vales do São Francisco e do Parnaíba (Company for the    Development of the São Francisco and Parnaíba Valleys)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">DNER – Departamento    Nacional de Estradas de Rodagem (National Department of Highways)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">DNOCS – Departamento    Nacional de Obras contra as Secas (National Department for Public Works against    Drought)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Embratur – Instituto    Brasileiro de Turismo (Brazilian Institute of Tourism)</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">GOV – Members of    the government coalition parties</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Ibama – Instituto    Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis (Brazilian Institute    of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Indesp – Instituto    Nacional do Desenvolvimento do Desporto (National Institute for the Development    of Sports)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">LWP – Left-wing    parties</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PC do B – Partido    Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PDT – Partido Democrático    Trabalhista (Labor Democratic Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PFL –Partido da    Frente Liberal (Liberal Front Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PHS – Partido Humanista    da Solidariedade (Humanist Solidarity Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PL – Partido Liberal    (Liberal Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PMDB – Partido    do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement)</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PMN – Partido da    Mobilização Nacional (National Mobilization Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PPB – Partido Progressista    Brasileiro (Brazilian Progressive Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PPS – Partido Popular    Socialista (Popular Socialist Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Prona – Partido    da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional (National Order Reconstruction Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PSB – Partido Socialista    Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PSC – Partido Social    Cristão (Christian Social Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PSD – Partido Social    Democrático (Social Democratic Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PSDB – Partido    da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PSL – Partido Social    Liberal (Social Liberal Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PST – Partido Social    Trabalhista (Social Laborist Party)</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PSTU – Partido    Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado (Unified Workers Socialist Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PT – Partido dos    Trabalhadores (Workers Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PTB – Partido Trabalhista    Brasileiro (Brazilian Laborist Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PTN – Partido Trabalhista    Nacional (National Laborist Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PV – Partido Verde    (Green Party)</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">RWP – Right-wing    parties</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Sudene – Superintendência    do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (Office for the Superintendency of the Development    of the Northeast Region)</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>REFERENCES</b></font></p>     <!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">AMES, Barry. (1995a),    &quot;Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting    in the Brazilian Congress&quot;. <i>The Journal of Politics</i>, vol. 57, nº    2, pp. 324-343.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">_____. (1995b),    &quot;Electoral Strategy under Open-list Proportional Representation&quot;.    <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, vol. 39, nº 2, pp. 406-433.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">_____. (2001),    <i>The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil</i>. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan    Press.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">BEZERRA, Marcos    Otávio. (1999), <i>Em Nome das Bases: Política, Favor e Dependência Pessoal</i>.    Rio de Janeiro, Relume Dumará.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">CAIN, Bruce, FEREJOHN,    John e FIORINA, Morris. (1987), <i>The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and    Electoral Independence</i>. Harvard, Harvard University Press.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">FIGUEIREDO, Argelina    e LIMONGI, Fernando. (2000), &quot;Presidential Power, Legislative Organization    and Party Behavior in Brazil&quot;. Comparative Politics, vol. 32, nº 2, pp.    151-170.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">_____. (2002),    &quot;Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos Políticos e Política Orçamentária&quot;.    <i>Dados</i>, vol. 45, nº 2, pp. 303-339.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">_____. (2003),    &quot;O Legislativo e Âncora Fiscal&quot;, <i>in</i> F. Rezende e A. Cunha (eds.),    <i>O Orçamento e a Transição de Poder</i>. Rio de Janeiro, Fundação Getulio    Vargas Editora, pp. 55-91.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">FIORINA, Morris    P. (1989), <i>Congress: The Keystone of Washington Establishment</i>. New Haven,    Yale University Press.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">FRANCO, Gustavo    Henrique Barroso. (1995), <i>O Plano Real e outros Ensaios</i>. Rio de Janeiro,    Francisco Alves.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">MAYHEW, David.    (1974), <i>The Electoral Connection</i>. New Haven, Yale University Press.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PEREIRA, Carlos.    (2000a), What Are the Conditions for the Presidential Success in the Legislative    Arena? The Brazilian Electoral Connection. Doctorate Thesis, New School University,    New York.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">_____. (2000b),    &quot;Why Have Brazilian Legislators Decided to Clean up their Sidewalks? The    Influence of the Brazilian Political Institutions on the Process of State Reform&quot;,    <i>in</i> S. Nagel (ed.), <i>Handbook of Global Political Policy</i>. New York,    Marcel Dekker, Inc.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">_____ e RENNÓ,    Lúcio. (2001), &quot;O que É que o Reeleito Tem? Dinâmicas Político-Institucionais    Locais e Nacionais nas Eleições de 1998 para a Câmara dos Deputados&quot;. <i>Dados</i>,    vol. 44, nº 2, pp. 323-362.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">PEREIRA, Carlos    e MUELLER, Bernardo. (2002), &quot;Comportamento Estratégico em Presidencialismo    de Coalizão: As Relações entre Executivo e Legislativo na Elaboração do Orçamento    Brasileiro&quot;. <i>Dados</i>, vol. 45, nº 2, pp. 265-301.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">_____. (2003),    &quot;Partidos Fracos na Arena Eleitoral e Partidos Fortes na Arena Legislativa:    A Conexão Eleitoral no Brasil&quot;. <i>Dados</i>, vol. 46, nº 4, pp. 735-771.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">SANTOS, Maria Helena    de Castro, MACHADO, Érica Massimo e ROCHA, Paulo Eduardo Nunes de Moura. (1997),    &quot;O Jogo Orçamentário da União: Relações Executivo-Legislativo na Terra    do <i>Pork-Barrel</i>&quot;, in E. Diniz e S. Azevedo (eds.), <i>Reforma do    Estado e Democracia no Brasil</i>. Brasília, Editora da UnB/ENAP.</font><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">SERRA, José. (1994),    <i>O Orçamento no Brasil: As Raízes da Crise</i>. São Paulo, Atual Editora.</font><p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>Argelina Figueiredo</b>    is associated professor of the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de    Janeiro – Iuperj and coordinates the political and society research area of    the Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento – Cebrap. She is the author    of <i>Democracia ou Reformas? Alternativas Democráticas à Crise Política</i>    (Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1993), and the co-author, with Fernando Limongi,    of <i>Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional</i> (Rio de Janeiro/São    Paulo, Fundação Getúlio Vargas Editora/Fapesp, 1999).</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>Fernando Limongi</b>    is professor at Universidade de São Paulo – USP and researcher of the Centro    Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento – Cebrap. He is the co-author, with Argelina    Figueiredo, of <i>Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional</i> (Rio    de Janeiro/São Paulo, Fundação Getúlio Vargas Editora/Fapesp, 1999), and, with    Adam Przeworsi, Michael E. Alvarez and José Antonio Cheibub, of <i>Democracy    and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990</i>    (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000).    <br>   </font><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="">*</a> A preliminary version of this text was presented at the 4<sup>th</sup>    National Meeting of the Brazilian Association of Political Science, in Rio de    Janeiro, from 21<sup>st</sup> to 24<sup>th </sup>July, 2004. Later versions    of this text benefited from the comments of the discussant, Octavio Amorim Neto,    the participants of the event and Dados' Journal reviewers. This research counts    on financial support from the State of São Paulo Research Foundation – FAPESP    and is part of a book in progress that analyzes the participation of Congress    in the budget process. We would like to say that this article analyzes a specific    aspect of a much wider and complex process which would be impossible to be done    in the limits of an article.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>APPENDIX</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Notes on the Organization    of the Federal Budget Database, Cebrap</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The source of information    of the data organized here is the database called "Execução Orçamentária da    União" available on the Internet at the Comissão Mista de Orçamento e Fiscalização    (Budget Committee) web site, organized by the Budget and Financial Overseeing    Consultancy from the House of Representatives (Câmara dos Deputados) together    with the Center of Informatics and Data Processing from the Federal Senate (Senado    Federal) – Prodasen. This database was reorganized specifically for this research    distinguishing the allocations in the smallest budget unit (called Rubrica)    for the Executive and the Legislature, both for the Budget/appropriation bill    and the execution of the Annual Budget Law &#91;Budget databases&#93;.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The original databases    give detailed information on each stage of the budgetary process: the project    sent by the Executive, the amendments approved in Congress, the final appropriation    bill, the presidential vetoes, the bill sanctioned by the President and, finally,    the amounts executed, which, besides the figures allocated in the law, includes    extra supplementary credits or cancellations that may change budget units originally    set in the appropriation bill.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The first treatment    of the original data aimed to give internal consistency between the database    containing the parliamentary amendments and the database on the resources actually    spent. For example, when in the database of parliamentary amendments the amount    approved was higher than the same record in the appropriation bill database,    corrections were done. Therefore, the original amount of resources (in <i>Reais</i>)    recorded at the amendments database was reviewed based on the amount approved    in the appropriation bill. It is very likely that these reviewed records are,    in fact, errors as they could not have been executed if they were not recorded    in the appropriation bill. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Additionally, it    was necessary to identify the amendments made to the Investment area, which    meant to identify the 'group/item of spending' (called GND, in Portuguese) of    each amendment as this information was not readily available. A set of computer    routines made the association between amendments and GND and only small corrections,    for internal consistency, had to be done when computer routines was not enough    to correct them. We built, therefore, parallel and integrated databases of all    approved amendments for each year. The number of amendments varies each year    from 5.000 to 10.000. </font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In order to define    the Executive part of the approved budget we simply subtracted the amount in    the budget/appropriation bill approved by Congress and sanctioned by the Executive    from the corrected amendments database, guaranteeing, once again, internal consistency    of all databases. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Another procedure    adopted was to sum all sorts of possible cuts, reallocations and supplementary    credits that take place into one single variable that we called 'supplements'.    Then, we calculated the 'authorized' amount of Reais for every single amendment/GND    (or the real amount authorized for execution), which was the difference between    the appropriation bill and the 'supplements'. It is worth noting that a 'supplement'    that cuts money from an approved amendment has a negative value. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Therefore, we could    follow the execution of every amendment by different GNDs. Other corrections    were done at this stage, to guarantee internal consistency among the databases,    basically making sure that the executed amount would not be higher that the    'authorized' amount calculated previously and that there were no repetitions    of cases. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Once the amount    authorized for execution was ready, we could link this information to the approved    amendments database and calculate the rate of execution for every single amendment.     At this stage, there were cases we needed to infer the rate of execution because    a budget item can received more than one amendment (to the same item). We chose,    in these cases, to calculate the proportional contribution of each amendment    to the total amount approved in an item and adopted the same (proportional)    rule to estimate the amounts authorized for each amendment. So, for example,    if a specific amendment contributed to 50% of the approved budget item, we inferred    that 50% of the execution (of this same item) was from that specific amendment.    Therefore, we could guarantee no double-counting records and maintained internal    consistency of the databases. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Finally, we would    like to note that the data organized in this way – in order to be able to have    information disaggregated to the smallest budget unit possible and maintain    consistency – present marginal differences when we compare the amounts sum up    by ministries, agencies, programs etc. and that can be found in the Congress    or government web sites.</font></p>      ]]></body><back>
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