versión impresa ISSN 0100-512X
Kriterion v.3 n.se Belo Horizonte 2007
The disguise of the force
O disfarce da força
Professor of Philosophy in Faculty João Paulo II FAJOPA MaríliaSP
Translated by Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves
Translation from Kriterion, Belo Horizonte, v.47, n.114, p. 259-271, Dec. 2006.
In this article we intend to analyze the definition of justice that Paschal offers such as it presents itself in the "kingdom of the concupiscence". For him, justice is "prevention of sedition". Preventing any revolt is the guarantee of peace in the State. For in such a way, the good art in governing is not enough, stood out Trois discours sur la condition des grandes, it is necessary to use the force. However, as the force if does not leave to manipulate for dealing with a concrete quality, whereas justice lends itself to this, being a spiritual quality, justice is manipulated to justify the force empted the old concept of justice: "giving to each one what it must to", it becomes the disguise of the force.
Keywords: justice; force; custom; concupiscence.
Neste artigo pretendemos analisar a definição de justiça que Pascal oferece, tal como ela se apresenta no "reino da concupiscência". Para ele, a justiça é "prevenção da sedição" (La 66; B.326). Prevenir qualquer revolta é a garantia da paz no Estado. Para tanto, não basta a arte do bem governar, ressaltada nos "Trois discours sur la condition des grands", é preciso usar a força. Ora, como a força não se deixa manipular por se tratar de uma qualidade palpável, ao passo que a justiça se presta a isso, por ser uma qualidade espiritual, manipula-se a justiça para justificar a força. Esvaziado o velho conceito de justiça: "dar a cada um o que lhe é devido", esta passa a ser o disfarce da força.
Palavras-chave: Justiça; Força; Costume; Concupiscência
Pascal introduces the man in the Nature as "[...] one anything in relation to the infinite, an everything with relationship to the anything, a middle between anything and everything, infinitely moved away of understanding the extremes; the end of the things and your beginnings are for him hidden of invincible way in an impenetrable secret [...]" (L.199; B.72). The science of the nature is in such way unprovided foundations that nothing reveals concerning the essence or of the purpose of the world. In the same way, the Pascal's analysis of the politics presents this as lacking of argumentation. "[...] Prisoner in a small cell [...]" (L. 199; B.72) in the infinite universe, the pascalian man is, in society, thrown, at random, in a "ignored island."
In this ignored island, in that each individual judges to be "king and emperor", due to concupiscence, this that is cause and consequence of the fall:
all the men hate each other naturally each other. It was used as it was able to her of the concupiscence to do her to serve to the very public. But that doesn't pass of feigning and of a false image of the charity, because in the bottom it is not more than hate (L. 210; B. 451).
They were based and removed of the concupiscence admirable rules of politics, of morals and of justice. But, in the bottom, that ugly bottom of the man, that fingimentum malum is just covers. It is not missing (L. 211; B. 453).
If in society the human concupiscence is just covers, in it the men are guided by the greed. The human society is then a true kingdom of the concupiscence, in which all the men want to dominate and nor all can, but just some. She comes how divided among dominant and dominated. The dominant party takes the power and there it stays for the force. The force is then that that is in the base of the men's society. Only the force is capable to moderate the human ambition.
If those that dominate only dominate for the force, there are neither a Natural Right nor a divine attribute that they make to place them, natural or of supernatural way, above the others, granting to them a true right of governing. In this kingdom of the concupiscence the justice is, just as Pascal it defines it, "the forecast of the sedition" (L. 66; B. 326), because it impedes that the lack of justice that is in the base of the society is known by all. Now, if the justice is that that prevents the revolt, the laws of the State, seeking to the justice, they are established for the force. How did the people start then to obey to the laws and to respect the dominant ones? Which done the means use for that? And which does the human artifice for the laws root justified, in other words, how the justice, heterogeneous to the force, did it become his disguise?
"Imagination. It is that dominant part of the man, that schoolmistress of the mistake and of the falsehood [...]" (L. 44; B. 82). The imagination is a potency and a dominant potency. Elevated is the force of that potency to the point of to value the small things and to depreciate the big ones; of taking the people to have faith. To the that force of the imagination the men don't resist.
[...] Our magistrates met that mystery well. Your red gowns, the ermines with that they are rocked, the palaces where judge, the flower-of-lis, that whole august apparatus was very necessary, and if the doctors didn't have gowns and mules, and if the doctors didn't have square caps and very wide clothes of four parts, they could never have deceived the people that cannot resist it such authentic exhibition. If they had the true justice, and if the doctors had the true art of curing, they would not have it to do with your square caps [...], but possessing imaginary sciences is only necessary that throw hand of those empty spaces instruments that play the imagination what they make appeal and by that, in fact, they provoke respect [...] (L. 44: B.82).
Red gowns, ermines, flower-of-lis, gowns, squared caps, all those empty spaces instruments are necessary to mask the absence of the true justice and of the true art of curing. As well as, surprising the imagination of those that attend such authentic shop window, to pull up them respect and the faith that they possess the true science. Once obtained the faith and the respect by the force of the imagination, the magistrates, that don't also resist the such force, start to have faith that they, in fact, possess a true knowledge.
Our kings not "[...] they seek those fantasies. They don't disguise with extraordinary clothes for us to seem extraordinary [...]" (L. 44; B. 82). The kings spare those disguises in your public appearances, because "[...] they make to accompany for guards, for men with scars. Those armed troops that only have hands and it forces for them, the bugles and the drums that march ahead and those legions that surround make them to shake the firmest. They don't have the clothes, but they have the force [...]" (L. 44; B. 82). Accustomed to see the king always accompanied for "armed troops", the people believe that him, having all force, it possesses the true power. "The bugles and the drums that march to your front", they announce such to can. The faith in the king's power does with that the people worship him to the point of to say that: "[...] the character of the divinity is printed in your face" (L. 25; B. 308). The king "doesn't need extraordinary clothes to seem extraordinary", because the armed army that accompanies covers his body in majesty body. It is with this body multiplied that the people see the king. And this, in turn, that doesn't also resist by force of the imagination, sees himself with the eyes of the people: he sees himself as it is seen. The king sees himself as another one the youth's Luis XIV such point to affirm: "the State is me" (Louis Marin, 1997, p.139). Not only the people believe that the king is the detainer of all power, but the own king also believes that he is detainer of an absolute power.
It is own of the imagination, due to the credibility that she raises, to give reality consistence to the appearances. "[...] The imagination has everything; it makes the beauty, the justice and the happiness that it is everything in the world [...]" (L. 44; B. 82). It is for the force of that dominant potency that the people, obeying the laws, he believes to obey the justice that imagines. The imagination is an indispensable file so that the party dominant, same assuming the power and there staying for the force, it gets to start of the people the recognition and the obedience.
Force and Justice
Getting the public respect, the dominant party can exercise his force instituting the laws, and these, in turn, they become habit and, with that, they avoid the reciprocal destruction, once, in that kingdom of the concupiscence, all judge to be "kings and emperors." Covered in law and habit, the force avoids the civil war and it gets the peace of the State.
The largest of the evils for Pascal is the civil wars (L. 94; B. 313); and the peace is well the sovereign of the State (L. 81; B. 299). The civil war is the largest of the evils, because in it the concupiscence surfaces. All the men, guided by the greed, they seek exclusively to your interests. All want to dominate. The civil war is the war of all against all. And the sovereign well of the State it is the peace, in other words, when the interests of most are satisfied of minimal way, when the greed, satisfied, shelter stays. This apparent peace is only reached if the revolts be inhibited. With effect, if the justice is defined as the prevention of the revolt and if this is only obtained when the men's concupiscence is, somehow, satisfied, we can affirm that for Pascal the justice is empty of its substantially essence: to give to each one that is him due. It is not treated more than a natural right than each individual could dispose and that, once not respected, he would be entitled of claiming it; and the ruler's duty wouldn't be of giving him that is him due, but simply of giving up of minimal way to the interests of most.
This art of governing: to satisfy to the interests of most, Pascal introduces it to the youth duke in Trois Discours sur la Condition des Grands:
You are enclosed of a small number of people, on which you reign to your way. Those people are full of concupiscence. They ask for you the goods of the concupiscence; it is the concupiscence that links them to you. Therefore, you are properly a concupiscence king. Your kingdom is of small extension; but in that you are same to the largest kings of the earth; so much as you, they are concupiscence kings. It is the concupiscence that makes your force, that is, the ownership of the things that the men's greed wants.
But knowing your natural condition [that maintains it in a perfect equality with all the men], you use the means that she offers and you don't intend to reign for other road to not to be for that that makes you king, [that is that established by the men]. It is not your force and your natural potency that submits to you all the people. You don't intend, therefore, to dominate them for the force, nor to treat them with hardness. Satisfy your fairs desires; you alleviate your needs, tends pleasure in being kind; you make the possible for them to progress and you will be acting as true concupiscence king (Pascal, 1963, p.368).
If that united rulers and governed it is the concupiscence, the only way of governing it consists of pleasing the men's greed. Doing with that they obey the laws judging to obey to the justice that you/they imagine. In this kingdom of the concupiscence, the only way of getting the peace is to prevent all and any sedition.
Though, if the concession to the interests of most is necessary to prevent the revolt, it isn't enough. It's necessary to use of other artifices to inhibit any mutiny. To reach such end, the men united the justice to the force.
In the fragment L. 85; B. 878, Pascal sustains not to be possible to put the force in the hands of the justice, for that they put the justice in the hands of the force. This because the force doesn't let to manipulate, once it is a "tangible quality", while the justice is a "spiritual quality" and, as such, it can be disposed her as it is wanted. Couldn't manipulate the force, it was manipulated the justice. Like this, the force it became fair: "[...] like this calls like fair exactly that is mandatory to observe [...]" (L. 85; B. 878).
To put the justice in the hands of the force implicates in forging the justice to legalize the force. Justifying the force is only possible to adapt the justice to the kingdom of the concupiscence. Only in that way it can feel the appearance of justice to the men's society, whose bow is the greed.
On that will base the man the economy of the world that wants to govern? Will it be on each individual's care? That confusion! Will it be about the justice? He ignores it. Certainly if he knew it would not have established that maxim, the most general of all the ones that exist among the men, that each one follows the habits of your country. The splendor of the true justness would have subdued all the people [...]. (L. 60; B. 294).
The government of the world cannot be based nor on the men's care, nor in the justice. The first because, moved by the greed, each individual would seek to their own interests and not to the very common, what would cart an absurd confusion and the own way government it would be destroyed by your own foundation. The second because, the men ignore the justice. The proof of this ignorance, Pascal finds it in the most general maxim of all: "that each one follows the habits of your country." Now, if the true justice was known by the men, it should govern all the people. The geographical limits of the countries would not limit the justice: "[...] funny justice that that a river limits [...]" (L. 60; B. 294). Like this, the people would not have anything to do with the habits of their country, because they would be subdued by the justice.
The habits are transmitted the generation of generation and, like this, they are established without she can mark your origin. And, in the same way that it cannot mark their origin, it cannot also mark their end, once they can change: "[...] in few years of ownership, the fundamental laws change; the right has your times [...]" (L. 60; B. 294). Now, if the habits can change of times in times; and if they become the maxim more followed by each country; and puts the laws, that govern the people, to sustain in the habits, the State is based in quite fragile bases. Their laws are flotation.
"[...] The habit (it is) all the justness, for the simple and only reason that is received [...]" (L. 60; B. 294). The habit, received by all, it takes them to judge that it is exactly, once all receive it. Its authority resides in all the men's fact to follow it. Being the habit all the justness, and puts the fundamental laws of the State to sustain in him, that implicates that there are not natural laws common to all the countries, that subdued all the people. "[...] They exist without a doubt naturals laws, but that beautiful rotten reason everything corrupted [...]" (L. 60; B. 294).
They corrupt the reason the men's interests, the desire of power and the force of the imagination. Corrupted the reason, the natural laws stop being followed for the men and, in his place, the habit become that that equals all of them, once all receive it: "[...] can it have something funnier than a man's fact has the right of killing me because it lives on the other side of the water and because his prince has some disagreement with mine, although I don't have any disagreement with him own? [...]" (L. 60; B. 294).
For to be subdued by the habit, for the fact of the fundamental laws of the State be sustained by him, the justice can only be defined as the "prevention of the sedition", because "[...] the art of bestirring, to subvert the states is in affecting the established habits, probing until their source to point them the authority lack and of justice [...]" (L. 60; B. 294). The established habits are affected when it is leaving until your source showing your authority lack and of justice. However, as the laws of the State if they sustain in the established habits, affecting these, that is destroyed. Like this, the revolt, that "art of bestirring", "it is a right game to lose everything" (L. 60; B. 294). The justice as "prevention of the sedition", it impedes that the lack of justice and of authority, that they are in the base of the State, come to the surface. The justice becomes then that that impedes that the absence of justice, for the which the men let to govern, be known. In other terms: the established justice is that that impedes that the non justice of the State is known. So that there is peace and it is that that seeks the established justice - it is necessary to hide to the men in what it is based the laws of the State.
In the fragment L.86; B. 297, Pascal points out the absence of the true justice in the men's society: "Veri Júris. We don't have it more. If we had, we would not take as rule of justice to follow the habits of the country. It was there that, not could find the fair, it was found the fort etc." The true right and the pure justice is us absent: "we don't have it more." The man is not guided then by the idea of justice. For that reason it is that the habits of the country are taken as rule of justice. The verb régler in the Thoughts floodgate a resignation idea, just as it points us Laurent Thirouin: "a phenomenon is ruled in the lack of dominating it, of understanding it, when one renounce to take possession of its true organization" (Thirouin, 1991, p. 68). With effect, the habits are taken as rule of justice, because the true justice is not understood.
Not being possible to follow the idea of justice to establish the laws, this that it would be the concrete expression of that, the men's society begins with the force: "[...] let us imagine that see it being formed. It happens without a doubt that they will beat until that the strongest part oppresses the weakest, and that finally there is a dominant party [...]" (L. 828; B. 304). The force becomes the foundation of the habit, because this is established for that: "the force is the queen of the world [...] it is her that makes the opinion" (L. 554; B. 303); if it is angry or second murderer "the side of the water" (L.51; B. 293). The habit, established for the force, it is generalized in justice: "[...] not could do with that roots mandatory to obey to the justice, it was done with that will obey the force exactly" (L. 81; B. 299).
The force is in the base of the men's society and not the justice. If this roots be its origin and your source, it would be its end. It is for the force and not for the justice that the dominant party takes the power and there it stays. It is also for her that the people let to govern, once the habit is established by her and later widespread in justice.
"The justice is what is established; and all our established laws will be had like this necessarily as fair without being examined, because they are established" (L. 645; B. 312). The established justice doesn't obey the idea of justice, once the men ignore the true justice. For which through her does settle down? Not only the justice is established, but also the laws. These are established for the force. Why are they had then necessarily as fair without same they be examined? Why that need? Because they are established for the force. If the force establishes the laws and, therefore, it establishes herself as fair, that justice is not discussed. It is not discussed with the force. The quality of the force is tangible. There is not the one to be examined. It is imposed by your quality. The laws, instituted by the force, they possess the power to inhibit any riots. With effect, if the justice is the "prevention of the sedition", the laws are necessarily had as fair. It is then the force that becomes fair. The justice is a human construction just based on the force. I score useful to avoid the civil war: the war of all against all.
If, in the men's society, the force is that it is fair, the justice is not fortified by the institution of the laws. Established by the force, the laws are not the concrete expression of the true justice. But, if the laws, once established, they are had as fair, it is the force that is justified. Justifying the force, the justice becomes its disguise.
In the fragment L. 103; B. 298 entitled justice, it forces, Pascal exposes the way by which the force went justified.
It is fair that what is exactly it is proceeded; it is necessary that what is it more fort is proceeded. The justice without the force is impotent; the force without the justice is tyrannical. The justice without force is contradicted, because bad people always exist. The force without the justice is accused. It is necessary, because, to place committees the justice and the force and, for that, to do with that that that is exactly is strong or that what is strong it is exactly. The justice is subject to the discussion. The force is very recognizable and without discussion. Like this, one could not give force to the justice, because the force contradicted the justice and it said that she was unjust, and it said that was it, the force, that was fair. It is like this, not could do with that what is exactly it goes strong, it was done with that what is strong it goes exactly.
Pascal begins the text sustaining that: "it is fair that what is exactly it is proceeded; it is necessary that what are more forts is proceeded." Two statements that are opposed. The justice imposes itself without appealing when Being and to the Good. It doesn't need any argument it is it of usefulness or of persuasion. This because the justice is fair for herself, for that it is exactly to follow it. There are not degrees in the justice as there is in the force. There is not a more fair and a less exactly. If it is exactly or not. There is justice or there is not. What is not exactly it is unjust. "[...]The justice and the truth are two such subtle tips that our instruments are too many blind for in them to play with accuracy. If they get, they will flatten them the tip and to support to the all more turn on the false than on the true [...]" (L. 44; B. 82). The tip of the justice doesn't admit steps that are going from the unjust to the fair.
While the justice imposes itself, the force is imposed as a physical need, mechanics, once its quality is tangible: "those armed troops that only have hands and it forces for the kings, the bugle and the drums that march to their front and those legions that surround they make them to shake the firmest [...]. They have the force" (L. 44, B. 82). The king's public appearance is the moment in that he manifests his force. The whole court that accompanies him is sign of force. The people, dominated by the imagination and trained by the habit, it shakes due to the exhibition of the force.
While there are not degrees in the justice, there are degrees in the force: "it is necessary that the more fort is proceeded." So that it is necessarily proceeded, the more fort needs to manifest his force. When manifesting his force, the more fort oppresses the weakest force. "The strings that tie the respect of some to the other ones in general are need strings; because it is necessary that there are different degrees, for they want all the men it to dominate and nor all can him, but just some can [...]" (L. 828; B. 304). The king's simple public appearance, manifesting your force, it annihilates the other forces. Annihilation without war, nor words. It is the authentic vision of the tangible quality of the force. His vision imposes the silence: "it makes to shake the firmest."
"The justice without the force is impotent; the force without the justice is tyrannical." The justice doesn't have force, because, unknown in the kingdom of the concupiscence, nobody is thank you and nobody assumes an obligation to follow it. To follow it is exactly simply because the justice is fair. In the kingdom of the concupiscence, in that each one seeks to its own interests, there is not any attraction in being exactly. The justice doesn't reward anybody for the fact of being exactly. Doesn't tend the force, the justice is, in itself, impotent: it is an anything of force. The tyranny, that is the force without the justice, is, in turn, the all of the force. Pure violence. The force without the justice brings with herself the desire to be the largest force, the desire of annihilating the other forces. The more high it is the largest force, more the other forces are annihilated. The tyrant is that that wants the destruction of all other force.
The Tyranny consists of the desire of universal domain and out of its order. Several compartments of forts, of beautiful, of good spirits, of merciful, of the which each one reigns in its part, not in another part. It is they sometimes meet, and the fort is beaten with the beautiful as fools arguing who will have the domain of the other, because your domain is of several gender. They don't understand each other. And their mistake is in wanting to reign for every part. Anything he can, not even the force: her nothing does in the kingdom of the wise persons, she only has the domain of the external actions [...]. The tyranny is in wanting to have for a road that can only have for other" (L. 58; B. 332).
Two tyranny definitions, that is, of the force without the justice. The first defines her as that that wants dominate all the other forces besides those of other orders: order of the spirit and order of the charity. Second defines her as that that wants be recognized as the largest force for the forces of the other orders. The tyranny is own of the order of the body, once it only has the domain of the external actions", it "nothing does in the kingdom of the wise persons." Two tyranny definitions that are the same thing in the bottom: I want of annihilating all the other forces and desire of being admired and loved by that universal domain.
"The justice without force is contradicted, because bad people always exist". The justice without force that is imposed by it self as fair it is contradicted by the bad people. These, that they always existed, it contradicts the justice for your own actions. Now, if the bad people are opposed to the justice, they are imposed, for its actions, as fair. For them, the justice is that is unjust. In a word: the bad people's existence contradicts the justice.
"The force without the justice is accused". The force without the justice, manifesting your force reduces the other forces to the silence. Who then does accuse the force? While the bad people contradict the justice without force, it is the justice without the force that accuses the force without the justice. But that the justice accuses the force? The force is the first quality manifested by the dominant party and it continues to be for the imposition of the laws. The force is then the quality of the laws and, once these are had as fair, it (the force) becomes the content of the justice (Lazzeri, 1993, p. 249). Like this, the justice without the force accuses the lack of justice of the force.
"It is necessary, because, for committees the justice and the force and, for that, to do with that is exactly is strong or that what is strong it is exactly." But, how does to place them join if up to now the one saw what it was they to operate in opposed fields? The justice without force cannot accomplish any fair act, because it is impotent. And the force without the justice only accomplishes besides out act of pure force of your domain. The initial statement of the fragment: "it is fair that what is exactly it is proceeded" it is contradicted by the bad people: for those that have the force without the justice. Now, these, for their actions, they says that the justice is unjust. Like this, the force without the justice opposes it that statement another one: "it is unjust that what is exactly it is proceeded" (Louis Marin, 1997, p. 121). "It is necessary that what is it more fort is proceeded." To the this statement, also initial of the fragment, the justice is opposed that accuses the force. Now, if the force is accused by the justice, it is the force that is unjust. The justice without force opposes it that statement another one: "it is unjust that what is it more fort is proceeded" (Louis Marin, 1997, p. 121).
The force contradicting the justice and the justice accusing the force shows clearly that they are excluded. Having exclusion, how "is to do with what that what exactly it is strong or what the one what is strong it is exactly?" For that is I need to identify justice and it forces, doing with that the force become a quality of the justice or that the justice becomes a quality of the force. It is necessary to decide on these two alternatives. The first of them is impossible to be accomplished: "[...] if it had been possible, it would have put it the force in the hand of the justice, but as the force doesn't let to manipulate as it is wanted by treating of a tangible quality, while the justice is a spiritual quality that is disposed as it is wanted [...]" (L. 85; B.878). The justice, unlike the force, is an idea: your quality is spiritual while the one of the force is tangible. Like this, first, one cannot force somebody to follow the justice, once its quality is spiritual; second, a tangible quality is not attributed to the that only possesses a spiritual quality.
"The justice is subject the discussion. The force is very recognizable and without discussion." For being an essential idea, the justice it is object of controversial discussions. It is object of speech of the philosophers that they develop countless arguments researching on what it is the fair. The force, to the opposite, is not subject the discussion. It is "very recognizable", its "quality is tangible." There is not a speech of the force, its quality it spares any speech. Nor also a speech against the force, because there are not arguments before the more fort. Face to him, the least forts remain silent. "That is admirable: it is not wanted me to render honors to a dressed man of brocades and followed by 7 or 8 slaves. The something! He will order to lash me if I don't greet him. Those clothes are a force [...]" (L. 89; B. 315). The clothes, as well as the court that accompanies the king and the doctors' empty spaces instruments become signs and signs of the force.
"Like this, one could not give force to the justice, because the force contradicted the justice and it said that it was unjust, and it said that was it, the force, that was fair." In first place, the force contradicted the justice when being instituted as law becoming the content of the justice. It then can say that the justice is unjust and it is it that is fair. In second place, the force, that it is not subject the discussion, it is entitled of speaking: "it said that...." The force appropriates of the signs of the language and it passes representing in signs. "It turns into sense." Of that it results that the force is less and less visible in the exercise of the power. And, for that, the people believe to not be obeying for the imposition of the force, but to something perfectly legitimate. The appropriation of the language signs for the force is moved by the desire of universal dominance and out of its order. Represented in signs, the force exercises its power out of its domain (that are the external actions). With the right of speaking, the force is instituted. It makes the law that is its law and for her it is legitimated. For the law that is your law, the force it is authorized. It is entitled then of speaking because it has the power of the speech. The speech of the force is, therefore, the speech of the power (Louis Marin, 1997, p. 125).
The force doesn't discuss what the justice is and what the fair is: "it said that the justice was unjust, and it said that was it that was fair." Justifying itself, the force takes possession of the justice. The more fort is the fair. It is then unjust to confront the force. Here is here the moment of a radical transformation in the text. Pascal begins the fragment supporting that: "it is fair that what is exactly it is proceeded; it is necessary that what it is more fort is proceeded." If the more fort is the fair and if it is unjust to confront the force, it is fair that the more fort is proceeded.
"It is like this, not could do with that what is exactly it goes strong, it was done with that what is strong it has been fair." It subjects to endless discussions, it could not fortify the justice. Saying that is it that is fair, the force attributes to itself a spiritual quality. That that only had a tangible quality, started to have a spiritual quality. This is not subject the discussion, because its subject is the force and not an idea. For that spiritual quality, the force could extend its domain to the other orders. Like this, what is, in the order of the thought, heterogeneous: it forces and justice became, in the order of the lived, united.
Justifying itself, the force was instituted; and the justice became its disguise. The force, disguised in justice, it established the order in the kingdom of the concupiscence: "it not could fortify the justice, it was justified the force, so that the fair and the fort were together and that there was peace, that is well the sovereign" (L. 81; B. 299). The peace, in the kingdom of the concupiscence, is then fruit of the justification of the force. Therefore that, the established justice should be that that "it prevents the sedition", because, otherwise, there would be the subversion of the order, in other words, the civil war: "the worst of the evils." That peace obtained through the justification of the force, however, it doesn't get to eliminate the concupiscence, it just hides it.
The men started to live together in peace in spite of the concupiscence. But, for that coexistence has been peaceful, it was necessary to adapt the justice to the kingdom of the concupiscence.
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This article was of original way uttered as conference in the Franc-Brazilian International Colloquy Anthropology and Politics in the Thoughts of Pascal, accomplished in Belo Horizonte, from 24 to October 26, 2005.