

## 1625, fire and ink: the battle of Salvador in accounts of the war

Carlos Ziller Camenietzki; Gianriccardo Grassia Pastore

### ABSTRACT

The reconquering of the city of Salvador by the Catholic Monarquic Forces was a belic enterprise of great impact. The abundance of narrations, stories and live accounts of the battle testify to its importance for their contemporaries. A detailed exam of this literature shows the opposition, even if veiled, between the “Fidalgos” from Portugal and from Castela: they both claimed proeminence of belic achievements and the merit of victorious deeds. The Battle of Bahia, narrated and celebrated to great extent, turned out to be revealing of the tensions between the “fidalgos” of Portugal and Castela, which in turn would give rise to a discussion more than secular eventually embodying itself in December 1640.

**Keywords:** Salvador, XVIIth Century, historical narratives.

As has been discussed for a long time, and as can be seen directly in numerous collective experiences, all conflicts have their *res gesta* and *rerum gestarum* accounts.<sup>i</sup> Any discussion, debate, conflict, battle or war always consists of two different moments. The first is when the conflicting sides act directly against each other, confronting one another through speech, writing or with arms. The second moment takes place when hostilities have been ended and differences have been reduced, superseded, eliminated or suffocated, when what actually occurred is discussed. Neither the agents involved nor what is at stake are necessarily the same in these two moments.

Any significant belic achievement usually prepares the ground for successful literary achievements. The loss and recapture of Bahia in 1624 and 1625 was no different.

The city of Salvador played an essential part of the strategies of the main belligerents in the Thirty Years War – in the context of this paper essentially the Netherlands and Spain – and, as

was to be expected, its capture and recapture was accompanied by numerous publications reporting and interpreting events from the arrival in Europe of the first news of the Batavian success almost until 1630. On the one hand, this involved the capture of the city and the appropriation of local wealth, but also the announcement of the achievement and the consequent rupture of the exclusive domain of the Catholic Monarchy in the South Atlantic. The expulsion of the Dutch, on the other hand, was also an occasion for Castile to loudly announce its bellic superiority and to demonstrate to the United Provinces the futility of rebellion.<sup>ii</sup>

The problem that faces us at present is linked to the final part of the war, to the dispute over what happened as soon as the smoke from the cannons disappeared on 30 April 1625. This second battle, the concern of this paper, did not involve the Catholic forces fighting against the heretics of Holland, this had been resolved in the terrain of facts, in Salvador. Rather, the conflict in question opposed combatants who had been on the same side in the field of battle and it was fought on the peninsula, right in the heart of the dominions of Castile: it opposed Portuguese and Castilians. The weapons used were accounts, chronicles, poems and theatre.

The issue was the subject of a recent study by Fernando Cristóvão who skilfully traced out the main lines of this argument.<sup>iii</sup> However, his work is too summarized and concentrates on narrative archetypes, without showing much concern for the meaning of the controversies in the given historical situation. On the other hand, an older work by Stuart Schwartz attempts to make a more broad-ranging analysis of the event, analyzing what had happened in Salvador as the expression of tensions between various social groups and the crown.<sup>iv</sup>

The question becomes even more important because the forces of the Monarchy were all from the domains of Philip IV from Castile, Naples and Portugal. The authors of the accounts and chronicles were all subjects or vassals of the same monarch. However, the dispute over the victory obtained was bitter, in other words the dispute for the role that each had played in the momentous achievement. Taken in isolation, this question would have had limited importance; it would be just a curious passage through tensions between allies in an old war. However, several

of those who had united in the 1620s to expel the Dutch from Salvador would rebel against the Monarchy in the 1640s, accelerating its decline in European politics.<sup>v</sup> Perhaps coincidentally, at the time of these rebellions only the kingdom most directly committed to the recapture of Bahia – Portugal – managed to achieve its independence. As a result the question of the ink war comes to have a significance involving much more than curiosity.

In 1625 was there significant ill-feeling towards Castile on the part of the Portuguese? How strong was it really? What did it signify? Can it be found in the accounts and chronicles of a battle won by the Catholic Monarchy in which some of the same Portuguese took part? Raising these questions involves important issues related to Portuguese politics in the first half of the seventeenth century. The attempts to resolve them, on the other hand, involves more than simply discovering them in documentary sources.

In 1625 Europe was enjoying the first decades of the Baroque Age, so the discovery of abundant clear and distinct manifestations of discontent towards the king on the part of Portuguese clergy, literati and *fidalgos* (gentlemen) is not something that can be expected.<sup>vi</sup> Political alignments evidently existed and tensions between groups disputing power were obviously high, but dissent was not always openly shown; the modes of expression used and abused dissimulation, double entendres, metaphors and ellipses. The appeal to this type of resource was abundant in the diplomacy and politics of the period, while those who gave it a literary and philosophical form can also be easily found: Torquato Acetto, for example, writing in Naples under Spanish domain published the book *Della Dissimulazione Onesta*, in which he defended dissimulation against tyranny as a form of survival in the political arena.<sup>vii</sup>

Taking this characteristic into account, an examination of the available documentation from the time, especially printed material (accounts of battles, chronicles, theater), may show that spirits were raised among both the Portuguese and Castilians, something which the exhilaration of victory tends to calm and ignorance of the subject hide.

It is not intended to find unequivocal answers to the questions raised here, but rather to identify manifestations, even if dissimulated, of Portuguese discontent (or some Portuguese) with the Castilians (and vice versa) and to look for alternative interpretations.

\* \* \*

In 1623 on St. Thomas' day, Fr. Bartolomeu Guerreiro, a Jesuit, gave an exalted sermon in the Royal Chapel in Lisbon. This skillful follower of Loyola associated the patron saint of India with the Portuguese achievements of the previous century and protested vehemently about the state of abandonment of the kingdom's conquests. Aply using the powerful resources of oratory Guerreiro let the saint himself speak to his audience. St. Thomas said to the court in Lisbon: "*And I have lived to see the banners of Maurice of Nassau, a heretic and damned apostate and son of another, lord of all the seas in the place of the Wounds of the Redeemer and of the arms of the grandchildren of King Manoel, my lord, who so much honoured me*".<sup>viii</sup>

For the Jesuit the problem was not limited to the assaults of the heretics on the conquests of the 'true religion'. The decadence into which the dominions of the East had fallen was the result of the greed of Viceroy, captains and traders more interested in increasing their wealth than protecting the Oriental territories. The issue raised by Guerreiro of most interest here is Monarchy's lack of concern with Portugal's dominions and the excesses of ministers regarding taxation.<sup>ix</sup> The abandonment of the kingdom is expressed in the recurrent absence of the Royal Court from Lisbon. In an appeal to St. Thomas the priest stated: "*I cannot deny to you the debt caused by the feeling and the pain of not finding in Lisbon those old Kings who made you powerful, to whom you and your riches are owed*".<sup>x</sup> The sermon carried an undeniable sense of protest. Among the various reports of mistakes by Castilian minister, Guerreiro remembered the 'tenderness' of D. João II to his vassals and how much the monarch was able to take advantage of this in his conflicts with Castile.

The oratory protest of this priest was not made in isolation in a melancholic kingdom saddened by the sorrows of a present less glorious than the past. Actually, as João Francisco

Marques emphasised in his studies of seventeenth century Portuguese panegyric, the pulpit was an extremely important means of protest and ‘political agitation’ against the decline of Portugal under the rule of the Philips, and especially against the ‘abandonment’ of its overseas conquests between 1620-40.<sup>xi</sup> Jesuits, Dominicans and members of other religious orders exercised their liberty of criticism in this privileged and protected space. Marques notes that Gregório Taveira preached in very similar terms to Guerreiro in the same year. Antônio de Oliveira also emphasises the role of the pulpit in Portuguese political opposition during the rule of Castile.<sup>xii</sup> This oratory protests expressed vivid discontent with real Portuguese losses in Orient. In the middle of 1622 – around a year before Fr. Guerreiro’s sermon – Macau had been besieged by the forces of the Dutch East Indian Company and Ormuz had fallen into the hands of the English and their Persian allies. As is widely known in the first half of the seventeenth century the Portuguese dominance in that region of the world was undermined and they were forced to cede physical and commercial space to competitors. At the beginnings of the 1620s, the Portuguese had much more to cry over than the disappearance of their king.<sup>xiii</sup>

According to an important diarist, the news of the loss of Salvador reached Lisbon in July 1624 and had a huge impact. The Portuguese government rapidly organised the collection of funds and the recruiting and arming of a fleet to retake the city. According to the chroniclers, the three estates collaborated in these efforts. The Council of Lisbon provided almost half the amount raised, the Duke of Bragança almost one tenth, and the archbishop of Braga around five percent. In relation to their commitment, the diarist sums up Portuguese efforts as follows: “On the 22 October of that year, it was announced that anyone living in sin of any rank who wanted to join the fleet should present themselves; so many came that those living in sin had to be sent back to where they came from”.<sup>xiv</sup>

The Portuguese fleet left Lisbon on 22 November carrying some of the highest ranking *fidalgos* in both the military and naval spheres. The fleet would have to wait in Cape Verde for the arrival of the fleet from Castile, bringing the *comandante-mor* of the operation, D. Fadrique

de Toledo Osório.<sup>xv</sup> Among the clerics on board were Fr. Bartolomeu Guerreiro and Fr. António de Sousa, both from the Company of Jesus. The latter Jesuit, according to João Francisco Marques, was the author of the tragicomedy performed in Santo Antão College in Lisbon before Philip III and his Court when the king visited the Portuguese capital in 1619.<sup>xvi</sup>

The chronicler also said that the first news of the Battle of Salvador reached Portugal on 23 June 1625, with information about the retaking of the city coming two weeks later on 6 July.

In the months that followed, the peninsula commemorated the bellic deed with the most vigorous forms of expression of content of that time: parties, processions, illuminations, masses, etc. Along with the first news came accounts of the war, official letters and then news from the men who had taken part in the combat. In the second half of 1625 part of this material was printed and sold on the streets of Lisbon, Madrid, Seville and Cadiz. The Court celebrated intensely. After all it was not just the recapture of a port that was important for the Empire that was at stake; as has already been stated, the recapture of Bahia reaffirmed the enormous power of the Monarchy at a time when the Catholic forces were recovering ground lost to the Protestants at the beginning of the Thirty Years War. In addition to these commemorations two plays were performed in Madrid the capital of the Empire: one by the famous Castilian writer, Lope de Vega, and the other by the Portuguese author João António Correia<sup>xvii</sup>.

However, what was done and undone was not of interest only in the peninsula. The feat was reported and divulged in printed texts among the enemies of the Catholic Monarchy, especially the Low Countries for obvious reasons. Perhaps the best known report is that of Johann Gregor Aldenburgk (one of the soldiers who occupied Salvador), translated into Portuguese about forty years ago<sup>xviii</sup>. Although it deals with war, this report seeks to imitate the success of the reports of travellers to the New World at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries, describing fish, fruit, tubers and emphasising the anthropophagy of the Indians and their savagery in combat. The text is very detailed and was very useful in outlining the problems of interest to this paper.

Among the accounts published in the Low Countries, of additional interest because it was aimed at the English public, was the *Plaine and True Relation*, written by an English author who had served with the Dutch troops and published in Rotterdam in 1626<sup>xix</sup>, a curious text that denounces the errors of the Dutch officers and criticises their behaviour during the occupation (they drank and frequented prostitutes). The problem of the tensions that divided the Portuguese and the Castilians appears at the beginning of this publication in the following expressive passage: “*The people that are the naturall inhabitants thereof are the Brasillians, they which are now the chieftest are the Portugals. The Spanish King clames soveraigne, though by some denied, and by the rest unwillingly accepced of*”.<sup>xx</sup> To a certain extent the report reproduced what had long been the view of the diplomats of Spain’s rivals.<sup>xxi</sup>

\* \* \*

Numerous reports of the event were published in the peninsula. These vary from short accounts written by soldiers to more detailed compositions and even relatively long volumes. The latter includes Fr. Bartolomeu Guerreiro’s celebrated work, discussed above, *Jornada dos Vassalos da Coroa de Portugal*.<sup>xxii</sup> In the prologue when the book is being presented and justified, the Jesuit states that he wants to explain what “*the Crown of Portugal actually did in Bahia*”, since they were “*successes most worthy of being remembered*”.<sup>xxiii</sup> This concern in establishing the truth expresses in a rather conventional way the motivations that have animated chroniclers throughout time in practically every epoch; however, the circumstances in which he was writing have to be taken into account. Given Guerreiro’s strong engagement in criticising the abandonment of the Portuguese *Ultramar*, already discussed above, as well as his closeness with the house of Bragança,<sup>xxiv</sup> it cannot be ignored that perhaps the concern with the truth hides a conflict with or an effective condemnation of other reports in circulation at the time. After all, it does not make sense to think about establishing the truth without falsehood being present to some extent.

As Stuart Schwartz hints, the actual use of the term vassal (*vassalo*) is significant.<sup>xxv</sup> In reality this word cannot be superimposed on ‘subject’ – which would substitute it in current usage. ‘Vassal’ brings to mind a narrow range of ‘subjects’ - the nobility; it also invokes an appeal with a slightly archaic tone, at least in terms of the present. Of course this tone would not have the same impact in 1625 that it currently has, but undoubtedly it makes the reader think of nobility more than any other sector of society. This was exactly what Guerreiro dealt in his *Jornada* – there the efforts of numerous noble houses are discussed, with more high ranking *fidalgos* being named than from any other social grouping. The participation of townsfolk – merchants, financiers, corporations – and members of the regular religious orders is reduced in the narrative, although the financial contributions of the Lisbon Council and the names of some large traders were mentioned. Guerreiro appears to want to show that the three estates all contributed to the undertaking, though the task was really undertaken by the *fidalgos*, after all war had always been the responsibility of this group.

Also noteworthy in this text is the fact that it is an account of just the Portuguese forces sent to Bahia to recover Salvador; which can be seen in the actual title. However, the organisation of the expedition sought to reflect what was most solidly held by the Catholic Monarchy at that time: the troops came from Portugal, Naples and ‘Spain’ and were under the command of one of the most renowned soldiers of that time, D. Fadrique de Toledo.

This arrangement was underpinned by a substantial symbolic weight, which was almost an allegory of the dominions of the Monarchy. It can be stated quite simply that there was no Portuguese expedition to Bahia, despite being able to find this type of references in relatively recent histories.<sup>xxvi</sup> Fr. Guerreiro clearly had this evidence and justified writing only about the Portuguese as follows:

“So that everything in this account is given distinction in separate chapters, it is taken with great precision and rigorous care and judgment from true and



authentic papers from the royal secretaries of the crown of Portugal. This was the reason why this account did not extend to how the crown of Castile entered into the venture; even though so much was spent on so large a fleet, in the number of captains and soldiers from various nations and the kingdoms of his majesty that went in the fleet: in the valour and prudence of the general, I lack the specific news and accounts without which there can be no true history...<sup>xxvii</sup>

Clearly establishing the truth was not a concern restricted to the Jesuit. King Philip's chronicler, Tomás Tamayo de Vargas, proclaims in his history (*Restauracion dela Ciudad Del Salvador, I Baia de Todos – Sanctos*), ordered by the king himself, that he had established the truth. At the beginning of his text Tamayo explains his book in his preface. He takes advantage of the fact that he had written his history at the order of the king, reinforcing his version of the facts through his access to the documents of the councils of State and War:

“it is clear that of the secretaries of those councils of the crowns of Castile and Portugal only exist those who write by order of their King and whose faith cannot be put under the slightest suspicion, especially when surrounded by his glories”.<sup>xxviii</sup>

Publishing his account more than three years after the events, Tamayo sought to explore what had already been written. He said that he was using three more detailed accounts, including that of Fr. Guerreiro, mentioning that the Jesuit's text “*only deals with Portugal's contribution to the enterprise, with some particularities that were worthy of his diligence*”.<sup>xxix</sup> The particularities worthy of the diligence of the Portuguese Jesuit are probably the elements of *Jornada dos Vassalos* and other contemporary accounts that can be counter-posed to Castilian accounts in

general and to the greatest Castilian synthesis – Tamayo de Vargas’s book. The dissimulated criticism of Guerreiro’s writing is evident in the closing of the preface:

“...I must confess that history does not admit the singularities that I raise here; but this is more the historical account of a particular success than a perfect history, in which such minute details do not fit; here they are mandatory. None have been left out because of negligence or malice. In all of them neither affection nor hate has been my aim, my only care being the truth of the actions of each one, with no distinction of nations. [...] the winning nation [Castile] only claims as her own what has been preserved in the memories of the scholars who have correctly explained it and of the nobles who have shaped it; everything else is the pastime of idle people who hide things because they cannot fix them”.<sup>xxx</sup>

It would not be excessive to identify this passage as a condemnation of the writings of the Portuguese Jesuit, followed by a severe reprimand of his inability to make his case progress favourably. He disguises what he is unable to fix.

Fixing the truth is also the concern of other somewhat later writings on the loss and recapture of Salvador. Perhaps the most famous of these authors, Father Antônio Vieira gave his account in a annual letter of the Company of Jesus, sent to Rome in 1626 corresponding to the two previous years. Vieira, then a young and promising Jesuit, had participated in the events first as a victim of the heretic invasion and later as a privileged observer. The priest, and most of his contemporaries, were in the village of Rio Vermelho, from where the resistance of the inhabitants of Brazil was organised.<sup>xxxii</sup> He wrote “*to tell what really happened, so that truth would have a place and that some of the falsehoods that are told will not be believed*”.<sup>xxxii</sup>

In addition, for those who were in Salvador during the events of 1624-25 declaring that something was true only made sense in opposition to an untruth, a falsity, a lie, that for some

reason bothered them. What bothered Antônio Vieira, Bartolomeu Guerreiro and Tamayo de Vargas was certainly not the same. In fact, as will be confirmed in the following pages, what bothered one of them was above all the writings of others, the ‘truth’ defended by others.

These ‘truths’ which so bothered the most important of these chroniclers can be found most often in the descriptions of particular moments. An examination of a sufficiently large sample of texts shows that there is large disagreement about certain questions from the motivation of the invaders to the departure of the fleet from the recaptured city. Due to the uselessness and the inconvenience of an exhaustive discussion of these contrasts, it will be more helpful to restrict the analysis to the questions with the greatest power of synthesis, such as the loss of the city and the evaluation of the lack of resistance to the Dutch attack; the meeting of the fleet and its trip to Bahia; and finally the surrender of the invaders and the entrance of the Catholic forces to the city. In examining the different discussions of the elements of the narratives decisive treatment is given to the following onlookers and participants: Portuguese from the fleet, Portuguese from Bahia (or Luso-Brazilians), Castilians, Indians, blacks and New Christians.

\* \* \*

According to all the accounts of the war, the capture of Salvador by the Dutch was easy: the city was occupied by the invaders without major resistance. However, although there is strong agreement about this, there is much disagreement about other, albeit secondary, elements in which the government of Brazil is criticised to a greater or lesser extent; a government according to an important item of the *Cortes* of Tomar that was in the hands of Portuguese.<sup>xxxiii</sup> For example, many authors emphasis the cowardice of the Portuguese in Bahia for surrendering the city without a fight, forsaking what they had the responsibility to defend, abandoning belongings and wealth, and quickly fleeing when the imminence of the assault became obvious.

The reference to the lack of preparedness and the incompetence of the governor Diogo de Mendonça Furtado is highlighted by Fr. Guerreiro who also notes the fear that overcame the inhabitants of Salvador; among Castilian authors the problem of the capture of the city is more

serious. For them the question is much more than incompetence, rather it involves cowardice and treason.

The idea that the inhabitants of Bahia looked favourably on the invasion was argued shortly before the siege in Dutch West Indian Company propaganda, specifically in Jan Andries Moerbeek's *Reasons why the East Indian Company should try to capture the land of Brazil from the King of Spain*.<sup>xxxiv</sup> This text was read in the Peninsula and mentioned by various chroniclers of the Battle of Salvador, by both Castilian and Portuguese writers, although the Jesuits Vieira and Guerreiro do not mention it. Eugenio de Narbona y Zuñinga, for example, explicitly refers to an agreement between the townsfolk and the invaders:

“... at dawn the enemy entered without resistance, warned and called (so it was said) by some of the neighbours, who had accommodated themselves to the fortune of the winner; they finally entered and found in the town no one except a few blacks and Portuguese, who were Hebrews, apostates of the Gospel, who were waiting for the Dutch success and who had had dealings with others of their nation who were fugitives waiting in Holland...”<sup>xxxv</sup>

In relation to treason, those who already had at various times personified treason for Christians were frequently evoked: Jews, Hebrews and New Christians. The reference to this group among the inhabitants of Salvador is emphasised by the Castilian writers, much less so by the Portuguese, especially the chroniclers from the Company of Jesus.

Fr. Guerreiro, suggesting that a hypothetical betrayal on the part of the Portuguese in Brazil was not necessary to facilitate the invasion, stresses that there were at least two men among the Dutch forces whom had been imprisoned in Brazil years before: one had been in jail in Rio and had escaped, while the other “*was imprisoned and condemned to death, but the execution*

*was stayed by order of His Majesty, in the time of governor D. Luís de Sousa*<sup>xxxvi</sup>. In other words, there were those who knew Brazil well on board the Dutch ships.

However, the emphasise given to role of the New Christians by the Spanish chronicles and its downplaying by the Portuguese writers is best exemplified in the comparison between the two best known plays about the event. In his comedy *El Brasil Restituido*, Felix Lope de Vega attributes a significant role to the supposed provision of information and collaboration by the New Christians of Salvador with the Dutch. The play starts with a dialogue between D. Guiomar, a New Christian woman, and D. Diego, a Portuguese *fidalgo*. This passage is curious because Diego is abandoning his pregnant lover (though he does not know this) because of her origin. The plot develops with explicit references to the collaboration of Guiomar's parents and contemporaries with the invaders. Guiomar marries Leonardo, a Dutch soldier and intermediary in the treason, who does not know the state of his 'bride', and ends up delivered to Machado, the gracious<sup>xxxvii</sup>. On the other hand, João António Correia, a native of Lisboa, does not even mention New Christians in his comedy *La Perdida y Restauracion de la Bahia de Todos los Santos*. They did not have the honour of even a brief mention.

On the other hand, if there exists a common reference in relation to the Dutch interest in occupying Salvador – capturing trading posts – the importance of this is presented somewhat faintly by King Philip's chronicler. In fact, Tamayo de Vargas looks at events from the Court in Madrid: he has to start his history looking at how the conflicts between the European states are progressing. At this time the Catholic forces were taking back territory from the Protestant alliance in the east of the Old World. The history of the initiative of the Dutch East India Company is strongly associated with the progress of the war in Europe. However, the other authors of accounts of the Battle of Salvador usually circumscribe the Dutch action to commercial interests, with many of them using Moerbeek's leaflet as a reference.

The discrepancy between the Castilian narratives and the Portuguese texts is also significant in relation to the second point mentioned above: the departure of the fleets to help

Bahia. Bartolomeu Guerreiro, the Portuguese Jesuit, indicates that Philip IV had sent letters to the governors of Portugal asking them to finish the preparations of the expedition by the end of August 1624; the monarch also said that the fleet would leave from Lisbon. Later, on 27 October, he ordered the Portuguese fleet to meet the other vessels in Cadiz. Finally, he ordered the Portuguese fleet to wait in Cape Verde for the arrival of the ships from Castile. All the accounts that mention this aspect agree that the Portuguese weighed anchor in Lisbon at the end of November 1624 and the Castilians in Cadiz on 14 January 1625. None of the chronicles examined neglects to emphasise that the Portuguese vassals waited more than forty days for the arrival of the Admiral and the other parts of the expedition.

Manuel de Faria e Sousa, a humanist and historian of the kingdom of Portugal, deals with the problem in his book published in 1628, *Epítome de las Historias Portuguesas*. It is important to bear in mind that this writer was among the enthusiasts of the Iberian Union who defends in his treatise the rule of the Philips and the most traditional values of Portuguese nobility, blaming the commercial involvement of the *fidalgos* for the decadence that had befallen the kingdom since the rule of King Manuel the Fortunate<sup>xxxviii</sup>. Faria e Sousa discusses the departure and meetings of the fleets as follows:

“At the same time they began to prepare, but with unequal diligence; the Portuguese fleet waited for the Castilian fleet in the port of Lisbon for a month; and leaving in November without it, waited for it in the island of Santiago (the main island of Cape Verde) until the month of February, when the two fleets met; a considerable delay, that was profitable to the enemy: the unequal preparations were not without cause, because one prepare with love and was paid by the vassals, whereas the other was paid by the king and the timidity of the ministers’<sup>xxxix</sup>”.

For some Castilian writers, the delay of the royal fleet was compensated by a barely disguised criticism of the navigation of the fleet that had left from Lisbon. Juan de Valencia y Guzmán, for example, deals with the sinking of a Portuguese vessel as follows:

“one of those [vessels] was lost, the galleon *La Concepcion* on which the Marshal Antonio Muñiz Bareto had embarked, with 140 men drowning (...) the artillery was saved and everything else lost including much of value...”<sup>xl</sup>

After the fleets met up they set off for Brazil. The journey which was never calm in those days also was transformed into a scenario of conflict between the narratives. D. Tamayo de Vargas does not hesitate to point out the lack of ability of the Portuguese in sailing on the high-seas: he repeats that the united fleet sailed on bravely “except the Portuguese ships seemed slower, since they were always falling behind”, or that the Castilian command sought “*not to lose the Portuguese fleet, which followed with difficulty the Castilian one*”. Associated with this were many considerations of Portuguese loyalty, especially in relation to the recognition of Castilian command and superiority. Valencia y Guzmán describes as follows the meeting of the Brazil fleet in Cape Verde, after first registering the lack of preparation of the Portuguese fleet:

“The enthusiasm and joy that occurred was generally superior and extraordinary, with our fleet following the flagship and entering in the order and arrangement, so that the flagship and admiral of Portugal dipped their flags in acknowledgement of superiors...”<sup>xli</sup>

Curiously in most of the chronicles the actions of the Luso-Brazilians between the invasion and the arrival of aid are, when they are mentioned, seen as base deeds rather than acts of war or bravery. A deed of undoubted significance, the killing of an enemy leader, something that has always been considered important in battle, is presented as something distasteful by almost all the writers, who express indignity rather than extolling the virtues of the combatants.

The death of Van Dort, the Dutch general, for example, is seen as an unjustified bloody and almost barbarous event by Narbona y Zuñiga:

“...Very swiftly the Portuguese put his foot on top of his chest, stabbing him with a knife, despite the fact that the Colonel asked for mercy saying he was the general. Nonetheless the other soldier did not want to grant him his life, and killed him and took his sword, cutting off his finger as a amulet and as testimony to the victory, and the other soldiers also profited from it, although bloodily, because apart from despoiling him of everything he had, they cut off parts of his body, something that the Dutch considered an affront and complained about it with reason...”<sup>xlii</sup>

Vieira, who describes events from the point of view of Rio Vermelho and who does not tire of highlighting the actions of his contemporaries and the Indians they fought with, treats the death of Van Dort in very different terms. After all, in the conditions in which the Portuguese of Bahia found themselves, there was not much room for the rituals of war and the privileges of commanders. Vieira states:

“With the captains and soldiers being organised according to said order, the first meeting in which they gave notice of their determination to the enemy, was when coming from the port of S. Filipe, neighbour to Nossa Senhora do Monserrate, their colonel or governor, an intrepid man famed in this war and that war, both naval and on land, both in Flanders and in their fleets, accompanied by a guard of one hundred, fell into an ambush of our men, one attacked the governor who was on horseback and laid him low. No soon had he fallen but the spirits of the soldiers accompanying him went to their feet, which could easily be seen, because lacking the strength to resist, all they had were their feet to run away”.<sup>xliii</sup>



The commander general of the Portuguese forces, D. Manuel de Menezes also refers to the death of the enemy commander in his account, which has not been published. For the commander of the Portuguese forces, the episode takes on the following significance:

“On 15 June Colonel João Doart left on horse accompanied by some soldiers, blowing on their trumpets; he was met by the captain [Francisco de Padilha] with the men following his banner, and the first arquebus killed the colonel’s horse, and attacking without listening to any pleas or promises cut off his head, attacked his company and put them to flight, and chased them for quite a while”.<sup>xliv</sup>

The opinions about the killing of the Dutch commander by the Luso-Brazilians is a good indicator of the values of those involved and the problem that this paper has attempted to describe since the beginning of this text. Guzman, Tamayo and Menezes show to various degrees horror with the brutality of the event; Van Dort was a noble and commander of the enemy forces and it was not dignified to kill someone of his position in that manner. Furthermore, the way the Luso-Brazilians acted collaborated with the idea of baseness attributed to them since the discussion of the loss of the city to enemy forces. On the other hand, it is only to be expected that Vieira would discuss the event in another form, expelled from what had been the College of Bahia to the village of Rio Vermelho and witness to the conditions of the *Soteropolitanos* and the inhabitants of Brazil during the Dutch invasion. The Jesuit also emphasised the performance of the Luso-Brazilians from Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro in sending reinforcements and military commanders to organise and strengthen the resistance, which turned out to be highly efficient.

But the fact that the invaders had lost their commander was seen in a much different manner by those occupying the city. The anonymous author of the *Plaine and True Relation*, mentioned above, sees the death of Van Dort as something which had a decisive impact on the

direction of events. He sees the disorderliness of the officers as being the main cause of the loss, so the death of the commander could not be taken to be a minor issue in relation to the evolution of the combativeness of the Dutch. He describes the episode as follows:

“The same morning the Colonell with some twelve horsemen went out of the Towne, with some twenty negars and a squadron of men, the Colonell riding before some twenty yeards in a narrow path, and woods on both sides, the portugals lying in ambush got about Colonell, a negar shot him in the brest, and the portugals puld him of his horse, who kild him and cut of his head and other parts, the most of the horsemen & souldiers retired to the towne, yet an englishman brought in his head, upon which there was a great alarme, but but nothing wort the writing”<sup>.xlv</sup>

Aldenburgk mentions a number of times the fear that came over the occupants of the city as soon as it became clear that the expectations created by Moerbeek did not correspond to the facts. For this writer the ties between the Portuguese of Bahia and the Indians were strong and decisively contributed to the wearing down of the occupying forces. General Van Dort, for example, was “*surprised by savage Indians, Portuguese and blacks, and wounded, along with his horse, with many poisoned arrows*”<sup>.xlvii</sup>, before having his head barbarously cut off.

In Aldenburgk’s view the invaders were literally surrounded, suffering from the lack of supplies, unable to treat with the besiegers and afraid of their unchivalrous forms of warfare. Justifying their rather unaristocratic acts of war by the barbarity of their enemies, Aldenburgk summarises the situation as follows:

“Since clemency could not be expected from the Portuguese, Brazilians or blacks, we took the large number of prisoners that remained in our hands, took them

outside the city, tied them to one another close to the port of Captain Isenach (S. Bento), by the convent and there we shot them with our arquebuses ”. <sup>xlvii</sup>

Furthermore, the ‘indignity’ of the combatants in Brazil, those Luso-Brazilians who resisted from Rio Vermelho, is also highlighted in another important occurrence. After the Dutch had surrendered and the city had been occupied by the Catholic forces, several chroniclers report that the Portuguese wanted to put the prisoners into their boats and set them on fire. The idea was not accepted by D. Fadrique, but its presence in the Castilian narratives and in the chroniclers of the invaders emphasises in the eyes of the readers the barbarism of the Portuguese, already present in the proximity between the Luso-Brazilians and the Indians.

\* \* \*

The tensions that have been looked at above between the various interpretations of events in Salvador become even clearer when the chronicles and accounts turn to the final moments of the venture. For the chroniclers from Castile, the rituals of the winners encapsulate the suggestions made throughout the texts: the laurels of victory belonged to the Castilians. Writers from Portugal refused to accept this coup and in their texts show clear discontent with the shape given to the events by Castilian writers and Castilians who had been in the fleet.

The main chronicler, D. Tamayo de Vargas, refers to the entrance of the Catholic forces into the city as something quite natural, as if the fact that only Castilian soldiers entered the city first was something associated with their function. Those who entered were those could ensure the safety of the place and control the goods of the royal treasury associated with the retaking of Salvador who entered first. <sup>xlviii</sup> Any pillaging, and D. Tamayo recognises that looting did occur, was the result of temporary losses of control and was quickly punished in an exemplary form:

“Some royal officers and soldiers, whom avarice had tempted from their positions, upon the falling of heavy rain, took advantage of the houses left unoccupied by those who had fled in such disarray; even though the Marshal

went around the town trying to prevent it, few people stayed by the banners, with the others concentrating on sacking some houses, especially where they thought there was merchandise.... resolved by the quick arrival of the general who threatened those who left their banners with death...”<sup>xlix</sup>.

Although his position as chronicler of Philip put D. Tamayo into a position of authority in relation to the material, the soldiers had been expecting to sack the city since landing in Bahia. According to the account of one Portuguese soldier, published just a week after the news of the recapture of Salvador reached Lisbon, it was known in the fleet that the Dutch had not dispatched the riches they had captured in the invasion and this excited the soldiers: “*and they say that everything is there and that the soldiers will not be unhappy on the day of the sack*”<sup>1</sup>. Even if it had been the intention of the Castilian military command to prevent excesses by the troops against local property, the accounts agree that the city was effectively sacked. However, the chroniclers from Castile appear to avoid calling attention to this, while those from Portugal tend to do the opposite.

Fr. Guerreiro, narrating the entrance of the Catholic forces into Salvador, shows a great unease with the fact that the city had first been occupied solely by nobles from Castile without the participation of Portuguese officers.<sup>ii</sup> After all, precedence in this type of matter was not something that could easily be given up. The reasons for the complaint are not found in this question alone; for Guerreiro the problem extended to the duties of the Catholic soldiers in the Luso-Brazilian city returned by the invaders to the forces of Philip, king of Portugal:

“Do not say that in this place, because it as much yours as those who took part in the work and danger of the siege of Bahia and in the other dangers faced by the Portuguese in the vanguard, rearguard, and those who guarded the gates of the city. And if this trust of the captains of the crown of Castile was founded on a desire to profit, the reason was that was granted to those who achieved so much

through work. But the fact was that the Portuguese militia were not driven by other interests than the service of His Majesty, and the honour and reputation of the Crown of Portugal.”<sup>lii</sup>

Having restored the city to the dominions of the king, the heroes of the hour treated Salvador as a place to be sacked, as enemy territory. Guerreiro’s complaint here in particular does not value the fact that Salvador was the ‘head’ of the dominions of the crown of Portugal in the New World. The evidence that the soldiers sacked the belongings of Luso-Brazilians that had previously been captured by the ‘heretics’ does not seem to have caught the attention of the Jesuit. The problem that interested him was solely restricted to tension between the Portuguese and Spanish: “*the pillaging attributed to the two Portuguese were, first, a picture of Our Lady, and the other a Dutch saddle, in contrast with the abundant pillaging attributed to the Spanish*”<sup>liiii</sup>. The picture of the Virgin was certainly not brought to Amsterdam, land of Calvinists...

D. Manuel de Menezes, concerned with the relegation of the Portuguese *fidalgos*, describes the retaking of the city with quite singular connotations. For him as well, the sack (or re-sacking) of the city was not a problem in itself; the question was in the place reserved for the Portuguese in the adventure, “if it happened that a Portuguese soldier would pick up old iron, or any other simple thing, it was soon taken away from him, often with haughtiness”<sup>liiv</sup>. D. Manuel summarised his complaints about the place of the Portuguese soldiers in the symbolism of the flag hoisted in the city after the Dutch standard was taken down:

“Thursday, First of May, at ten in the morning, the flag of Maurice was taken down and in its place the royal arms of S.M. with castles and lions was planted over the See. This was the cause of notable discontent among the Portuguese, who saw it as showing, if were carelessness, the hatred of the Castilians for the

Portuguese nation in everything that was shown and never so apparent in public”.<sup>lv</sup>

Although D. Fadrique, commander general of operations eased Portuguese discontent by raising another flag alongside that of Castile, D. Manuel was not satisfied. As he stated in his chronicle, with an undisguisable discontent:

“The complaint over the arms was partly answered by D. Fadrique ordering an ordinary Portuguese flag to be planted in the usual place, but there was no satisfying the discontented; because after the first impetus had been admitted, some Italian and Portuguese companies, taking all complaints on their account, as is common among those of inferior fortune, said that they could well see the intention of enriching some and preventing the profit of the others, because already then there was nothing of substance left, of if there were it was so hidden that those in the vanguard of the pillaging no matter how curious they were in searching would not find it”.<sup>lvi</sup>

Antônio Vieira, appearing not to recognise the problems indicated by his fellow countryman or even those explicitly mentioned by the commander of the Portuguese fleet, describes the entrance of the Catholic forces to Salvador as follows: “*Things were decided as follows, on the day of St. Philip and St. Ignatius, which was the first of May 1625, our forces entered and took possession of the city, the Dutch flag was lowered and the flags of Portugal and Castile raised*”.<sup>lvii</sup>

Manuel de Faria e Sousa, historian of the kingdom of Portugal, referred to the sack of the city in terms even more alarming than those of the previous chroniclers. According to him: “*inside there was great pillaging, in which there were Spanish soldiers who seemed like Dutch: the city in being sacked found no difference but that it was by the one and not the other*”.<sup>lviii</sup>

On the other hand, the men who had participated on the Dutch side cared little about the flags over the See or which nation was first to enter the restored city. However, they recorded in a particularly interesting form the entrance of the Catholic forces to the city and the problem of the pillaging of local goods by Castilian soldiers. Both Aldenburgk and the anonymous author of the English account describe in strikingly similar terms the selling back to the residents of Salvador of their own houses recovered by the Catholic forces. More than this they describe the sacking of the city:

“But let mee note one thing here which is worth the observation, concerning the Portugals. The prince Don Frederico a little before his going away sold to the portugals their houses, which before were their owne, and at his going away did not onely take away all goods till it came to old stooles and dores, but also stript then naked of all armes and munition, and did take away all their ordnance that was planted to sea or land-ward. So that the towne in now more weake then it was when the hollander tooke it in. More may be said of this but I will not”.<sup>lix</sup>

In light of what these two Dutch soldiers said, the victory of the Catholic expedition against the heretics was also a victory over the Portuguese! Especially the Portuguese from Brazil!

\* \* \*

As was discussed at the beginning of this paper, in disputing the truth the chroniclers fought over much more than an expanded share in the book market. It involved the supremacy of a version. The aim of the ink war which followed the bellic events in Salvador was the place of the nobility and the *fidalgos* of Portugal in the domains of the crown, held by a Castilian; this was a problem of the first order.

It would certainly be naive to believe that to some extent the writers involved anticipated in letters the feelings and interests that moved the acts that took place on 1 December 1640: the return to independence. The ink war did not express a latent or buried national feeling, to the

contrary it expressed the discontent of *fidalgos*, and especially members of the nobility in broad sense. The cause of this ill-feeling, as outlined above, was the place occupied by Portuguese vassals in the exercise of their ‘natural’ and ancient role in Portuguese society: governing, defending the kingdom and its conquests. The absence of ‘autonomist’ content can be seen by the fact that some of the most important evidence of this discontent came from the pen of the famous writer and enthusiast of the dominion of the Philips: Manuel de Faria e Sousa. Furthermore, in as far as can be seen, this discomfort was reciprocal: the *hidalgos* of the Spanish fleet were not satisfied with their Portuguese contemporaries.

After the Restoration the Battle of Salvador lost importance and the ink war associated with it simply ended. This did not prevent the somewhat late but very curious contribution of Diogo Gomes Carneiro, *Brazilian and native of Rio de Janeiro*, interested in calling the nobility of Portugal to the cause of independence. This author referred to Portuguese bravery in defence of the conquests of the kingdom under Castilian dominion, citing the events in Bahia as a significant example. He stated:

“... in *Bahia do Salvador* metropole of the state of Brazil, the Portuguese, inhabitants and sons of that enlarged province, resisted the Dutch, where with fineness for so many years the new laws of war have been observed that are taught to the world, where temerity will be reduced to obligations of valour”.<sup>lx</sup>

Finally, it is worth noting that the tension between the writers about events in Salvador certainly was not noted only by the authors in question. It would be very strange to suppose that a dispute of this scope, involving illustrious writers from the two kingdoms governed by the same crown would go unperceived. From what has been outlined above, it can be imagined that the ink war was not in the eyes of readers a literary dispute in the strict sense – what was at play was the prominence of nobleness of Portugal. It is not difficult to suppose that a controversy involving the values and the capacities of the Portuguese vassals of Philip IV contained a disruptive potential in relation to the unifying potentials of the Iberian arms: furthermore, while in relation to Salvador a



large part of the chronicles showed the existence of discontent between Castilians and Portuguese, would this have occurred in a joint military action in any other part of the extensive Empire, or even in Catalonia? The risk of the cooling of the spirits of Portuguese nobility in the exercise of their traditional functions at the service of their king could be elevated.<sup>lxi</sup>

According to Stuart Schwartz, in the study already cited more than once in this paper, the government of the Catholic Monarchy perceived the problem. In light of the ongoing ink war, the Council of State of Philip IV did not hesitate to take measures aimed at calming spirits: the dissemination of accounts, chronicles and histories about events in Salvador was prohibited.<sup>lxii</sup>

As was noted at the beginning of this text, the fact that Portugal rebelled around fifteen years after the Battle of Salvador allows us to think that the problems described here reveal a political scenario that developed in an unexpected direction. However, this does not make the dynamic of nobility, which is not always recognised nor emphasised, any less expressive.

---

<sup>i</sup> The authors would like to acknowledge the support provided by CNPq for writing this paper.

<sup>ii</sup> Due to the quantity of publications already listed on previous occasions, the size of the problem can be easily gauged. In his book *Bibliografia do Domínio Holandês no Brasil*, (Rio de Janeiro: INL, 1949, p. 190-209), José Honório Rodrigues lists more than forty titles of accounts and chronicles of the Battle of Salvador. It is curious to note that the methodological researcher left aside the best known text in Portuguese in the seventeenth century, that of Padre Antônio Vieira.

<sup>iii</sup> CRISTÓVÃO, Fernando. “A luta de libertação da Bahia em 1625 e a batalha dos seus textos narrativos e épicos”. *Quinto Império*, Salvador, v. 1, n. 16, 2002, p. 79-103. This work successfully seeks to integrate contributions from outside the peninsula to the analysis. Its characterisation of the conflict of texts significantly contributed to this study.

<sup>iv</sup> SCHWARTZ, Stuart B. “The Voyage of the vassals: royal power, noble obligations and merchant capital before the Portuguese restoration of independence 1624-1640”. *The American Historical Review*, 96, 3, 1991, p. 735-62.

<sup>v</sup> Catalonia rebelled in June 1640, six months before the Portuguese Rising of 1 December. Naples revolted in July 1647.

<sup>vi</sup> The various written forms of discontent towards the domain of Castile were given the curious name of *Literatura Autonomista* (Autonomist Literature). Some studies that are now quite old sought to take this material into account, with the most notable being: Cidade, Hernâni. *A Literatura Autonomista sob os Felipes*. Lisboa: Sá da Costa, not dated.

<sup>vii</sup> A Brazilian translation of Acetto has been published recently by Martins Fontes. The most important study of this question is Villari, Rosario, *Elogio della Dissimulazione, la lotta politica nel seicento*. Bari: Laterza, 1987.

<sup>viii</sup> GUERREIRO, Bartolomeu. *Sermão que fez o Padre Bertolameu Guerreiro da Companhia de Jesus, na cidade de Lisboa na Capella Real, dia de São Thome, anno de 1623, cuja festa como de Padroeiro da India celebra, por ordem dos Reys o Tribunal daquelle Estado com offertas publicas das drogas delle*. Lisboa: Pedro Craesbeeck, King's Printer, 1624, p. 7r. The final phrase in the quotation does not lack political

---

meaning. There is an explicit ambiguity in the references to the descendents of D. Manuel. His grandchildren included Philip II, but also the other claimants of the Portuguese who had lost the dispute in 1580, including D. Catarina de Bragança, grandmother of D. João, the monarch of the restoration of the kingdom.

<sup>ix</sup> “but in this case the minor lords had the obligation to meet the needs of the King, but the fidelity of the ministers has to be considered: in order not to take more from the vassals that what the king’s needs require”. GUERREIRO, *Op. Cit.* p. 10v.

<sup>x</sup> *Idem*, p. 8v.

<sup>xi</sup> MARQUES, João Francisco. *A Parenética Portuguesa e a Dominação Filipina*. Porto: INIC, 1986.

<sup>xii</sup> OLIVEIRA, António de, *Poder e oposição política em Portugal no período Filipino (1580-1640)*. Lisbon: Difel, 1991; \_\_\_\_\_. *Movimentos Sociais e Poder em Portugal no século XVII*. Coimbra: IHES/FL, 2002.

<sup>xiii</sup> Cf in this respect the classic text, Boxer, Charles R. *O Império Marítimo Português*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002, especially pp. 120-163.

<sup>xiv</sup> SOARES, Pero Roiz. *Memorial*. Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1953, p. 466.

<sup>xv</sup> *Idem*, p. 465-75.

<sup>xvi</sup> It was noted that Fr. António de Sousa’s play performed on this occasion talked about Portugal’s conquests in the Orient and exalted D. Manuel I and the sixteenth century Portuguese grandees linked to these deeds. Cf. MIMOSO, João Sardinha SJ. *Relacion de la Real Tragicomédia com que los padres de la Compañia de Jesus em su Colégio de S. Anton de Lisboa recibieron a la Magetad Católica de Felipe II de Portugal*. Lisbon: Jorge Rodriguez, 1620.

<sup>xvii</sup> LISBOA, J. Carlos. *Uma peça desconhecida sobre os holandeses na Bahia*. Rio de Janeiro: INL, 1961. This play was published in the seventeenth century in *Comedias Novas e Escogidas*, vol. XXXIII. Madrid, 1670, p. 201-33. *El Brasil Restituido* by Lope de Veja was published several times in Spanish theatrical collections. The licence for the performance was issued on 29 October 1625, as can be seen in the study: Barreiro, José Maria Viqueira. *El lusitanismo de Lope de Veja y su Comedia “El Brasil Restituido”*. Coimbra: FLUC/Coimbra Editora, 1950, p. 217-8.

<sup>xviii</sup> ALDENBURGK, Johann Gregor. *Relação da Conquista e perda da cidade do Salvador pelos holandeses em 1624-5*. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1961.

<sup>xix</sup> *A Plaine and true relation of the going forth of a Holland fleete the eleventh of november 1623, to the coast of Brasil with the taking of Salvador, and the chief occurrences falling out there, in the time of the hollanders continuance therein. As also the coming of the Spanish armado to Salvadoe, with the beleaguering of it, the accedints falling in the towne the time of beleaguering ...* Rotterdam, 1626.

<sup>xx</sup> *A planie and true relation*, cit. p. 3.

<sup>xxi</sup> A few years before the events in Salvador, a leaflet was circulated in Paris giving news of Philip III’s trip to Lisbon, the swearing of an oath by the Portuguese Cortes to his successor and the dissimulating attitude of the Portuguese in relation to their real feelings to their Castilian king. Cf. *Le serment de fidelité faict au prince d’Espagne, à l’ouverture des Estats du Royaume de Portugal*. Paris: Nicolas Alexandre, 1619, p. 7.

<sup>xxii</sup> Guerreiro, Bartolomeu SJ. *Jornada dos vassallos da coroa de Portugal, pera se recuperar a Cidade do Salvador, na Bahia de todos os Santos, tomada pollos Olandezes, a oito de mayo de 1624, & recuperada ao primeiro de mayo de 1625. Feita pollo padre Bertolameu Guerreiro da Companhia de Jesus*. Lisbon: Matheus Pinheiro, 1625. The Jesuit who travelled with the Portuguese fleet had his book completed by October 1625, as shown in the first publishing licenses, dated 7 November.

<sup>xxiii</sup> *Idem*, pages not numbered.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Guerreiro spent seven years in the court of the Dukes of Bragança. He was the confessor of D. Theodósio and preached in the memorial services celebrated in 1630 in his memory. The sermon was published two years later: cf. Guerreiro, Bartolomeu. *Sermam que fez o R. P. Bertolameu Guerreiro da Companhia de Jesus nas exequias do anno que se fizerão ao serenissimo Principe D. Theodosio segundo Duque de Bragança em Villaviçosa na Igreja dos religiosos de S. Paulo primeiro hermitão onde o dito senhor está depositado em 29 de novembro de 1630*. Lisbon: Mathias Rodrigues, 1632. The sermon was an exalted elegy of the House of Bragança, praising in one passage its significant place in the kingdom: “Three greatnesses the Kingdom of Portugal has, since it is so small and limited, like the Roman Monarchy was once samll. First the famous city of Lisbon, head of the Kingdom filling all parts of the world with the oppulence of its trade, as if it were lord of the Ocean, which in other times it was [...] The second, the

---

conquests of the Kingdom. With the Portuguese monarchy ruling the cradles where the sun was born and the tombs where it hides from us: starting it lordship where the Roman Monarchy ended its empire [...] The third, the roya; magnificence of the House of Bragança, which follows after the Kings, and declares its intention after you, us” 26v-27r.

<sup>xxv</sup> Cf. SCHWARTZ *Cit.* p. 744-5.

<sup>xxvi</sup> Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, for example, discussing the Dutch expedition against Portuguese territories, refers to the loss and recapture of Bahia in the following terms: “A surprise attack in 1624 led to the conquest of Salvador, news of which caused great commotion when it reached the Kingdom. The following year a fleet sent by Lisbon re-captured the capital of Brazil”. Serrão, Joaquim Veríssimo. *O tempo dos filipes em Portugal e no Brasil (1580-1668)*. Lisbon: Colibri, 1994. This text was published in 1982 part of a large series on the history of Portugal.

<sup>xxvii</sup> GUERREIRO, Bartolomeu. *Jornada dos Vassalos*, *Cit.* p. not numbered.

<sup>xxviii</sup> VARGAS, Tomás Tamayo de. *Restauracion d la ciudad Del Salvador, I Baia de Todos-Sanctos, em la província del Brasil por lãs armas deDom Philippe IV, el grande, Rei Catholico de lãs Espanas, Índias etc.* Madrid: the widow of Alonso Martin, 1628, p. not numbered. This book was translated into Portuguese and dedicated to D. Pedro II by Ignacio Accioli de Cerqueira e Silva in 1847.

<sup>xxix</sup> *Ibidem*, p. not numbered.

<sup>xxx</sup> *Ibidem*, p. not numbered.

<sup>xxxi</sup> The letter was not published at that time. VIEIRA, Antônio. *Cartas*. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1997, vol. I, p. 3-70.

<sup>xxxii</sup> VIEIRA, *Op. Cit.* p. 11.

<sup>xxxiii</sup> After the invasion of Portugal by Castilian forces, Philip II summoned the *Cortes* of the kingdom in 1580. Among other items, it was agreed that Portuguese would be nominated for governmental positions both in the kingdom (with the sole exception of the Viceroy if he – or she - were a member of the Royal Family) and overseas.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> MOERBEECK, Jan Andries. *Redenen Wâeromme de West-Indisch Compagnie dient te trachten het Landt van Brasilia den Connick van Spangie te ontmachtigen en data ten eersten*. Amsterdam: Cornelius Lodewycksz, 1624. There is a Brazilian translation of this entitled: *Os holandeses no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro, 1942.

<sup>xxxv</sup> NARBONA Y ZUÑIGA, Eugenio de. “Historia de la Recuperacion del Brasil”. *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional*. Vol. 69, 1950, p. 170.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> GUERREIRO, p. 5.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> Among the numerous versions of this text, that by José Maria Viqueira Barreiro, which has already been cited, stands out. Lope de Vega’s original is accompanied by a long introduction and comments that are not always worth being considered.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Among the causes of the carelessness of Diogo de Mendonça Furtado is the fact that “the governors there came to be merchants rather than captains”, FARIA E SOUSA, Manuel de. *Epitome de las Historias Portuguesas*. Brussels: Foppens, 1677, p. 332.

<sup>xxxix</sup> *Epitome*, p. 333.

<sup>xl</sup> VALENCIA Y GUZMÁN, Juan de. *Compendio historial de la jornada del Brasil año 1625*. Recife: Pool, 1984, p.247.

<sup>xli</sup> *Compendio*, p. 251.

<sup>xlii</sup> NARBONA Y ZUÑIGA, Eugenio de. *Historia*, p.191.

<sup>xliiii</sup> VIEIRA, *Cartas*, p. 27.

<sup>xliv</sup> MENEZES, Manuel de. “Recuperação da cidade do Salvador”, *Revista do IHGB*, 1850, p. 400.

<sup>xlv</sup> *Plaine and True Relation*, p. 9.

<sup>xlvi</sup> ALDENBURGK, Johann Gregor. *Relação da Conquista*, p. 178.

<sup>xlvii</sup> ALDENBURGK. *Relação*, p. 187.

<sup>xlviii</sup> “... taking possession of the city in the name of Don Philip the Fourth, King of Spain, with the Marshal, General, his lieutenant; and the Marshal Don Juan de Orellana entering with some companies for their guard; also to guarantee what was convenient for him, both in how the soldiers behaved, as well as in what was required by the royal treasury...” VARGAS, Tomas Tamayo de. *Recuperacion*, p. 134r-v.

<sup>xlix</sup> VARGAS. *Recuperacion*, p. 134v-5r.

<sup>1</sup> *Relaçam verdadeira de tudo o succedido na restauração da Bahia de todos os Santos desde o dia, em que partirão as armadas de sua Magestade, té o em que em a dita Cidade forão arvorados seus estandartes*

---

*com grande gloria de Deos, exaltação do Rey, & Reyno, nome de seus vassallos, que nesta empresa se acharão, anihilação, & perda dos Olandezes ali domados. Mandada pellos officiaes de sua Magestade a estes Reynos.* (True report of everything that occurred in the recovery of Bahia de Todos os Santos, from the day His Majesty's fleets left until the day his standards were raised in that city to the glory of God and the Kingdom, the name of his vassals who took part in this venture, the annihilation and defeat of the Dutch who were beaten there. Sent by His Majesty's Officers to these Kingdoms), Porto: João Rodriguez, 1625, p. not numbered. The taxation date is 12 July 1625, while according to Pero Róis Soares the news of the success arrived in the capital on 6 July. The document was re-published later in Lisbon. More recently IHBG published the account in Volume 5 of its journal.

<sup>li</sup> "The capitulations having been made; the Dutch allowed entrance to the city, with the Marques de Coprani and D. João de Orelhana being the first to enter, who were not due to have entered the city, but rather Antonio Moniz Barreto, Marshal of a Portuguese tercio". GUERREIRO, *Jornada*, p. 58v.

<sup>lii</sup> GUERREIRO. *Jornada*, p. 59r.

<sup>liii</sup> GUERREIRO. p. 58/59.

<sup>liv</sup> MENEZES. *Recuperação*, p. 592.

<sup>lv</sup> MENEZES. *Recuperação*, p. 591.

<sup>lvi</sup> MENEZES. *Recuperação*, p. 592-3.

<sup>lvii</sup> VIEIRA. *Cartas*, p. 44.

<sup>lviii</sup> FARIA E SOUSA. *Epitome*, p. 335.

<sup>lix</sup> *Plaine end True Relation*, p. 20. ALDENBURGK. *Relação*: "Equally, the Portuguese had to rescue again the city of S. Salvador and pay the annual tribute in double to the Spanish treasury. ... Furthermore, the Portuguese had to rescue their old cannon from the power of the Spanish, who had badly spoiled the city, loading the ships of their fleet with Brazil wood, tobacco, sugar, spices and everything they could collect, tables, chairs, carpets and furniture", 218.

<sup>lx</sup> CARNEIRO, Diogo Gomes. *Oração Apodixica aos scismaticos da patria*. Lisboa: Lourenço de Anvers, 1641, f. 8r.

<sup>lxi</sup> Seven years after the events in Salvador, João Pinto Ribeiro published a booklet whose title highlighted the resistance to the idea of the efforts of Portuguese gentlemen in the wars of the Monarchy: *Discurso sobre os fidalgos e soldados portugueses não militarem em conquistas alheias desta coroa*, (Discourse on why Portuguese *fidalgos* and soldiers should not take part in conquests outside this Crown) Lisbon: Pedro Craesbeeck, 1632.

<sup>lxii</sup> "The council of State acted to prevent the publication before Menezes could publish his. See *Consulta, Council of State, April 1623[sic]*, *British Library, London, Egerton 324, fol. 18*". SCHWARTZ. p. 740n.