RELATIONS BETWEEN CHILE AND CANADA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. THE FIRST EXPERIENCES OF CHILEAN DIPLOMATS

José del Pozo

Abstract

Based on the reports of Chilean diplomats, this article analyzes the relations between Chile and Canada during the period in which those countries moved forward to the exchange of embassies, between 1941 and 1944. It is explained that before those years, Canada only had a commercial interest in Latin America; for Chile the diplomatic level was more important, due to its interest in reinforcing its international position, somewhat weakened since the beginning of the 20th century. The reasons that made both countries take that decision were directly related to the context of the Second World War. Once the embassies were opened, the impressions of the first representatives of Chile in Ottawa are commented about what Canada was, showing the difficulties to understand the functioning of a country quite different from Chile. This article concludes that on the short run the establishment of embassies did not produce a significant increment of relations neither on a commercial nor on a political level.

Before the Second World War

The relations between Chile and Canada, the two extremes of the Americas, had begun at the end of the 19th century in an asymmetrical and irregular way. On the diplomatic level, Chile made its first steps when Máximo Patricio Morris was named honorary consul in Vancouver in 1892. In 1897 his rank was raised to consul general though not becoming a career official. This nomination was due to the private initiative of Morris, a Chilean of north-american origin who had moved to that western city of Canada. The presence of a certain number of Chilean citizens in that area, most of which were seamen who had deserted, justified the presence of an honorary consul that served those people as translator and sent news to their families in Chile when any of these Chileans passed away. Besides this consulate, Chile had representatives in other parts of Canada although they were always Canadian citizens who also acted on a voluntary basis. The correspondence between Morris and the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to a certain Ovide Fréchette, consul in Quebec since 1885, also to Carlos (sic) Waterous, consul in Brantford (Ontario), named in 1907, and to Francisco José de Lima (whose nationality is not mentioned), consul in Montreal, named in 1923.
These facts indicate a certain interest from both countries to maintain some link but we lack information to know what the job of those persons was and the kind of relations it implied.

At the beginning of the 1930s the general consulate was moved to Montreal. This was an important change since now a career officer was named for the job, while the Vancouver consul remained on a volunteer basis, now manned by Heriberto José Morris, son of the former. We ignore what happened with honorary consulates of the other cities.

Until the beginnings of the Second World War, Canada did not have a diplomatic representative in any Latin American country, not even at a consular level. This situation can be explained by the particular condition of Canada within the British Empire, since Canada left most of its foreign affairs in the hands of the British representatives. Only in 1928 did Canada establish embassies in Washington, Paris, Tokyo and in 1931, with the Westminster Statute, does Canada assume the full conduction of its foreign policy. The absence of Latin American representatives can also be explained by the lack of specialized personnel in that region, and by the shortage of funds of the Canadian diplomatic service.

On the commercial level, the contacts between both countries existed, but they were limited and the balance was largely favorable to Canada. According to the report of Arturo Bascuñán, Chilean consul in Montreal from 1929 to 1931, Canada had sold goods to Chile worth over two million dollars per year, amount that fell violently in latter years because of the crisis. The exports from Chile to Canada were very inferior in worth, since in 1930 the total was US$667,000, amount which also decreased in the following years; in 1933, the total was only US$21,000. Bascuñán deplored that Canada did not buy a single liter of Chilean wine, unknown in the Canadian market, while buying wine in 1933 for over a million dollars worth from France, Spain and other European countries. Moreover, he pointed out that from the beginning of the crisis, 87% of the Canadian saltpeter imports came from the United States, while before 1930 Chile sold 30,000 tons a year of that product to Canada, an amount that was reduced to only 51 by 1933.

Until the beginnings of the Second World War, there was little interest on Canada´s side to tighten links with Latin America. In 1939 Canadian exports to this region represented only 1.8% of its worldwide sales while imports from Latin America amounted to only 2.8% of the total. The trip of a Canadian commercial mission which visited Cuba, Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina in 1931 and also stopped at Trinidad and Bermuda, had not brought any concrete results. It was a private initiative formed mainly by entrepreneurs of the manufacturing area. The government participation was limited to the presence of George Perley, minister without portfolio, who accompanied the delegation to give it a more official character. This was only the second trip of its kind; the first had occurred in... 1866.

On the diplomatic level, besides lacking diplomatic representatives in that region, Canada had shown no interest to enter the Pan-American Union, an organism created in 1889, but rather concentrated its relations with Great Britain, France and the United States. There were, however, certain political sectors interested in stretching links with Latin America, like the well known politician and journalist Henri Bourassa in the
Quebec province, who in 1915 contended that an association with that region would permit Canada to better confront the imperialist tendencies of the United States. Other politicians that also favored the entrance of Canada in the Pan-american Union were Paul Martin (father of the present Prime Minister) and J.S. Woodworth\(^7\). But this was a minority sector and Canada took decades before deciding to enter the inter-american system in 1989.

On the migration level the contacts were minimal. There was a certain number of Chileans in the west coast of Canada who were pushed by a current that started in the 19th century - mentioned earlier in this article - but the full number of Chileans was surely very small and there are no statistics to this respect\(^8\). Anyway, in those years Canada had no interest to promote the immigration from Latin America and most of the immigrants came from Western Europe. Inversely, the only Canadian presence in Chile came from the clergy, some of them present in the country since 1850\(^9\), but it was a very limited process.

The new conditions created by the war

The conflict initiated in 1939 created a new context, both diplomatically and commercially. Canada was the first country of the Americas to enter the war as part of the Commonwealth. This put Canada in an ambiguous position within the hemisphere since, by not being a member of the Pan-american Union, it was not invited to the Panama Meeting, at the end of that year, where the other countries of the Americas discussed policies to be followed in the new era initiated by the war. This led Ottawa to think over the need to approach its neighbors in the south. Moreover, disturbances in the European commerce made it necessary to look for new markets. This last consideration was also true for Latin American countries, which saw Canada as a possible buyer for their products.

Brazil and Argentina were the first countries considered by Canada to establish new embassies. Brazil had started making contacts to that goal before the beginning of the war\(^10\) and the selection of both countries was justified by their demographic and economic weight; besides, the presence in Argentina of many people of German and Italian origin, suspect of collaboration with the Axis, made it necessary to have diplomatic personnel in that country to be informed of the possible maneuvers of the enemy.

Many other Latin American nations sought to obtain the same treatment. Almost simultaneously, Ottawa received petitions from Cuba, Chile, Peru and Mexico that expressed their wish to exchange embassies. They all wanted to have a visible presence in Canada, mainly for commercial goals.

The latter was also the main Canadian objective, since it saw Latin America mainly in market terms, not as a political ally. Thus, in 1941, an important commercial mission headed by the Secretary of Commerce James MacKinnon, visited six Latin American countries: Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, signing commercial treaties in almost all of them. At the beginning of 1942, when the results of this trip were discussed at the Parliament in Ottawa, the Representative Paul Martin, as was seen earlier, was among those who wanted Canada to enter the Pan-american Union and emphasized the importance of developing political relations - not only commercial
relations - with Latin America, especially considering the war context and the possible Nazi influence in those countries. It is worth mentioning his intervention, since it gives the image Canada had of Latin American countries. Speaking of the postwar period, Martin declared that a Canada - Latin America approach would additionally permit an approach between Great Britain and the United States, Canada and Latin America, desirable and necessary because “although Pan-american (sic) countries up to a certain extent ignore the democratic methods and the principle of a fair judicial process, they have great sympathy for the democratic regime. The political system of Pan-american countries recognizes equality of races and admits that preserving democracy is something desirable”.

Canada appointed ambassadors in Argentina and Brazil by mid 1941, W.F.A. Turgeon and Jean Désy being its first representatives in those countries. Chile was not yet considered at the same level even though the southern country wanted to obtain diplomatic recognition.

The Chilean approach

To better understand the Chilean interest in establishing diplomatic relations with Canada on an embassy rank, the complete situation of the Chilean foreign policy must be envisaged. On the eve of war, Chile had long abandoned its expansionist policy of the end of the 19th century, a period in which it had exercised a certain regional leadership, even expressed in military, naval and territorial power due to its victory over Peru and Bolivia in the war of 1879 - 1883. In the first decades of the 20th century, after being exceeded by Argentinian naval power (and demographic weight), Chile rather tended to a policy of maintaining the *status quo*. To that purpose it impelled the formation of a block with Argentina and Brazil which was called the “ABC”. This group had a certain international renown, expressed in the participation of the ABC at the Niagara Falls negotiations (Canada) over the withdrawal of north-american troops from Veracruz during the Mexican revolution in 1914. But the block soon decayed due to the lack of Brazilian interest in maintaining it, although it occasionally revived in later years. In general terms, Chile oriented its policies by its respect to international legislation either within the inter-american system or in the Society of Nations.

When war broke out, Chile was in a weak position at the international level. The attempts of Arturo Alessandri’s government to reinforce the war fleet had failed, due to the refusal of the British government to sell war ships (in spite of a long tradition of friendship and naval influence in Chile). The earthquake of January 1939 had devastated many cities of Central and Southern Chile, causing the death of 30,000 people, but also imposed budgetary changes which had an effect on the diplomatic service, where 40% of the personnel was discharged. The presence of a relatively large population of German origin made the Allies regard Chile with a certain suspicion, which was aggravated at the beginning of 1942, when Chile was the only country, with Argentina, not to follow the decisions of the Rio de Janeiro Conference recommending its participants to break relations with the Axis countries. And, in general, Chile suffered war reverses on the economic level, possibly in a larger measure than other countries in the area, because of Germany’s importance as a commercial partner before the war.
All of these reasons explain the Chilean interest in exchanging embassies with Canada, and doing it before other countries of the region, like Peru, also interested in the same goal, since that would increase chilean international prestige and give the country commercial advantages. Therefore, by the end of 1940, the Chilean consul in Montreal, Luis Feliú, initiated conversations in this respect. An interesting fact: one of Feliú’s arguments, used in a memorandum he sent to the Canadian Prime Minister, said that the establishment of diplomatic relations between both countries would allow Chile to maintain the “ABC”\(^{16}\). Chilean postulation got the support of the United States: President Roosevelt wrote Ottawa suggesting that Canada gave Chile its diplomatic recognition, which would be beneficial for all democratic forces\(^{17}\). Canada partly fulfilled this wish by giving Ambassador Tuergeon, first Canadian representative in Argentina, an accreditation for Chile in September 1941. The government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King based its decision saying that the member countries of the ABC should be treated on an equal basis, which allowed Canada to postpone the recognition of other Latin American countries that were not in that same situation\(^{18}\). Chile responded this decision by increasing its diplomatic corps in Canada. Beginning July 15, 1942, the Chilean representation passed from consular rank to Legation, whose head, Eduardo Grove\(^{19}\) had the rank of Special Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister. There were career consuls in two cities, Luis Feliú in Toronto and Enrique Bustos in Montreal, while in other two cities there were honorary consuls, Heriberto Morris in Vancouver and Juan Vega in Quebec. By the end of 1942 Canada also established a permanent legation in Santiago headed by Warwick Chipman. The way to the exchange of embassies was thus prepared, which finally happened in June 1944 when consul Grove became the first Chilean ambassador in Canada.

So, from 1942 onwards there was a stable Chilean diplomatic corps with career officers. From their correspondence we can extract information not only about the main Chilean objectives in Canada, but also get an idea about the vision those officers had of the country they were beginning to know.

Before analyzing that correspondence, it is timely to know the conditions in which those officers operated. The activities of the Chilean diplomatic personnel were met with very scarce material means. In 1943, Grove informed the Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister that he could not pay the chancelor’s wages\(^{20}\) so he had to fire him; after two months he hired another one. Of the US$308 he disposed of for the expenses of the Chancellery, $120 were for the salary of the secretary-interpreter, an expense that was impossible to elude since “here are no secretaries that know Spanish and the few there get immediately hired”. Grove thought that he needed at least $500 for monthly expenses since “during the winter months, social life in Ottawa is very intense and any dinner or cocktail has to be reciprocated”\(^{21}\). These complaints are constantly repeated in the correspondence of ambassadors and consuls in the following years. A linguistic problem must be added here, since not all of the personnel at the Chilean embassy had a good languages proficiency: in 1946, Grove’s successor Pedro Castelblanco asked Santiago for another secretary since the one he had at the time spoke no English, which kept him isolated. The ambassador suggested that the secretary be sent back to Chile\(^{22}\). We can suppose that, apart from anecdotal aspects, the Chilean representatives were not in the best conditions to know their new milieu, which can in some way influence their reports to Chile.

The objectives of Chilean diplomacy in Canada
The first objective was to make Chile known. Very often the Chilean diplomats spoke of the interest that certain Canadians had (individually or in groups) to be informed about Chile. One of them was André Patry, of the Geographic Society of Laval University, who asked for information about Chile to write an article. In this same letter it was explained to the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry that there were two associations dedicated to Latin America, the “Canada-Amerique Latine Association” among whose leaders was Marcel Rousseau, and the “Association Canadienne Inter-Americaine”, headed by a General Escobar whose nationality was not specified, in which different companies and universities participated. Edouard Montpetit, a well known frenchspeaking intellectual, was its vice-president. The Chilean representatives also aimed at making friendships with journalists; the consul in Montreal, Enrique Bustos, pointed out that the city newspapers had emphasized our “national day” and had referred to the visit of consul Grove to that city, where he had met “a good friend, Cross, of the Morning Star.”

Another objective was to distinguish the Chilean policy of neutrality during the war from a support for the Axis countries. Feliú wrote in 1942 that the Canadian press had published a note according to which the Chilean government had accepted German diplomatic protests, prohibiting insults against Hitler. Feliú added that he supposed that this measure applied to all leaders of the countries in war; in which case, he said it is “urgent to correct” what the Canadian press expressed. But the next year, in 1943, Grove informed he had defended the Chilean policy of delaying a break with the Axis, adding that the Canadian press had behaved in a very understanding manner, showing a “very respectful attitude.” In fact, Chile was perceived as a country that, though being neutral, could contribute to the cause of the Allies. The Czech legation in Ottawa often addressed its Chilean equivalent to ask the government in Santiago to hand out visas to Czech soldiers who had been fighting in France so they could move from there to a neutral state. The Chilean consul was of the opinion that a positive answer should be given to this demand, arguing that most of these fighters “were young and well prepared in crafts and professions.” This matter came up often in the correspondence, and the Czech legation informed that “none of the evacuated would be a burden to the Chilean treasury,” Minister Grove was of the opinion that Chile should support this petition for humanitarian reasons and explained that this could be done through the Chilean consul in Spain, where many of the Czech had managed to arrive, but we do not know what the Chilean answer actually was.

The third objective of the Chilean representation was to increase Chilean exports and to receive certain key imports from Canada. In relation to the former, wine was among the priorities. Chile wanted to penetrate the Canadian market, but there were many obstacles. A letter sent to the legation by Chilean Wines Registered, a society based in Ottawa, explained that a tax of 10 dollars per gallon of wine charged by Canada for Chilean wines was deadly for the exports, since French wine was only charged half as much, and wines coming from the British Empire only paid 3 dollars. The commercial treaty signed in 1941 between Canada and Chile had not solved that problem. The company asked the legation that Chile should require the same tariff as French wines had. Another report mentioned that the problem derived from the United States, since those had to grant a special transit permit for Chilean wines so they could reach Canada. And when Chilean wines got there, sometimes they did not meet the quality standards that had been announced. Feliú complained to exporters Gibbs and Co., saying that old wines had been offered and that the label did not specify the harvest date; according to
him, this ruined two years of efforts to promote Chilean wines in Canada\textsuperscript{31}. The problem remained without a real solution all through the war.

Chile was also interested in securing some imports from Canada, key elements for certain activities. Among them, the dispatch of 350 monthly tons of asbestos, vital to produce high pressure pipes which were required by a Chilean enterprise, the Pizarreño Industrial Society. Another element was wood pulp and paper for journals, so restricted that the Minister for Industry and Commerce excused himself to Grove, saying they were not even sure to be able to meet the demands from the United States\textsuperscript{32}.

The main Chilean worry in economic matters was the end that Canada would give to its saltpeter manufacturing plants, created during the war because of the need to produce explosives. Chile asked itself whether these would be continued after the war, arguing that if this occurred, it would mean a severe blow to the Chilean economy and would cause unemployment. According to the Canadian representatives, they “understood” the Chilean worries, but could not assure that these plants would no longer operate, “we will see if they are justified in times of peace”\textsuperscript{33}. The subject continued being an uneasiness for Chile, and it was addressed by President Juan Antonio Ríos during his short stop in Canada at the beginning of September 1945.

Canada’s vision by Chilean diplomats

Canada appeared as a curious country to the Chilean representatives, different from all others in America, with unparalleled peculiarities. In his 1943 memoir, when speaking of the internal political situation in Canada, Grove speaks of a “complex and illogical country”, independent and not independent at the same time, lead by a monarch that was an abstract entity, represented by a governor that does not govern. National unity was somewhat difficult, due to “the superposition of races that have not been able to melt, as they did in the United States”, and which continue cultivating their differences. According to him, the Anglophones did not mix with immigrants from other origins and many of the newcomers lived separately, among them Ucranians. Grove believed that because of this, “Canada has not as yet given proof of its creative potential, not in literature or music, nor in art or in architecture”. He nevertheless thought that its participation in the war would contribute to national unity.

Grove dedicated a paragraph especially to the French-Canadians who at that time represented 31% of the total population. He said that “biologically, these people are superior to France to day…they grow but do not assimilate, and they multiply very quickly, constituting the biggest preoccupation to the Anglo-Canadians, and it is one of the greatest obstacles to the fulfillment of the national unity”\textsuperscript{34}. He also pointed out the influence of the Catholic Church and explained that before the war there had been an important spreading of fascist ideas; at the University of Montreal there were Franco supporters. At a socio-economical level, his picture was that of an almost feudal society: “There are industries in Quebec, but there are also rural areas where people make their own bread, their wines, knit their clothes and live in a semi-patriarchal way, dedicated to their small handicrafts…it is a very simple way of life, far from civilization and especially from the increasing Americanization…” (underlined by me). He also said that the economic inferiority of the French-Canadians is a fact that will surely have repercussions\textsuperscript{35}. He concluded this section by explaining that this part of Canada is
interested in “us” since “they consider themselves Latins”, many learn Spanish and sympathize with the fact that, as for them, Catholicism is important in Latin America.

Returning to the situation of Canada in the international scene, Grove thought that pan-americanism “gives Canada great doubts”, since they do not want to take sides in an eventual conflict between the United States and Latin America. Another obstacle was the Canadian adherence to the Commonwealth, since it is hard to be loyal to two organizations, as was seen at the beginning of the war. Canada has little knowledge about Latin America, but that will change in the future, with the commercial treaties that have just been signed with different South American countries. There will be more commercial possibilities, but “we are barely on the mutual discovery stage”36.

For Chile, the relation with Canada was very important because of the role Canada could play in the United Nations. Chile expected that Canada would cooperate in giving Latin America a role of some importance in the new structure of the organization. In that respect, a series of letters of Humberto Díaz Casanueva, secretary of the Chilean embassy, speak for themselves when he informs of interviews with Canadian public officials. In one of them he informed that according to these officials, the members of the Security Council should be countries that could make “an effective contribution” to the maintenance of peace37, which did not leave much room for countries such as Chile. More importantly, in a session of Parliament, Mackenzie King had talked about “medium-sized powers” that should have a more relevant role in the U.N., among which he mentioned Australia, the Netherlands or Brazil. Díaz commented on this intervention, saying it was “dangerous and disappointing” for Latin America, adding that if that thesis was imposed “we would not only have the United States on top of us but also Brazil or Argentina”, which would leave Chile in an “inferior and degrading” situation. He also complained about Canada’s lack of interest to enter the pan-american movement, saying that “it is also disappointing to think that Canada so far reveals no vital interest in approaching the pan-american system. During the course of the present debate it has been proved that Canadians have a worldly but not a continental conscience”38.

Conclusion

The contacts between Chile and Canada were activated with the Second World War, but they did not bear much fruit in the short run. On the commercial level, Chilean exports to Canada passed from 0.6 million in 1945 to 1.4 in 1950 and then decreased to 0.3 in 1955, while the Canadian imports, which were worth 2.6 million Canadian dollars in 1945 increased to 6.9 by 1950 but decreased to 3.8 in 195539. In other words, the commercial balance was still very favorable to Canada as in the years preceding the war of 1939 - 1945 and, in general, the exchanges between the two countries represented very low percentages of the total volume. On a political level, the contact with Canada did not bring any important changes in the Chilean diplomatic decisions, partly because of Canada’s refusal to enter the pan-american movement and later the Organization of American States, and by the excessive weight of the United States in the hemispheric system. An example of this was the long trip that President Juan Antonio Ríos made throughout the Americas between September and October 1945, with three weeks dedicated to travel through the United States and only two days to Canada, a visit in between his travels through the USA. It gives the impression that Ríos’s short stay in Ottawa (he was also a few hours in Montreal) was somewhat improvised, because when
the Chilean president arrived in Canada he was not received by the Prime Minister nor by the Governor General, as they both had other commitments.

Besides, the Canadian opinions did not seem to be very important, as attested by an official letter sent by the Chilean ambassador in Ottawa to Santiago by the end of 1945. In this letter, it was said that the Canadian newspapers commented that the plans of the United States to assure the hemispheric defense meant a “gigantic plan to establish political and military leadership over the whole continent”, which was positively regarded by Canadian officials. This, as is known, did not hinder the Chilean participation in the Inter-American Mutual Defense Treaty of 1947.

This situation can be explained by the contradictions of the Canadian foreign policy in relation to Latin America during the Cold War. Among others, one can point out the contradiction between the objective of promoting democracy in Latin America and, at the same time, by all means try, to contain the advance of groups that could favor communism. Or between the goal of diminishing inequalities and the absence of bilateral aid programs. Besides, Canada’s involvement in OTAN left less resources to help Latin American countries. Finally, the minimal presence of migrations between both countries was another negative factor, as was the total absence of studies about Canada in Chilean universities. A long time would pass before Canada gave more importance to its relations with Latin American countries and for Chile to act likewise in respect to Canada.

- History Department, University of Quebec, Canada. E-mail: josdelpozo@hotmail.com

1 Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile (from now on AMRE), official letters n. 67, Aug. 6, 1912, n.139, Oct.14, 1921, and n. 94, Dec. 7, 1923.


3 AMRE, official letter 1, May 18, 1935.

4 Ibid.


6 This was partly motivated by the attitude of the United States, that did not want Canada to enter the pan-american movement because that might improve the British influence in the hemisphere. Rochlin, James: Discovering the Americas. The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America. Vancouver, 1994, 13.

7 Ibid.

8 The reports of the Chilean consul mention a few cases of Chileans in Vancouver, while no reference to the presence of Chileans in that city is found in the reports of the Montreal consul.

9 In 1851, a group of nuns from Montreal on their way to western United States had arrived in Chile. They remained in the country at the request of Manuel Montt’s government to look after orphaned children in the Divine Providence shelter. The best known of these nuns was Sister Bernarde Morin, who remained in Chile for the rest of her life, dying at the late age of 100 years in 1927. A street in Santiago is named after her.
10 Murray, “Canada’s First Diplomatic…” loc. cit., 121.

11 Parliamentary debates, Feb.27,1942, 950, French version.

12 I here follow Emilio Meneses’analysis, Coping with Decline: Chilean Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century, 1902-1972. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Trinity Term, 1987. This author indicates that Chile hesitated in joining this latter organization since this might become a platform for the Bolivian territorial claims.


14 In spite of this, Washington did not develop a hostile policy towards Chile, arguing they understood the reasons for its attitude, based on the fear of a Japanese attack; instead, the Argentinian attitude was perceived under a much more negative light.

15 Between 1936-1938, Germany had received about 10% of the annual Chilean exports, while 26% of the Chilean imports came from Germany. Figures cited by Joaquín Fernandois, in Abismo y cimiento. Gastavo Ross y las relaciones diplomáticas entre Chile y Estados Unidos, 1932-1938. Santiago, Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1997, 186.

16 Murray, Canada’s First Diplomatic… loc. cit, 164. According to this author, the maneuvers of consul Feliú were not at all well received by Ottawa, that considered those as an act of personal benefit since Feliú argued that he was the right person to be the first Chilean ambassador in Canada. The argument of belonging to the ABC was quite weak, since the existence of this block was somewhat doubtful at this point.

17 Cited by Ogelsby, Gringos... op. cit., 48. Roosevelt obviously thought that the diplomatic recognition of Chile by Canada would accelerate the break up of this country with the Axis.

18 Murray, “Canada’s First Diplomatic… “ loc. cit., 168. Here is clear that the quite fictitious existence of the ABC was a well fitted argument both to Canadian and Chilean diplomacy. Peru protested this decision arguing that it was a country equal, if not superior to Chile.

19 Grove, a medical doctor, was the brother of Marmaduke, Air Force officer founder of the Socialist Party and senator at the time here analyzed.

20 The position of “chancelor” is that of a person who replaces the consul. It is not a career diplomat, and can be any person that has the trust of the consul. An interesting anecdotic fact: the person hired by Grove was Mario Harrington, of Cuban nationality, because he “speaks three languages and has good contacts” (AMRE, Memoria anual de Grove, 1-4-43, 2), which gives a measure of the small number of Chileans that lived in Canada at that time.

21 AMRE, Grove to the Minister, Dec.27, 1944.

22 AMRE, Castellblanco to the Minister, official letter 198/7, Apr. 29, 1946.


24 AMRE, letter of consul Bustos, Aug.21, 1942.

25 AMRE, official letter 3637, June 18, 1942, Feliú to the Minister.

26 AMRE, Memoria… 5.

27 AMRE, Official letter of Feliú to the Minister, n. 942, undated, 1942.

29 *Ibid.*, official letters 6404, Nov.18, 1942, Grove to the Minister.

30 AMRE, Letter to the legation, undated, year 1942.

31 AMRE, Feliú to Gibbs, Feb.19, 1943.

32 Letter of the Minister to Grove, Dec.13, 1943.

33 Letter of N.A.Robertson, of the Dept. of External Affairs, to Grove, Oct. 21, 1944.

34 Memoria of Apr. 1, 1943, 10.


37 Confidential official letter, Jan. 25, 1945, Díaz to the Foreign Affairs Minister of Chile.


39 Rochlin, *Discovering the Americas*, op. cit., 238 to 241.

40 AMRE, confidential official letter n. 39, Nov.3, 1945, the Minister to ambassador Mora, in Washington.


Translated by Daniela Joana Rubens Flatow
Translation from *Historia* vol.1 n.38, Jan./June 2005 p.31-42